On 12 Feb 2014, at 17:55, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, February 12, 2014 11:23:14 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 12 Feb 2014, at 13:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, February 12, 2014 5:19:38 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 11 Feb 2014, at 22:13, Craig Weinberg wrote:
"Explanation, unlike causation is not just of an event but of an
event under a description. An explanation must show why it was
likely than an event of that type occurred." - Thomas Nagel
This quote applies to my rejection of Comp since Comp does not
explain why there is any such type of thing as qualities which are
felt, seen, heard, etc, only that there are gaps in what can be
understood about how machines logically operate.
This alludes to the gap G* minus G, but not Z* minus Z, which is
the one corresponding to the UDA FPI.
I think that it alludes to the gap between all conceptual
expressions (including G*, G, Z*, Z, and all other letters of the
alphabet) and actual experienced qualia.
But that is exactly the error that you are doing. You confuse the
machine fingers (G*, Z*, etc.) toward the moon (sense, observation,
etc.) with the moon.
I'm saying that the machine fingers are just pointing at each
other's blind spot,
Yes. But that's your perpetual begging of the question.
and you're calling it the moon because it can't be proved that it
isn't.
No. I call it the moon because it concerns varieties of things that
the machine tell me about her, and that she is already aware that she
cannot justify them to me, and the logic of those are already close to
logic already proposed to describe qualia, and quanta.
You confuse a theory (part of the machine discourse), and what the
theory is about. You don't listen, and your prejudice that they
don't think a priori explains probably why.
I don't think that the theory is about anything but itself.
<sigh>
Craig
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
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