On 19 Mar 2014, at 18:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 5:02:15 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Mar 2014, at 22:28, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, March 17, 2014 2:18:58 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Mar 2014, at 17:50, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I'm mirroring back to you what my impression is of what you say to
me. I say it is obvious that machines are impersonal, cold,
mechanical, and that it is obvious that sophisticated technology
can be developed that will make them seem less mechanical without
actually feeling anything. Your response has been that I'm only
looking at machines that exist now, not the more advanced
versions. I see no significant between the two arguments, except
that mine is facetious. You say that there is no reason why
certain kinds of computations could not produce consciousness, and
I say there is no reason why certain kinds of configurations of
mirrors or cameras couldn't produce computation.
You go from a mirror to a configuration of mirror. I discussed that
case.
I am comparing the argument against zombies in comp with your
argument against the VCR. I see a double standard in comp which is
very left wing in presuming equality with living creatures,
?
The "argument against zombies" presume equality for equal behavior.
Your "theory" single out the living.
I don't single out the living, I discern between directly
experienced histories and generic information.
A chance! (comp too)
Our histories just so happen to follow the
biological>zoological>anthropological branch, but I would not expect
any kind of proprietary experience to be possible to emulate with
generic information.
My fault, perhaps. I suppose people to get well the 1p and 3p person
notion, at step 2 of the UDA already. Then I indulge myself in
shortening, like saying that a machine can think (be conscious), where
I always mean it in the sense of comp: that is the bet, or act of
faith, in a level of description of my"body" so that a digital
emulation would preserve my first person experience, with the normal
"probabilities" conserved.
But the "proprietary experience" is NOT "generic information". (except
perhaps in some "God's eyes", but not hereby).
That would be a confusion between []p and []p & p.
UDA illustrates the difference in some intuitive way, and just
arithmetic justify how correct machine *already* knows the difference,
once they have the introspective ability []A -> [][]A, like PA, ZF,
and many other "theories/machines/numbers".
but very right wing in presuming lower status for phenomena in
which computation is not apparent.
Behavior is not apparent.
Why not?
For a 3p unknown creature, we have to be cautious in denying first-
personality and consciousness, but by default we can stay trivially
agnostic.
If we can suspect computations indeed somewhere, like a mobile for
example, then why not enlarge the opening to such an attribution,
indeed.
Because you believe that comp associate consciousness to machine/
bodies, or to behavior, despite I have explained many times this is
not what comp does. Consciousness is an attribute of a person,
which own a body (well, infinitely many bodies).
Then the explanatory gap is moved from mind/brain to person/
computation, with no improvement on bridging it.
On the contrary, computation handles both the first and third person
reference and this by using only the existing standard definition
(of knowledge, etc.). It lead to a mathematical theory of qualia,
and of quanta, 100% precise and this testable, and indeed partially
tested. You make affirmation just showing that you are not studying
neither the posts nor the papers.
The gap is still there.
But with comp it acquires 8 mathematical descriptions, some explicit
in terms of the Z* \ Z, X* \ X, inheritated from the Gödel-Solovay
"gap" G* \ G.
The gap vanishes only in the outer God's point of view (Arithmetical
truth), and curiously enough, in the first person point of view (the
inner God, the soul).
Your "sense" fits well the machine's soul (S4Grz, []p & p, the inner
God, the soul).
Math offers no first person theory of computation,
I offer you a counter-example on a plate.
More precisely, a theory of the soul (and matter) based on
computations (motivated by the computationalist assumption).
You just ignore it, or refute it with straw man argument, or begging
the question.
nor third person theory of qualia,
For qualia, you get them in X1* \ X1.
it only correlates the *idea* of first and third person perspectives
(devoid of aesthetic content)
No, you are wrong here: it is not devoid of the "aesthetic content",
unless the theory is shown wrong, but the basic theory of knowledge
used is independent of comp, and it applies to many arithmetical non-
machine entities (like PI_1 complete set, which are like some kind of
little gods, having abilities surpassing all universal machines).
with the idea of knowledge (again, semantically flattened into maps).
You confuse the map and the territory, here. Comp makes this, but
explicitly at some level, and I agree this is quite counter-intuitive.
Then by assuming "sense", sorry, but that does just not make sense
to me, unless you mean God,
God has to make sense too.
You make your case worth, here. You cannot invoke "god" in a
scientific explanation (even in theology, that is when talking about
god), but then you can't a priori invoke something "larger" than God,
like your "sense" apparently.
That is a reason more to not invoke "sense" in a scientific
explanation. You just make your case worst.
Science is tradition within sense. Sense is the reality.
Amen.
Your "theory" seems to be only an opinion that another theory is
foolish.
Not at all. My attack on CTM is only part of MSR because MSR seeks
to pick up where CTM leaves off. The theory is about the relation
of sense, information, and physics, and about the spectrum of
sense, not just about pointing out the mistake of comp.
But you did not succeed in showing where CTM leaves of. You just beg
the question, or play with words.
CTM leaves off in failing to account for the presence of aesthetic
qualities.
You are wrong. Comp is based on those presence, and after UDA it gives
a procedure to derive a theory of everything, a theology, which
typically distinguish in each views the possible aesthetic qualities,
and the discourse about them. Machines are troubled by them too, but
eventually, they can understand where the trouble come from, like, in
a nutshell, the confusion between truth, proof, knowledge, and all the
many nuances that we can see brought by introspection
It provides for no presence, no motivation, no proprietary novelty,
etc.
