On Sunday, March 16, 2014 12:05:50 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 16 Mar 2014, at 13:52, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:41:30 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 16 Mar 2014, at 05:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> >> On Saturday, March 15, 2014 7:00:48 PM UTC-4, Edgar L. Owen wrote: >>> >>> Craig, >>> >>> Hmmm, let me see. If I just take my eye out of its socket and turn it >>> around then I guess by your theory I'd have self awareness? >>> >> >> It's not my theory, but does computationalism provide a reason why your >> eye looking in the mirror doesn't have self-awareness? >> >> >> The mirror does not compute. >> > > How do you know you're not being racist against mirrors? > > > > Did I ever say something bad about mirror? >
You're saying they don't compute. Just as I say your sun in law doesn't appreciate the flavor of food. > I have no clue they are intensional agent, but if they ask I will oblige. > If you hold up a sign that says 'I am an intensional agent' in backward letters, you will see that they turn them around so you can see what they are. > Mirror will also evolves, and the intelligent digital mirror can > anticipate on you, or show you with another cut, or some brain scan. > > You know that I assume comp, so it should just be obvious to you that > mirror have not the ability of universal computation. > I thought that you are agnostic about comp. How do you know that the mirror doesn't have the ability of universal computation though? Maybe they are just very shy about it? Maybe the mirrors of today are just babies? > Even the Dx = F"xx" method alone, seen as a control structure, alone, or > even some generalization of it, are not Turing universal. Consciousness is > the attribute to the first person, it is phenomenal, and there is nothing > in a mirror which a priori invites us to such an attribution. > The VCR+camera do invite such an attribution though. > I tend currently to attribute consciousness at the Turing complete level, > and self-consciousness at the Gödel-Löbian one, like when a K4 reasoner > becomes when he visits the Knave Knight Island, or when a universal Turing > machine develops beliefs in enough induction axioms. > > Now, if your theory attributes consciousness to a mirror, and not to my > sun in law, it will look even less convincing to me, Craig. > I don't attribute consciousness to either one, I present the VCR example as a reductio ad absurdum against comp. Craig > > > > > Craig > > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Edgar >>> >>> >>> >>> On Saturday, March 15, 2014 6:09:27 PM UTC-4, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> <https://31.media.tumblr.com/935c9f6ad77f94164442956d8929da19/tumblr_mncj8t2OCc1qz63ydo10_250.gif> >>>> http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/ >>>> >>>> Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_) >>>> >>>> Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any >>>> computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self awareness? >>>> Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way have a greater chance >>>> of developing that awareness than those which have not? If not, what >>>> initial conditions would be necessary for such an awareness to develop in >>>> some machines and how would those initial conditions appear? >>>> >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
