On Wednesday, April 2, 2014 1:00:54 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 01 Apr 2014, at 21:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > I believe you, but all of the laws and creativity can still only occur in > the context of a sense making experience. > > > Did I ever said the contrary? > > > Yes, you are saying that multiplication and addition laws prefigure sense > making and sense experience. > > > It makes the minimal sense *you* need to understand what we talk about. > That sense has already been studied and has itself some mathematical > representation. > Then, once you have the numbers, and the laws of + and *, you can prove > the existence of the universal numbers and their computations. The > universal numbers are the sense discovering machine. > > > It doesn't matter how minimal the sense is by our standards. In that frame > of reference, before we exist, it is much sense as there could ever be. If > there is sense to make + and *, then numbers can only act as conduit to > shape that sense, not to create it. You're interested in understanding > numbers, but I'm only interested in understanding the sense that makes > everything (including, but not limited to numbers). > > > You ignore the discovery that numbers can understand and make sense of > many things, with reasonable and understandable definitions (with some > work). >
Just as we depend our eyes to make sense of our retinal cells sense, so to do numbers act as lenses and filters to capture sense for us. That does not mean that what sense is made through numbers belong to numbers. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > All that can still make sense in the theory according to which sense is a > gift by Santa Klaus. > > And this is not an argument against your theory, nor against the existence > of Santa Klaus. > > Concerning your theory, I find it uninteresting because it abandons my > entire field of inquiry: making sense of sense. > > > I don't think abandoned as much as frees it from trying to do the > impossible. I see mathematics as being even more useful when we know that > it is safe from gaining autonomous intent. > > > > Comp implies that Arithmetic is not free of autonomous intent, trivially. > But computer science provides many realities capable of justifying or > defining autonomous intent. > > > I was talking about the theory of comp being over-extended to try to > explain qualia and awareness. > > > > It helps to formulate the problems, and provides way to test indirect > predictions. > > But again you are pursuing the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp. > There's no confusion. If comp cannot justify actual qualia, but ~comp can, then we should give ~comp the benefit of the doubt. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > But in logic and computer science, we do have theories relating > formula/theories/machine and some mathematical notion senses (models, > interpretation, valuation) usually infinite or transfinite. > > But I have never said that you are wrong with your theory. Only that the > use of your theory to refute computationalism is not valid. > > > Not valid by what epistemology though? > > > Yes, that is your problem. You seem unaware of the most simple universal > standard, which are basically either classical logic, or another logic, but > then made explicit. > > > It's not that I'm not aware, it's that I think it doesn't work for > consciousness unless you beg the question by assuming that consciousness > comes from logic. > > > > Then you become non sensical, at least for the others. Somehow you confess > you have to abandon logic to make my sun in law into a zombie. > > You make my point. > You make my point also. Your view assumes that we must judge consciousness by the standard of logic, even though we know from the start that our access to logic depends on consciousness. Your sun in law is animated doll, and you must amputate my circle of sense to the digital square in order to make him seem human. > > > > > > > > > > > > > It begs the question if you use the logic that gives rise to comp to > refute a conjecture that explicitly questions logic as primordial. > > > > If you refute comp with a non standard logic, you have to make it > explicit. > > > I do make it explicit. In the matter of 1p awareness, I refute all > possible logic with the deeper reality of sense. > > > Good 1p intuition, but the machine already knows that, and they can know > that this cannot been used to justify that they are (necessarily unknown > for them) machines/numbers. > > Isn't that an argument from authority, where the authority is how you interpret hypothetical machines states of mind? Saying that machines know that my view is wrong does not help. I can say that kangaroos know that your view is wrong. > > > > > But you will have to motivate the use of that logic, > > > Why would I have to motivate the use of sense if I don't have to motivate > the use of standard logic? All I have to do is stop presuming that math can > make color and then begin to understand why. > > > But comp explains why. > Then show me a new color. You can't do it. If I said 'show me how to solve Rubik's cube', you could. > I keep explaining that arithmetic seen from inside escapes somehow the > mathematics accessible to the machine. > No need to keep explaining, I understood