I think the argument usually goes like this: Suppose there's an infinite ensemble of the computations that include a mental state that remembers having been you as you are now. There are a lot of details needed to support such a mental state. Let's say it takes a minimum of N bits. Longer programs in the universal dovetailing may contain smaller subroutines, so we might expect that a given N-bit subroutine is twice as dense as a given (N+1)-bit subroutine. In consequence, we would expect our subsequent mental states to find themselves well explained by the simplest compatible program, and [insert handwaving here] the Big Bang with subsequent inflation is that simplest compatible scenario.
You can also translate the above from terms of "computations" to terms of "mathematical structures" or if you prefer a different ToE ontology. You can probably also translate into physicalist terms given the right kind of infinitely varied physical multiverse. Any ontology that you can wrangle into being isomorphic to computation should do, I suppose. In any case: yeah, it's a wonderful post-hoc rationalization, not science. Nobody's deriving real testable predictions from it yet. If we're lucky it's proto-science and maybe someday we can make it science. -Gabe On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 11:32:59 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 17 Mar 2014, at 22:20, [email protected] wrote: > > So....did anyone's ToE predict this outcome? > > So, the apparent existence of a finite past might be a trouble for the > computationalist hypothesis, below the substitution level, a first person > plural reality should look like a superposition of more and more ever > "possible states", up to the still possible inflation of "white rabbits". > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
