On Sunday, April 6, 2014 1:13:09 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 05 Apr 2014, at 19:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Friday, April 4, 2014 2:07:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 04 Apr 2014, at 03:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Thursday, April 3, 2014 2:34:06 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > I'm not confusing them, I'm saying that []~comp is not untrue > > > this means you say []~comp is true. > > > Yes. > > > > Nice. > > > > > > Or that you confuse, like you did already "truth" and knowledge, but in > that case you keep saying that you know []~comp, yet your argument above > was only for ~[]comp, on which I already agree, as it is a consequence of > comp. > > > I'm not saying that I know it, I'm saying that it makes more sense. > > > But then why are we discussing? >
To make more sense of everything. > Then, as I said, comp makes no sense from the 1p, which in comp is the > sense-maker, which makes your point logically in favor of comp. > If 1p is the sense maker, and comp makes no sense from the 1p, then comp makes no sense. > > > > > > > just because it is outside of logic. When you arbitrarily begin from the > 3p perspective, you can only see the flatland version of 1p intuition. You > would have to consider the possibility that numbers can come from this kind > of intuition and not the other way around. If you put your fingers in your > ears, and only listen to formalism, then you can only hear what formalism > has to say about intuition, which is... not much. > > > Why? > > > Because of the incompleteness of all formal systems. > > > But this is based on arithmetic. > Ah, you are confusing the arithmetic with the sensible conditions that the arithmetic is pointing to. > > > comp implies that ~comp has the benefits of the doubt. I told you this > many times. > As I just repeated above, this does not refute comp. > > > What does it mean to give it the benefit of the doubt but then deny it? > > > > You are the only one who deny a theory here. > > > By saying that ~comp is only what seems true from the machine's 1p > perspective, you are denying ~comp can be more true than comp. > > > I am just saying that the non comp feeling is normal with comp, > Yes, I have no problem with the idea that some analysis of machine function would point outside of computation. > and cannot be used to refute logically comp. > Why not? Aren't you just jumping to a conclusion like 'since there are drive through restaurants, it means that we cannot assume that cars are not hungry'. > I am not denying non-comp. Not at all. > > > > > > > > > I never said that comp is true, or that comp is false. I say only that > comp leads to a Plato/aristotle reversal, to be short. > > > We agree on this from the start, but what I am saying is that Plato also > can be reversed on the lower level, so that the ideal/arithmetic is > generated statistically by aesthetics. > > > > Derive 1 = 1 in your theory. Show me the theory first. > In my theory, 1 = 1 is reflects a particular set of mathematical expectations. I don't make any claims on the contents of arithmetic, only on the nature of what arithmetic derives from. > > > > > > > But *you* say that comp is false, and that is why we ask you an argument. > The argument has to be understandable, and not of the type "let us abandon > logic and ...", which is like "God told me ...", and has zero argumentative > value. > > > We don't have to abandon logic, but we have to understand that the source > of logic is not necessarily going to be logical. This is what most people > get from Godel. > > > We knew this already. The choice of theories are not 100% logical. We > don't need Gödel for this. > even better > > > > The truth does not require argumentation value. > > > Very plausibly. That part can be related to Tarski or Gödel limitation > theorem, although very often the arguments are not valid, but sometimes it > is. > Some things may be true but not arguable, so that an invalid argument can still point us to a valid truth - i.e. a metaphor. > > > > If I said that I have a theory that horses pull carts rather than the > other way around, does its lack of argumentative value make it less true? > > > Lack of justfication can make it less plausible, compared to a theory with > more justification. That is a very contextual questions, depending on many > things. > > You're interested in what makes a good theory, but I'm interested in understanding consciousness. > > > > > > > > > > > Comp is Gödelian. It behaves like "consistency" (~[]f, <>t), which entails > the consistency of its negation: <>t -> <>[]f. > > > Not sure what you mean. Maybe if you wrote it out without symbols. > > > If I am consistent then it is consistent that I am not consistent. (I = > the 3p notion of self). > > > How is "I" a 3p notion of self? > > > It is not. Only here. > (raise eyebrow) > > I was just saying that I was using "I" in the 3p sense of the self. In that > case, the "I" is given by the body or the code of the entity saying "I" (by > definition). > > > > > > > > > > The decision to