On 07 Apr 2014, at 21:33, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sunday, April 6, 2014 1:13:09 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Apr 2014, at 19:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I'm not saying that I know it, I'm saying that it makes more sense.
But then why are we discussing?
To make more sense of everything.
Then, as I said, comp makes no sense from the 1p, which in comp is
the sense-maker, which makes your point logically in favor of comp.
If 1p is the sense maker, and comp makes no sense from the 1p, then
comp makes no sense.
For the 1p. You will tell me that is all what count in your theory,
but that is what is debated, and you beg the question again.
I am just saying that the non comp feeling is normal with comp,
Yes, I have no problem with the idea that some analysis of machine
function would point outside of computation.
... some analysis of machine function made by the machine.
Very plausibly. That part can be related to Tarski or Gödel
limitation theorem, although very often the arguments are not valid,
but sometimes it is.
Some things may be true but not arguable, so that an invalid
argument can still point us to a valid truth - i.e. a metaphor.
You confuse false and non-valid. Non-valid does not entail false, but
it remains non valid, and thus is not an argument, even if you were
correct in the conclusion. You might guess this, because that type of
argument can prove everything.
If I said that I have a theory that horses pull carts rather than
the other way around, does its lack of argumentative value make it
less true?
Lack of justfication can make it less plausible, compared to a
theory with more justification. That is a very contextual questions,
depending on many things.
You're interested in what makes a good theory, but I'm interested in
understanding consciousness.
I am interested in consciousness too, and ask for a good theory, not
one which makes it into a primitive falling from the sky.
The decision to say "yes" to the doctor.
What would a UM say to the doctor?
The 1-I will say no, and the 3-I might say yes. The UM will live a
conflict, and only its education might help to decide, in one or the
other direction.
That sounds like it is the 1-I doing the deciding...which makes me
wonder what is 3-I there to do?
Your body, or your Gödel number, that is a description at the right
substitution level. It is the []p, for the case of the ideally correct
machine, as opposed to the 1p Theaetetus' []p & p, which obeys a quite
different logic.
The machine's decision to add a self-consistency axiom and become
another machine.
The direct introspection of the machine, when she feels what is out
of any possible justification.
That is formalized by the the annuli Z* \ Z, X* \ X, etc.
Yes, mathematical logic provides tools to meta-formalizes some non
formalizable, by the machine, predicate which are still applying on
the machine.
Whether it is formal or meta-formal, it's still logic.
Not really. Logic is applied, but is not the subject of the inquiry.
As you said above, arithmetic is not entirely logical.
It depends. If the method of inquiry is logical and the response is
logical, there is no reason to expect that there is anything beyond
logic in between, even if it is not the logic that we are expecting.
But the point is that "logical" does not mean anything per se. The 3p
and the 1p have different and opposed logics.
It remains a view of consciousness that lacks aesthetic presence
That is the statement I am quite skeptical about, and that you
should justify, at least the day you pretend that comp is false (not
today).
I justify it with all of the examples you keep ignoring -
blindsight, synesthesia, the separation of i/o devices from CPUs,
the map-territory distinction, the conflict between generic/
universal systems and proprietary histories, the model of
information as a reduction of qualia, the lack of need for geometry
in binary systems, etc. I don't see anything that positively
supports qualia arising from computation, other than the pathetic
fallacy.
You don't have to see that. The counter-example shows you invalid.
That's all. You confuse again []~comp, which you defend, and ~[]comp,
on which we both agree, as comp -> ~[]comp.
and is limited to programmatic states of figuring and configuring.
It concerns both the 1p, and its relation with some 3p. You are the
one conflating them, but that beg the question of why we should
conflate them.
Not sure what you mean or how it relates.
All your argument shows that the 3p machine cannot think, and I agree
with them. A body, or a description or a number cannot think indeed,
only a (first) person can. But comp does not say that a machine can
think, only that it can manifest the thinking of a person. With comp,
my body and brain are just natural machine that we get at birth. We
are not them, we own them.
He's already dead, I'm just saying that I'm not fooled, even if your
daughter's mistakes make her happy.
That's my point. Your theory amputes the sense that my sun-in-law is
able to make, in the comp theory.
Your sun-in-law can make a great deal of sense in the eyes of other
people, I only say that there is no sun-in-law that is independent
of our expectations. The mechanism that represents this meaning to
us is indeed an order of magnitude of difference from ordinary
machines, just as a sculpture that moves is greater than a still
photograph, but no new interiority need be imagined to explain why
this behavioral sculpture could seem life like.
