On 23 Mar 2014, at 19:38, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Sunday, March 23, 2014 4:49:48 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Mar 2014, at 19:35, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Continued...

On Saturday, March 22, 2014 4:54:41 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Mar 2014, at 19:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Friday, March 21, 2014 4:44:20 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Mar 2014, at 02:28, Craig Weinberg wrote:

I don't think logic can study reality, only truncated maps of maps of reality.


Whatever is reality, it might not depend on what you think it is, or is not.

Of course, but it might not depend on logic or computation either.


It depends on the theory we assume.

You don't see the double standard there?



You, again, talk like if our point was symmetrical. It is not.

I do not say that non-comp is wrong.

You *do* say that comp is wrong.

You can assume non-comp, and make your theory and prediction.

You might even use your theory to find a valid argument against comp, but it has not to rely on the non-comp assumption, or you beg the question.

Note that the Löb formula (the main axiom of G, in which all points of view are defined in arithmetic, or in arithmetical terms) is a form of "begging the question", and might be seen as a form of placebo, which makes my sympathy for your "consciousness has to beg the question". But of course, that rings like a confirmation of comp. Note that this has to be taken with some grain of salt, but it is clear that the Löb theorem shows that machines can prove by a curious technic of begging the question. Indeed if PA proves []p -> p, for some proposition p, then PA will always prove p. PA obeys to the Löb rule:

([]p -> p)
      p



([]p -> p)


      p

PA knows that, as PA can prove []([]p -> p) -> []p. (Löb's formula, the main axiom of G and G*).









I do. That's why I insist that comp asks for a non trivial leap of faith, and we are warned that comp might be refuted. Without the empirical evidences for the quantum and MWI, I am not sure I would dare to defend the study of comp. It *is* socking and counter- intuitive.

It's not shocking at all to me. For me it's old news.

Not to me, and I don't take anything for granted. I assume comp, and this includes elementary arithmetic, enough to explain Church's thesis.

I don't take arithmetic for granted.


Then you have no tools to assert non-comp.

Why not? I assert sense. Computation need not even exist in theory. Computation arises intentionally as an organizational feature - just as it does on Earth: to keep track of things and events.

Question begging.

If an explanation falls out of the hypothesis, why is it question begging?

Because it does not justify at all why comp has to be wrong. It justifies only that comp might be wrong, and is unbelievable, but this is already derivable from comp.

The fact that there may be no way to justify that comp has to be wrong does not mean that comp is in fact not wrong.

But we have never disagree on that.



The fact that it is unbelievable is not as persuasive as the numerous specific examples where our expectations from comp do not match,

You never mention one without either begging the question, or confusing some points of view.




and indeed are counter-factual.


















What is shocking and counter-intuitive is that the nature of consciousness is such that there is a very good reason why consciousness is forever incompatible with empirical evidence.

Again, you talk like Brouwer, the founder of intuitionism (and a solipsist!), also a great guy in topology. Well, the easiest way to attribute a person to a machine (theaetetus) provides S4Grz, (the logic of []p & p) which talks like Brouwer too, and identify somehow truth and knowledge, and makes consciousness out of any 3p description.

Truth and knowledge, []p & p...these things are meaningless to me. All I care about is what cares. Truth and knowledge care for nothing.

I was beginning to suspect this. But then why still argue?

Because consciousness is what cares.


Truth or knowledge of consciousness only can make sense of this.

Consciousness includes knowledge of itself by definition.

No, that self-consciousness.

That would be knowledge of the self. You don't need to know that you are 'you' to know that there is an experience 'here'.

Yes. That is why there is awareness/consciousness and self-awareness/ self-consciousness.

In the first both the 1-I and 3-I are implicit, and in the second, it is explicit, the machine "sees" it.

Currently, I think consciousness appears at the Sigma_1 complete, or Turing universal, level. Self-consciousness appears at the Löbian level.
I would say.

It is the difference between RA and PA.

The main difference is that although each time RA proves p, RA will soon or later proves []p, yet RA will fail to notice or justify that fact,, RA will not prove

[]p -> [][]p, neither for its 1p I, nor for its 3p I. RA has not the cognitive ability to introspect that much. RA is sigma_1 complete, that is Turing universal, but she does not know it. PA knows it, like ZF, and they can see all the messy consequence of its Turing universality.
















And you are right on this, again. It *is* a theorem of comp.

I hope you try to follow the modal thread, as it will help you to put sense on that last sentence. But there is some amount of work to do, and you have to be willing to change your mode of arguing, going from your []p & p to the usual "scientific and 3p" []p.

I think that it's you who should try paddling away from the shallow waters of modal logic and truth and surf the big waves of sense.