You must study the theory before judging.
It takes sense for granted and mistakes its own shadow for the truth.
You seem to take sense for granted. I show that computer science
refute Socrates' critics of the Theaetetus.
The oldest theory of knowledge is redeemed by computer science.
You seem unable to doubt, as I have shown the remarkable coherence,
with respect to comp, of your phenomenology, with the one made by
the first person associated naturally to the machine, by applying
the oldest definition of knowledge to machines, and it works thanks
to a remarkable, and non obvious double phenomena: incompleteness
and machine's understanding of incompleteness.
This is one of your points that I find the most flawed, and I have
explained why many times. If we are both machines under comp, how
can you say that my view is consistent with the stereotypical
machine views if your view is not?
By the tension between []p and []p & p. It explains why the "comp
truth" is counter-intuitive fpr the machine.
If we have opposite intuitions, and we are both machines, how can
you claim that comp would be counter-intuitive to one of us and not
the other?
?
On the contrary, that is a point where I agree with you the most (at
some antipode of John Clark which believes that comp is trivially true).
I cannot imagine something more counter-intuitive than comp. And the
more you study it, the more counter-intuitive it is.
So it is counter-intuitive to both of us. Indeed, my point is that
comp is quasi unbelievable, with quite strange and shocking
consequences, (but may be not more shocking than QM Everett, or no
more shocking than Plotinus, which, of course, might be shocking for
an Aristotelian, that is "shocking" is cultural).
But jumping from a plane, especially on the first time, is a counter-
intuitive act. Your left brain says everything is OK, you have a
parachute, no problem, and your right brain says just no; I will never
jump; I am not crazy.
You infer from your intuition that comp is false. But counter-
intuition is not "refutation". I am aware that saying "yes" to the
doctor is quite a jump, with basically irrversible consequences for
all fundamental fields.
And, thanks to comp-uter science, this raises a lot of interesting
problem in logic, math, physics, etc.
You would have to be placing yourself above me arbitrarily
No, I have just to assume comp.
But if comp is counter-intuitive to me, then it must be counter-
intuitive to you -
Yes. As far as we are self-referentially correct, comp has to be
counter-intuitive, and possibly wrong.
but clearly it is not counter-intuitive to you because you are able
to assume comp.
Yeah, that 10 years of observation and self-identification with
protozoans, then the description of the "mechanics" in Molecular
Biology. There are string 3p evidence for comp, and actually no
evidences at all for non-comp (perhaps even not enough for having comp
true: it is testable).
It is counter-intuitive, and the mode of reasoning is counter-
intuitive too, be it with the duplication thought experiences, or with
the mathematical dx = F"xx" method. But special relativity is counter-
intuitive too, QM is also (whatever "interpretation" you prefer).
Then comp helps to see that machine already understand (in some
precise sense) the difference between the non 3p definable first
person "aesthetic", and anything 3p definable.
When you say that a machine has no first person experience (is a doll,
a zombie), you confuse the []p and []p & p views of the machine.
You are calling on a super-intuitive definition of your own mind
which you are assuming that I am not using as well. I have assumed
comp myself, but just as you transcended naive realism, I have
transcended the sophisticated counter-realism that you are
defending. I'm telling you that there's no way out from inside, you
have to manually reclaim the immediacy and authenticity of sense in
order to see the limits of comp.
Comp put a limit to the number of bits you need to "keep stored" to
survived. The first person "I", is already not a machine, in the
engineering 3p sense. It is a owner of "[]", its 3p body-code-relative-
universal-numbers. The first person "I" has no name or description.
But it can bet on some one, and the evidences are that "nature"
already made the bet for us.
and escaping your own 1p machine nature somehow.
Yes, we have to that, but that is the case when we attribute 1p to
others. Comp explains why the machine is wrong about comp, from the
1p view. And the machine can understand, and find by itself, that
explanation.
Why would the machine be wrong about comp first, but right about it
later?
It is a bit like children, which begin by saying "Toto is thirsty",
and later says "I am thirsty".
We don't feel the split in the duplication, and we lost ourselves up
to the point of confusing who we are and our bodies. It is easy, even
for a correct machine to confuse []p and []p & p, for onesef, like
Toto, or for the other "machine", like you did above.
Why doesn't Bruno machine succumb to incompleteness and his
understanding of incompleteness?
I do. That's why I insist that comp asks for a non trivial leap of
faith, and we are warned that comp might be refuted. Without the
empirical evidences for the quantum and MWI, I am not sure I would
dare to defend the study of comp. It *is* socking and counter-
intuitive.
It's not shocking at all to me. For me it's old news.
Not to me, and I don't take anything for granted. I assume comp, and
this includes elementary arithmetic, enough to explain Church's thesis.
What is shocking and counter-intuitive is that the nature of
consciousness is such that there is a very good reason why
consciousness is forever incompatible with empirical evidence.
Again, you talk like Brouwer, the founder of intuitionism (and a
solipsist!), also a great guy in topology. Well, the easiest way to
attribute a person to a machine (theaetetus) provides S4Grz, (the
logic of []p & p) which talks like Brouwer too, and identify somehow
truth and knowledge, and makes consciousness out of any 3p description.
And you are right on this, again. It *is* a theorem of comp.
I hope you try to follow the modal thread, as it will help you to put
sense on that last sentence. But there is some amount of work to do,
and you have to be willing to change your mode of arguing, going from
your []p & p to the usual "scientific and 3p" []p.
Bruno
Craig
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