On 26 Oct 2013, at 19:09, Jason Resch wrote:
John,
I came across this today, which you might find of interest:
http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9709032v1.pdf
In particular section 3 goes to great pains to describe the
importance of the first person / third person distinction. From the
paper:
A. "It doesn't explain why we perceive randomness"
Everett's brilliant insight was that the MWI does
explain why we perceive randomness even though the
Schrodinger equation itself is completely causal. To avoid
linguistic confusion, it is crucial that we distinguish between
* the outside view of the world (the way a mathematical
thinks of it, i.e., as an evolving wavefunction),
and
* the inside view, the way it is perceived from the
subjective frog perspective of an observer in it.
Therefore, the 1st / 3rd person views are not just some obscure
aspect of Bruno's theory that is unknown or unused in any other part
of science, it is critical in other theories of science too. You
dismiss it as "pee pee" and that is what prevents you from arriving
at the correct conclusion, I think. If you take into account the
first person "inside view" or "frog perspective", you get a
different result than when you use only the third person "outside
view" or "bird perspective".
Your confusion regarding the third step has nothing to do with
pronouns or personal identity, it is purely due to a focus on only
the objective perspective when the experiment calls for use of the
subjective perspective.
Exactly.
Now, to nitpick a little bit, I would not conflate bird/frog and 3p/
1p, as bird/frog gives a feeling that it is a question of scaling,
where in fact it is, arguably in both QM and computationalism, a
question of entanglement or isolation. In comp, entanglement being
simply defined by entering, or not, in the telebox. Both in UDA and in
AUDA, the 1p/3p distinction is precisely defined.
Bruno
Jason
On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 1:59 PM, John Clark <[email protected]>
wrote:
On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 12:27 PM, Quentin Anciaux
<[email protected]> wrote:
>> In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who "you" is
because however many copies of "you" there may or may not be they
will never meet
> What does it have to do with prediction and probability ?
In the MWI if John Clark is asked for a prediction or a probability
or anything for that matter about "you" further clarification is not
needed, in a thought experiment involving people duplicating
machines it is.
> you refuse to let work your brain while you doesn't do *as you
should*
You doesn't well speak.
John K Clark
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