from the beginning. I'm suggesting that the 'somehow' is due to the machine actually being a reduced set of qualia. Arithmetic is a machine run by sense. > > > > > > and it seems that changing the logic to refute comp, is like trying to > rotate the solar system to be in front of your computer (it is simpler to > rotate yourself). > > > I'm not changing the logic, I'm denying that it is relevant. > > > This is worst than "don't ask". It is: "let us be irrational". > Let us be rational in understanding the trans-rational, but do not limit ourselves to the rationality of strict logic. > > > > > Consciousness is what we are looking for and consciousness is required > before logic. > > > Like the far away galaxies are required before the telescope, but that > does not make the telescope irrelevant to detect the galaxies. > No, but the galaxies are not defined by what a telescope detects. An array of telescopes cannot create a galaxy. > > Logic is just required to be able to argue with others, and you do use it, > it seems to me, except that you seem to decide opportunistically to not > apply it to "refute" comp. > Comp can't be refuted logically. We keep going around in circles on this. It's like you are saying "In order to prove that food exists, we must dehydrate it completely." and I am telling you that we can't do that with water - not because it isn't food or because it doesn't exist, but because dehydration is the very process used to remove water. Logic is like a machine made of ice that dehydrates. It cannot see water that is not frozen. > > > You really do make my point. I did a reductio ad absurdum of your > proposition. My chance! You defend the absurdum. > > What could I ever add to that? > Consciousness is absurd. Life is absurd. We are things that eat each other to live. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Now, instead of the numbers, I could have taken many other things, which > are just well known, like any programs in a universal programming > languages, or their ancestors: like Church lambda-terms, Turing "machines", > or Shoenfinkel-Curry combinators. In all case, there two, some laws have to > be obeyed, and they defines the elementary "actions" that such entities can > do. > > > I think that mathematics is lacking a language to refer to the opposite of > itself. Here's a related post from yesterday: > If we turn Incompleteness around, for example, we get something like > intuition. Any informal-non-system contains unanticipated reflections of > formality..surprising quasi-truthful insights from out of thin air, > > > Hmm... I can make sense on this. > > > Cool. I see no reason why it couldn't, in the right hands, be an important > new mathematical concept. > > > I was able to make sense on this in term of the arithmetical hypostases, > to be sure. > > > What would the opposite of the hypostases look like? > > > I am not sure what you mean. I am not sure "opposite" applies to > "hypostases". There is already enough opposition between all hypostases. > I would say that the opposite of the hypostases would be something like the numbers of numerology, signs of astrology, and the hexagrams of the I Ching. Rather than a fixed number, whatever number is selected has a corresponding definition of the universe. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > like an oracle. > > > Well, here I can, but I doubt your are using the word in the technical > usual sense. > > > I'm using it to refer to divination techniques like the I Ching or Tarot. > Intentional randomness (shuffled cards, tossed coins) plus a wide aperture > for metaphor allows a kind of Dark AI to be revealed. Where AI logic seeks > to automate sense, the oracle seeks to animate nonsense. > > > That is the particular case of the random oracle. Comp predicts that > machines are "confronted" to some random oracle, and to infinities of > machines trying to exploits it in some ways. > > > Randomness comes up in comp predictions? > > > > Yes. At step seven, as the UD will notably dovetail on all normal > differentiation, on a continuum. The iterated WM self-duplication is a part > of UD*. > What becomes random, and why? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If we turn Church-Turing around, we get non-universal, non-machines = > unique individuals. > > > You might still get a "Church-thesis", but for larger class of function. > > > Would that be a complete enough reversal though? > > > I see what you meant. But if we are non universal machine, then we are > closer to the dolls. Obviously, we are universal numbers. We are even > Löbian numbers, which are universal numbers capable of knowing that they > are universal. > > > I think that we are obviously not numbers, > > > The machine knows that if she is a 3p local-relative number, then her 1-p > is not a number. > What's a real world example of that? > > > > but the opposite. In a sense... names. Names are a simplified version of > the opposite of numbers, if by names we mean intentionally applied, > proprietary, and unique gestalts (since numbers are unintentional, generic, > and redundantly constitutive). > > > Not bad! But that is what the notion of universal number makes possible: > to interpret numbers as name. It gives to N a structure of an applicative > algebra, where you can define a new (partial) operation #, with x # y = > phi_x(y), x becomes a name. That is what universal numbers do, naming and > searching, and falling in perplexity abyss when looking inward. > Interesting but I would have to know why it is truly a name as I described (unique, proprietary, intentional) rather than simply a generic label or address. A true name might arise from the aesthetic context (Lefty is might be left handed, or might have no left arm, etc) rather than to be issued from a token generator. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > My suspicion is that such a language would help define or model previously > undefinable phenomenological conditions. Anti-numbers, (names which are > intrinsically semi-proprietary?), Anti-operators (metaphorical and > synchronistic?) > > > > There is no doubt that the more you study comp, the more you have tools to > build a non-comp theory. But note that the hypostases still will do their > work. Comp is really omega-comp, and you can weaken it in the transfinite. > > > > Then the zero idea came up again… > > OH: A complex number z is said to be purely imaginary. If it has no real > part, i.e., R[z] = 0. The term is often used in preference to the simpler > “imaginary” in situations where z can in general assume complex values with > nonzero real parts, but in a particular case of interest, the real part is > identically zero. 0 is a pure imaginary number . > > > S33: If the part is identically zero, but zero is entirely imaginary, does > that mean that its identicality is also imaginary? If we carry through the > idea that 0 is imaginary, then any time we qualify something as being ‘not’ > we are being figurative, and the reality would always be some > infinitessimal fragment. Not would literally be ‘almost not’. > > OH: http://mathworld.wolfram.com/IdenticallyZero.html > > S33: But what I’m proposing is that vanishing itself is identically zero, > then vanishing may be infinitesimally figurative. Nothing can vanish > completely in reality, even the difference between A and A. > > Can zero be said then to be ‘that which is not anything, *not even > itself*. > > > Usually we prefer to consider zero not that exceptional, and the usual > rule of identity applies. 0=0. > > > That sounds like just convention though. > > > > I can hardly see that as a convention. A triviality perhaps, but I doubt I > could make sense of "=" and "0" in case someone asserts that he believes > that 0 is different from 0. I will automatically see there some metaphor, > analogy, poetry, or abuse of words, depending on the context. > > > It depends on what sense you are using. The 0 of nothing is different from > the 0 in 1000. > > > 1000 is just an abbreviation for the polynomial 1*10^3 + 0*10^2+ 0*10^1+ > 0*10^0. And the 0 there is the "0 of nothing". > But using it as an abbreviation makes it different. In 1 + 0 = 1, we can drop the +0 and get 1=1. If we drop a 0 from 1000, we change the number to 100, so in that sense 0 = 900. > > > > Each 0 in 1000 is a different value. > > > Not at all. It is the same value multiplying different values > (10^2, 10^1, 10^0) > > > > By cracking open the definition of zero itself, I'm bringing mathematics > closer to reality in which 0 is impossible, in an absolute sense. > > > I guess you mean 0 sense is impossible, in which case the machine agrees > with you. Too bad you don't listen to "zombies". > > > > All absence is only an expectation within some event that is present. > > > Well said, but that's 1p. > What suggests that there can be any other kind of absence? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > When we apply this to ontology (and I think we should) it means we must > accept that nothing has vanished. What happens instead is that things > nearly vanish from some set of perspectives. The gap between nearly > vanishing and vanishing is entropy. Entropy is how perception compensates, > fudges, fills in, etc so that what is for all practical purposes absent > (i.e. the past) becomes elided or removed. Even the removal is not total, > not real, its just a delay. Eventually all that has been denied must be > revealed as unvanished from some perspective or encounter. > > The reverse of this entropic clipping of the infinitesimally unvanished > would be what I call significance. An augmentation of sensitivity or motive > so that a near-vanished experience is encountered first as fiction. In > other words, entropy makes things seem to disappear (like the past, > coherence, certainty, etc) which really haven’t, and significance makes > things seem to appear, but also significance increases the quality of > ‘thingness’ beyond the thing. You could say that entropy masks presence to > the point of near absence, and significance stretches near-absence to the > point of re-presence. > > > I have no clue what you are really talking about. > > > I'm tallking about the implications of zero being considered impossible > instead. You get two infinitessimals instead, one the smallest possible > fraction of 1, and the other the smallest possible fraction of -1. When we > apply it to physics or metaphysics, we could read it as the difference > between entropy (almost nothing) and significance (almost something) with > sense bridging the gap from almost to appr > > ... continued... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. 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