say "yes" to the doctor. > > > What would a UM say to the doctor? > > > The 1-I will say no, and the 3-I might say yes. The UM will live a > conflict, and only its education might help to decide, in one or the other > direction. > That sounds like it is the 1-I doing the deciding...which makes me wonder what is 3-I there to do? > > > > > > The machine's decision to add a self-consistency axiom and become another > machine. > The direct introspection of the machine, when she feels what is out of any > possible justification. > That is formalized by the the annuli Z* \ Z, X* \ X, etc. > > Yes, mathematical logic provides tools to meta-formalizes some non > formalizable, by the machine, predicate which are still applying on the > machine. > > > Whether it is formal or meta-formal, it's still logic. > > > Not really. Logic is applied, but is not the subject of the inquiry. As > you said above, arithmetic is not entirely logical. > It depends. If the method of inquiry is logical and the response is logical, there is no reason to expect that there is anything beyond logic in between, even if it is not the logic that we are expecting. > > > > It remains a view of consciousness that lacks aesthetic presence > > > That is the statement I am quite skeptical about, and that you should > justify, at least the day you pretend that comp is false (not today). > I justify it with all of the examples you keep ignoring - blindsight, synesthesia, the separation of i/o devices from CPUs, the map-territory distinction, the conflict between generic/universal systems and proprietary histories, the model of information as a reduction of qualia, the lack of need for geometry in binary systems, etc. I don't see anything that positively supports qualia arising from computation, other than the pathetic fallacy. > > > > > > and is limited to programmatic states of figuring and configuring. > > > It concerns both the 1p, and its relation with some 3p. You are the one > conflating them, but that beg the question of why we should conflate them. > Not sure what you mean or how it relates. > > > > > > > > > > > > > even though we know from the start that our access to logic depends on > consciousness. Your sun in law is animated doll, and you must amputate my > circle of sense to the digital square in order to make him seem human. > > > On the contrary. I justify why the machine has no "amputation of sense" to > do. > > > But you justify it by defining sense in an amputated way so that it does > nothing but serve math. > > > > You do the amputation. For you, in 1985, when my sun in law got the > digital brain, you stop to attribute any sense to his talk. > > > You are the one making it into a doll. He made a wonderful carrier (in > nuclear physics), makes my daughter happy, have two children, but *you* > tell me that he is dead. > > > He's already dead, I'm just saying that I'm not fooled, even if your > daughter's mistakes make her happy. > > > > That's my point. Your theory amputes the sense that my sun-in-law is able > to make, in the comp theory. > Your sun-in-law can make a great deal of sense in the eyes of other people, I only say that there is no sun-in-law that is independent of our expectations. The mechanism that represents this meaning to us is indeed an order of magnitude of difference from ordinary machines, just as a sculpture that moves is greater than a still photograph, but no new interiority need be imagined to explain why this behavioral sculpture could seem life like. > > > > > > > > You don't have the monopoly on a word like sense. And you should not > confuse a theory of sense with sense, and a simple theory of sense if given > by machine's intensional self-references, and so your move to evacuate it > by abandoning logic just to "kill" my sun-in-law confirms my point. > > > I don't try to have a theory of sense, I try to address sense as it > actually seems to be. > > > Yes, that is what I criticize. You project your conception of sense to > others. > By comp, I only do what machines always do. > > > > > I don't think that any simple theory of sense given by logic > > > It is not given by logic, it is only maintained by the assumption that at > some description level we are Turing emulable. And then the math, in that > theory, explain why indeed that is not a logical move, and why it asks for > a "religious" sort of act of faith. > In my view, the act of faith is sleight of hand. By the time we have assumed that we are Turing emulable, we have already put the cart in front of the horse. While we are distracted with ideas of religion, we have made a fundamental mistake in substituting a phenomenological territory for a map of maps that has no territory. > > > > can do anything but obstruct our understanding...unless we use it as an > example of how sense works to obstruct itself, which it does. > > > > You need to abandon logic to be argue that some talk by some entities does > not make sense. > > > Only if you are blind to the pathetic fallacy. > > > You comment yourself here. > It seems pretty straightforward to me. I can talk to a voice mail machine without imagining that there is