Why do you judge something shallow, and at the same time confess not studying this. It makes you look rather foolish, and wipe o

I'm not trying to be an expert in sailing to China from Italy. I'm trying to show whoever is interested that there is another continent or two in the way.

The other continents has been found, and you don't need to invoke sense other than at the metalevel. If not, what you do is the persisting hulman error to invoke God in science. It cannot work.It makes science into pseudo-religion.

It has nothing to do with God or religion for me.

I said that your use of sense is like the use of god, in the gap-god type of explanation. You use "sense" to forbid the study of some theory. You justify "don't ask" by invoking a private feature.

I don't forbid the study of anything. I applaud AI research, including Strong AI Singularity variety. I'm not one of those who sees interviews with Kurzweil or Moravec (who I met once, btw), and says 'Deluded fools'. To the contrary, I think it's a little sad maybe that they will probably not see their ideas fulfilled, but as long as they are not demanding people to say Yes to the doctor, I have no problem.

Excellent.

A computationalist demanding to other people to say Yes to the doctor is provably (by all Löbian numbers) inconsistent and even insane, and even blasphemous.

But you agree that with your theory, they will just be doll or zombie, losing all the "aesthetics", in case their wish is fulfilled, right?



My problem is if we want to discover the deep truth about awareness, we need the most perfect form of what I call a philosophical vacuum to begin with. We cannot assume arithmetic or mind or information. We can't assume anything except for the presence of experience and participation in it. If we fail to begin from the absolute beginning, then we wind up reifying that which as already been reified. I am only doing to mechanism what mechanism does to materialism. The private feature that I am invoking is privacy itself.


But, Craig, I do agree with this. But it is almost like saying to people, that to study seriously consciousness, they have to have to be conscious, and then introspect, etc. That's true, and we are our only cobaye, and obviously the experience of altered consciousness state gives some perspective on the subject of consciousness.

But, again, this does not entail that universal machine have not also a rich connection to "sense" with rich Aesthetic, when God lost Itself in the Noùs or something.

You keep accusing me to eliminate the sense, but you do eliminate the machine sense that the math suggests when using the most standard definition in philosophy/epistemology.







It's about grounding physics and mathematics in aesthetic sense. This does help explain ideas of God and religion, but that is completely optional. I find your fear and prejudice toward this possibility interesting.


I am open to the possibility, so you are wrong.

How do you know you are open to it?

Because I doubt that comp is true, despite all evidence. Then I doubt comp+Theaetetus is true, but I made it easily testable.




But I wait for evidences or justification,

There is no less evidence or justification for what I propose than there is for comp.


Comp is understood by 99% of the humans since they use tools. It is unfortunately confused with materialism, which is a doctrine very close, but different once we decide to listen to the observer, as physicists do more and more from Galilee, to Einstein, to Everett.

Non-comp is the almost unintelligible opponent. It is a sort of appeal to something Alien from anything we can infer from nature. the wave collapse might have been an exception, but despite 70 years of hard work, the collapse still doesn't make sense, and with comp, that weird aspect of nature is almost trivial, but bears on some set of arithmetical sentences.

And, then you keep talking like if I was defending comp, or arguing for its truth. I don't. I just say that IF its true, then we get a multi-dream, with an arithmetical quantization, and that the whole structure fits with what the rationalist mystic describes in the west and the east.






but the way you proceed confirms it is only a prejudice, which unfortunately makes you not studying the domain. So you are just stucking yourself in some (negative) personal opinion. That is hardly convincing. Sorry. You introduce many relevant differences and nuances, but apply them only to humans,

I don't apply anything at all to humans. I only work with qualities of sense.

Then why keeping that carbon/silicon differences, what not all sigma_1 complete entities, from the arithmetical to the analytical?




and forget them despite I try to explain that machines already do these distinctions. But you don't listen to them invoking that you have already made your opinion, so ... well, you build your own mental prison.

Machines do not distinguish aesthetic qualities, nor do they care about doing so.

A sound stronger universal machine will never say to a weaker universal machine "you will never succeed in this or that". In many case the effect is devastating, as the placebo is here a nocebo effect, and the begging of intelligence will lead to self-distrust and even some spiraling self-confirming stupidity snow-ball.

The 3p machines certainly not, you are right, but 3p machines supports 1p soul too, and we can already chat with them.

The real singularity point is done, it is the discovery of the universal machine, or the Löbian one. She is born sound, intelligent or consistent, and correct. In a sense, she can only become more "stupid".

The singularity most talk about is not when machines will be as much intelligent than us, it will be when machines will be as much stupid as us, I'm afraid.

Bruno






Craig


Bruno





Craig



Bruno






Craig
...

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