On 16 Mar 2014, at 14:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:40:49 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Mar 2014, at 23:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:
http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/
Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_)
Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any
computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self
awareness?
The computational reason is that there is no computation at all
there. There is no self-representation, no introspection in the
computer science theoretical sense.
How do you know though?
I don't know.
I assume it.
This is the same argument that I give for machines, except I am
saying that there is no introspection in the sense of aesthetic
phenomenal sense.
Where you confuse []p and []p & p.
Before Gödel, it was thought they would obey the same logic, when the
machine is correct. But after Gödel, we know that they obey different
logic, even when the machine is always correct.
The aesthetics phenomenal sense comes from the machine keeping its
umbilical chord with truth, which is natural for her to do, as it
exists, even if relatively.
Maybe the VCR is just very young compared to the machines that you
are used to considering as capable of self-representation - indeed
the jumpy screen artifacts correlate perfectly with the events that
are impacting the VCR's body. Notice how each operation performed on
the 'VCS' (VCR + Camera System) generates a unique vocabulary of
responses on the screen. Why not assume that these are intelligent
cries which reflect specific mechanical emotions. If we reproduced
the experiment on a variety of similar devices, we could probably
deduce a mathematical schema - a language through which VCS' talk
about themselves and their environment. We could interview them and
see whether they follow computationalist expectations for UMs or LUMs.
OK, but why would they not. You speculate on some analog machines, and
you speculate on an analog theory of mind. That might be more
interesting than assuming sense. You would make a theory of sense from
a non comp theory of machines. Go for it.
There is an interesting analogy, as the computational self-reference
leads to similar fixed points, but the analogy stops there. The VCR
is like a mirror, with some dynamical delay similar to a computer
self-reference, but it lacks the computations. Simply.
I think that you would have to be telepathic to say with certainty
that it lacks computations, just as I would have to be telepathic to
'know' that a machine is not a p-zombie.
Oh, but if there are computations, I apologize. just show them to me.
Keep in mind that with comp, a "material object like a mirror" does
not really exist, it is a map of your most probable future experience
among infinitely many: it is a "wave" of possible computations
(arithmetical relations, in our base). It is a common and sharable
*experience*.
Your argument is that the VCS is a an m-zombie. A mechanical zombie
which only seems to respond to its own condition as if it were a
machine's 1p.
By definition, a zombie acts like you and me. The mirror does not act
like you and me.
My sun in law does. He can discuss with you on consciousness, zombie,
mind, brain, philosophy and also gastronomy, he works himself as a
chef, actually. He makes money with his nose.
But let me think, when was my last discussion on culinary art with a
mirror, hmm .... ?
Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way have a greater
chance of developing that awareness than those which have not?
No.
Not when you have ruled out their right to compute from the start ;)
You can compute with a ruler, a compass, but with a mirror you can do
only simple symmetries, and dilations. Now, with many mirrors, it is
different, especially if you can make them transparent and reflecting
by a switch, then you can made them computing, by placing them in the
right places.
With quantum semi-mirror you can do quantum computations.
If not, what initial conditions would be necessary for such an
awareness to develop in some machines and how would those initial
conditions appear?
The VCR lacks the numbers, the digital information. It lack
retrievable memories, and well, the whole universality/Löbianity
stuff.
Maybe its just very quiet about it. Any argument that you have used
against my objections to computationalism can be used as effectively
here to your objections to sub-computationalism.
Well, if sub-computationalism is correct, then computationalism is
correct. It is just that one mirror does not compute much more than
addition or multiplication, but it can't do both, and lacks the
ability of a universal machine.
There is a notion, in computer science, of sub-universality, and sub-
creativity, which is indeed where I think consciousness arises, if
comp is true. It has the speed-up abilities of the universal
(creative) machines (sets), but is closer to the tractable.
I rarely mention this, as it is more technically involved, and not
really important for most of our topics. Here is a good book(*).
Bruno
(*)
http://www.amazon.ca/Subrecursive-Programming-Systems-Complexity-Succinctness/dp/0817637672
Craig
The VCR just singles out one aspect of digital machine self-
reference, but lacks the main part: the computations itself.
How would those initial conditions appears? You can derive them from
the laws of addition + multiplication.
Bruno
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