something that it is like to be a voice mail machine. > > > For most people, it is pretty cleat that just because words can be made to > come out of a machine in the correct order, it doesn't mean that the > machine understands what it is saying. Most people understand that voice > mail can't really listen to you, aren't really being polite, etc. There's > nothing there behind the woman's voice that is a woman. It does make sense, > but at a much lower level, so that the imitation of high level sense is a > pseudo-aesthetic presentation. > > > For most people it has been pretty clear that the sun moves in the sky. > Then comp explains why ~comp is pretty clear. > Once you understand the relation between sun and Earth, it makes more sense out of our actual experience. Comp doesn't seem to offer any more sense of our experience, and in fact makes our experience a 'qualia of the gaps' within arithmetic. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > It begs the question if you use the logic that gives rise to comp to > refute a conjecture that explicitly questions logic as primordial. > > > > If you refute comp with a non standard logic, you have to make it > explicit. > > > I do make it explicit. In the matter of 1p awareness, I refute all > possible logic with the deeper reality of sense. > > > Good 1p intuition, but the machine already knows that, and they can know > that this cannot been used to justify that they are (necessarily unknown > for them) machines/numbers. > > > Isn't that an argument from authority, where the authority is how you > interpret hypothetical machines states of mind? Saying that machines know > that my view is wrong does not help. I can say that kangaroos know that > your view is wrong. > > > Machines derives your view for their 1p. This is justified in detail. > > > You continue to push this bizarre arguments. You are the brown egg saying > 'it makes sense that eggs are white by default'. > > > I agree that argument is a bit diabolical. But comp explains why comp is > not believable, and even why comp is false from the 1p view. > > > Yet you forbid my diabolical argument that sense cannot be sliced into > logic without losing the most important part. > > > Indeed, that would be a reduction of ([]p & p) to []p. > I don't think there is any &p, it's just [([([])])] all the way down. p = [([([])])] - [] > > > > > > My view also explains why comp is not believable, and why it would seem > true from the 3p view. > > > > That is why I insist that saying "yes" to the doctor involves some faith, > and courage, and that comp has theological consequences, that we can study > on PA, which in comp is an Escherichia Coli for the study of soul and body. > > > I don't see that comp allows any faith or courage...just mechanism acting > on arithmetic function and senseless whims with no consequence to it. > > > here you do reduce the machine to its []p, and abstract from its []p & p. > You could say that you don't see a qualia inside a brain, or inside carbon, > etc. You just adopt a double standard distinguishing silicon machine and > carbon machines. > It's not a double standard if you explicitly define the brain and carbon as [([([])])] representations to begin with. I would not expect to find proprietary qualia in the body's generic view of us (the brain). That is not my objection to machine sentience though. Again, there is no theoretical problem with machine sentience, it is an empirical problem which arises from assuming 3p behaviors are the cause rather than effect of experience. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > But you will have to motivate the use of that logic, > > > Why would I have to motivate the use of sense if I don't have to motivate > the use of standard logic? All I have to do is stop presuming that math can > make color and then begin to understand why. > > > But comp explains why. > > > Then show me a new color. You can't do it. If I said 'show me how to solve > Rubik's cube', you could. > > > Machines can already explain why. Anyway, what you say does not > distinguish silicon and organic bodies on the consciousness matter. > > > It's not the composition of the matter that is the problem, its what the > composition represents. Authenticity is more fundamental than matter or > information. > > > Why should my sun-in-law be no more authentic after its prosthetic > operation? > > > Because you killed him when you replaced the brain that has been > constructed since the beginning of time as his one and only connection to > express himself in 3p and replaced it with an imitation that is missing > billions of years of experience as living organisms. > > > If you say that his brain has been build from the beginning of time, I can > say the same for the computer. > The substances that you make the computer out of have been built from the beginning of time, but when we superimpose a machine onto that substance, there is no crossover from the experience represented by the substance and the modalities introduced into them. ... Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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