On Sunday, March 23, 2014 4:49:48 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 22 Mar 2014, at 19:35, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > Continued... > > On Saturday, March 22, 2014 4:54:41 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 21 Mar 2014, at 19:43, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, March 21, 2014 4:44:20 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 21 Mar 2014, at 02:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> >> I don't think logic can study reality, only truncated maps of maps of >>> reality. >>> >> >> >> Whatever is reality, it might not depend on what you think it is, or is >> not. >> > > Of course, but it might not depend on logic or computation either. > > > > It depends on the theory we assume. >
You don't see the double standard there? > > > > > > >> >> >> I do. That's why I insist that comp asks for a non trivial leap of faith, >>> and we are warned that comp might be refuted. Without the empirical >>> evidences for the quantum and MWI, I am not sure I would dare to defend the >>> study of comp. It *is* socking and counter-intuitive. >>> >>> >>> It's not shocking at all to me. For me it's old news. >>> >>> >>> Not to me, and I don't take anything for granted. I assume comp, and >>> this includes elementary arithmetic, enough to explain Church's thesis. >>> >>> >>> I don't take arithmetic for granted. >>> >>> >>> >>> Then you have no tools to assert non-comp. >>> >> >> Why not? I assert sense. Computation need not even exist in theory. >> Computation arises intentionally as an organizational feature - just as it >> does on Earth: to keep track of things and events. >> >> >> Question begging. >> > > If an explanation falls out of the hypothesis, why is it question begging? > > > Because it does not justify at all why comp has to be wrong. It justifies > only that comp might be wrong, and is unbelievable, but this is already > derivable from comp. > The fact that there may be no way to justify that comp has to be wrong does not mean that comp is in fact not wrong. The fact that it is unbelievable is not as persuasive as the numerous specific examples where our expectations from comp do not match, and indeed are counter-factual. > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> What is shocking and counter-intuitive is that the nature of >>> consciousness is such that there is a very good reason why consciousness is >>> forever incompatible with empirical evidence. >>> >>> >>> Again, you talk like Brouwer, the founder of intuitionism (and a >>> solipsist!), also a great guy in topology. Well, the easiest way to >>> attribute a person to a machine (theaetetus) provides S4Grz, (the logic of >>> []p & p) which talks like Brouwer too, and identify somehow truth and >>> knowledge, and makes consciousness out of any 3p description. >>> >>> >>> Truth and knowledge, []p & p...these things are meaningless to me. All I >>> care about is what cares. Truth and knowledge care for nothing. >>> >>> >>> I was beginning to suspect this. But then why still argue? >>> >> >> Because consciousness is what cares. >> >> >> >> Truth or knowledge of consciousness only can make sense of this. >> > > Consciousness includes knowledge of itself by definition. > > > No, that self-consciousness. > That would be knowledge of the self. You don't need to know that you are 'you' to know that there is an experience 'here'. > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> And you are right on this, again. It *is* a theorem of comp. >>> >>> I hope you try to follow the modal thread, as it will help you to put >>> sense on that last sentence. But there is some amount of work to do, and >>> you have to be willing to change your mode of arguing, going from your []p >>> & p to the usual "scientific and 3p" []p. >>> >>> >>> I think that it's you who should try paddling away from the shallow >>> waters of modal logic and truth and surf the big waves of sense. >>> >>> >>> Why do you judge something shallow, and at the same time confess not >>> studying this. It makes you look rather foolish, and wipe o >>> >> >> I'm not trying to be an expert in sailing to China from Italy. I'm trying >> to show whoever is interested that there is another continent or two in the >> way. >> >> >> The other continents has been found, and you don't need to invoke sense >> other than at the metalevel. If not, what you do is the persisting hulman >> error to invoke God in science. It cannot work.It makes science into >> pseudo-religion. >> > > It has nothing to do with God or religion for me. > > > I said that your use of sense is like the use of god, in the gap-god type > of explanation. You use "sense" to forbid the study of some theory. You > justify "don't ask" by invoking a private feature. > I don't forbid the study of anything. I applaud AI research, including Strong AI Singularity variety. I'm not one of those who sees interviews with Kurzweil or Moravec (who I met once, btw), and says 'Deluded fools'. To the contrary, I think it's a little sad maybe that they will probably not see their ideas fulfilled, but as long as they are not demanding people to say Yes to the doctor, I have no problem. My problem is if we want to discover the deep truth about awareness, we need the most perfect form of what I call a philosophical vacuum to begin with. We cannot assume arithmetic or mind or information. We can't assume anything except for the presence of experience and participation in it. If we fail to begin from the absolute beginning, then we wind up reifying that which as already been reified. I am only doing to mechanism what mechanism does to materialism. The private feature that I am invoking is privacy itself. > > > It's about grounding physics and mathematics in aesthetic sense. This does > help explain ideas of God and religion, but that is completely optional. I > find your fear and prejudice toward this possibility interesting. > > > > I am open to the possibility, so you are wrong. > How do you know you are open to it? > But I wait for evidences or justification, > There is no less evidence or justification for what I propose than there is for comp. > but the way you proceed confirms it is only a prejudice, which > unfortunately makes you not studying the domain. So you are just stucking > yourself in some (negative) personal opinion. That is hardly convincing. > Sorry. > You introduce many relevant differences and nuances, but apply them only > to humans, > I don't apply anything at all to humans. I only work with qualities of sense. > and forget them despite I try to explain that machines already do these > distinctions. But you don't listen to them invoking that you have already > made your opinion, so ... well, you build your own mental prison. > Machines do not distinguish aesthetic qualities, nor do they care about doing so. Craig > > Bruno > > > > > > Craig > > > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Craig >> >>> ... >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
