On 17 Mar 2014, at 22:28, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, March 17, 2014 2:18:58 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Mar 2014, at 17:50, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I'm mirroring back to you what my impression is of what you say to
me. I say it is obvious that machines are impersonal, cold,
mechanical, and that it is obvious that sophisticated technology
can be developed that will make them seem less mechanical without
actually feeling anything. Your response has been that I'm only
looking at machines that exist now, not the more advanced versions.
I see no significant between the two arguments, except that mine is
facetious. You say that there is no reason why certain kinds of
computations could not produce consciousness, and I say there is no
reason why certain kinds of configurations of mirrors or cameras
couldn't produce computation.
You go from a mirror to a configuration of mirror. I discussed that
case.
I am comparing the argument against zombies in comp with your
argument against the VCR. I see a double standard in comp which is
very left wing in presuming equality with living creatures,
?
The "argument against zombies" presume equality for equal behavior.
Your "theory" single out the living.
but very right wing in presuming lower status for phenomena in which
computation is not apparent.
Behavior is not apparent.
Because you believe that comp associate consciousness to machine/
bodies, or to behavior, despite I have explained many times this is
not what comp does. Consciousness is an attribute of a person, which
own a body (well, infinitely many bodies).
Then the explanatory gap is moved from mind/brain to person/
computation, with no improvement on bridging it.
On the contrary, computation handles both the first and third person
reference and this by using only the existing standard definition (of
knowledge, etc.). It lead to a mathematical theory of qualia, and of
quanta, 100% precise and this testable, and indeed partially tested.
You make affirmation just showing that you are not studying neither
the posts nor the papers.
Then by assuming "sense", sorry, but that does just not make sense to
me, unless you mean God,
God has to make sense too.
That is a reason more to not invoke "sense" in a scientific
explanation. You just make your case worst.
Your "theory" seems to be only an opinion that another theory is
foolish.
Not at all. My attack on CTM is only part of MSR because MSR seeks
to pick up where CTM leaves off. The theory is about the relation of
sense, information, and physics, and about the spectrum of sense,
not just about pointing out the mistake of comp.
But you did not succeed in showing where CTM leaves of. You just beg
the question, or play with words.
You seem unable to doubt, as I have shown the remarkable coherence,
with respect to comp, of your phenomenology, with the one made by
the first person associated naturally to the machine, by applying
the oldest definition of knowledge to machines, and it works thanks
to a remarkable, and non obvious double phenomena: incompleteness
and machine's understanding of incompleteness.
This is one of your points that I find the most flawed, and I have
explained why many times. If we are both machines under comp, how
can you say that my view is consistent with the stereotypical
machine views if your view is not?
By the tension between []p and []p & p. It explains why the "comp
truth" is counter-intuitive fpr the machine.
You would have to be placing yourself above me arbitrarily
No, I have just to assume comp.
and escaping your own 1p machine nature somehow.
Yes, we have to that, but that is the case when we attribute 1p to
others. Comp explains why the machine is wrong about comp, from the 1p
view. And the machine can understand, and find by itself, that
explanation.
Why doesn't Bruno machine succumb to incompleteness and his
understanding of incompleteness?
I do. That's why I insist that comp asks for a non trivial leap of
faith, and we are warned that comp might be refuted. Without the
empirical evidences for the quantum and MWI, I am not sure I would
dare to defend the study of comp. It *is* socking and counter-intuitive.
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
