On 17 Mar 2014, at 22:20, [email protected] wrote:

So....did anyone's ToE predict this outcome?

I am not sure you are 100% serious on this, but the question is very interesting, so I will make some comments, which might not been taken 100% seriously.

At first, we might say that any evidence that something is finite hereby already look like a refutation of comp, and this basically at the start, by taking seriously the FPI on *all* true sigma_1 sentences (which I recall somehow emulate the universal dovetailing). So, the apparent existence of a finite past might be a trouble for the computationalist hypothesis, below the substitution level, a first person plural reality should look like a superposition of more and more ever "possible states", up to the still possible inflation of "white rabbits".

What restricts, possibly the inflation is the non triviality of the logic of relative self-referential universal numbers. Basically, the intensional variant ([]p & p, []p & Dt, []p & Dt & p, with Gödel's arithmetical beweisbar predicate, and p for the sigma_1 arithmetical sentences (which I recall are the sentences of the type ExP(x), with P a decidable predicate. Being able to prove all true sigma_1 sentences is computably equivalent with being Turing universal).

Comp would have preferred, so to speak, a confirmation of brane collisions, or supersymmetries, but to be be 100% serious, at least one second, all this is still way above what comp can decide: open problems. Gathering information on a possible local physical beginning might gives us clues on the first person plural sharable substitution level, or of the depth (in Bennett sense of "intrinsically long computation") of our cosmologies and cosmogonies. Beginning or beginnings?

Now classical computationalism and mathematical logic, and number theory, can be many years late compared to physics, that's sure, but it might be a bit slightly in advance in theology. Certainly in machine theology. In the platonist sense of "theology" where "God = Truth" at some "G*" level (the machine should not say that "God = Truth", for example: but we can see it for simple machine we can trust, and study their theology).

Advantage of comp: it does not eliminate the first-person, the knower, the soul. On the contrary it attaches one to any universal number, with varying induction powers, and it provides a role in the emergence of laws and illusions. But the UDA shows that the quantization H -> e^iH has to come from that first person (plural) view, notably from p - > []<>p, with [] being the intensional variants of the beweisbar [], and much work remain to be done.

Comp is not a solution, comp is a problem. I give the beginning of the solution to illustrate the problem.
Oops, I am 110% serious here, sorry!

Bruno



On Monday, March 17, 2014 9:14:00 PM UTC, Kim Jones wrote:
Inflation appears now to be evidenced




http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/gravity-waves-cmb-b-mode-polarization/?utm_source=hootsuite&utm_campaign=hootsuite
============================

Kim Jones B.Mus.GDTL

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