In your theory. But that begs the question, when seen as a refutation
of comp.
You don't have the monopoly on a word like sense. And you should not
confuse a theory of sense with sense, and a simple theory of sense
if given by machine's intensional self-references, and so your move
to evacuate it by abandoning logic just to "kill" my sun-in-law
confirms my point.
I don't try to have a theory of sense, I try to address sense as it
actually seems to be.
Yes, that is what I criticize. You project your conception of sense
to others.
By comp, I only do what machines always do.
I don't think that any simple theory of sense given by logic
It is not given by logic, it is only maintained by the assumption
that at some description level we are Turing emulable. And then the
math, in that theory, explain why indeed that is not a logical move,
and why it asks for a "religious" sort of act of faith.
In my view, the act of faith is sleight of hand. By the time we have
assumed that we are Turing emulable, we have already put the cart in
front of the horse. While we are distracted with ideas of religion,
we have made a fundamental mistake in substituting a
phenomenological territory for a map of maps that has no territory.
Confusing map and territory is a mistake that *you* do when reducing
my sun in law to his mechanical body.
can do anything but obstruct our understanding...unless we use it as
an example of how sense works to obstruct itself, which it does.
You need to abandon logic to be argue that some talk by some
entities does not make sense.
Only if you are blind to the pathetic fallacy.
You comment yourself here.
It seems pretty straightforward to me. I can talk to a voice mail
machine without imagining that there is something that it is like to
be a voice mail machine.
Me too, but a voice mail is not a self-introspective universal machine.
For most people, it is pretty cleat that just because words can be
made to come out of a machine in the correct order, it doesn't mean
that the machine understands what it is saying. Most people
understand that voice mail can't really listen to you, aren't really
being polite, etc. There's nothing there behind the woman's voice
that is a woman. It does make sense, but at a much lower level, so
that the imitation of high level sense is a pseudo-aesthetic
presentation.
For most people it has been pretty clear that the sun moves in the
sky. Then comp explains why ~comp is pretty clear.
Once you understand the relation between sun and Earth, it makes
more sense out of our actual experience. Comp doesn't seem to offer
any more sense of our experience, and in fact makes our experience a
'qualia of the gaps' within arithmetic.
... because you don't study the theory. Comp explains why all machine
are perturbed by the gap between 3p and 1p, and the gap between the x
logics and the x* logics, and machine can understand that they cannot
prove the existence of their 1p to you, although we can derive it for
simple correct machine.
I agree that argument is a bit diabolical. But comp explains why
comp is not believable, and even why comp is false from the 1p view.
Yet you forbid my diabolical argument that sense cannot be sliced
into logic without losing the most important part.
Indeed, that would be a reduction of ([]p & p) to []p.
I don't think there is any &p, it's just [([([])])] all the way
down. p = [([([])])] - []
"& p" does not involve any description of p. But you have to do some
math to see this, and to not confuse a statement like p and a sentence
denoting p.
My view also explains why comp is not believable, and why it would
seem true from the 3p view.
That is why I insist that saying "yes" to the doctor involves some
faith, and courage, and that comp has theological consequences, that
we can study on PA, which in comp is an Escherichia Coli for the
study of soul and body.
I don't see that comp allows any faith or courage...just mechanism
acting on arithmetic function and senseless whims with no
consequence to it.
here you do reduce the machine to its []p, and abstract from its []p
& p. You could say that you don't see a qualia inside a brain, or
inside carbon, etc. You just adopt a double standard distinguishing
silicon machine and carbon machines.
It's not a double standard if you explicitly define the brain and
carbon as [([([])])] representations to begin with. I would not
expect to find proprietary qualia in the body's generic view of us
(the brain). That is not my objection to machine sentience though.
Again, there is no theoretical problem with machine sentience, it is
an empirical problem which arises from assuming 3p behaviors are the
cause rather than effect of experience.
Not at all. It is the logico-arithmetical relations and their
semantics which brought the experience, not the behavior, which is a
consequences of those relations.
But you will have to motivate the use of that logic,
Why would I have to motivate the use of sense if I don't have to
motivate the use of standard logic? All I have to do is stop
presuming that math can make color and then begin to understand why.
But comp explains why.
Then show me a new color. You can't do it. If I said 'show me how to
solve Rubik's cube', you could.
Machines can already explain why. Anyway, what you say does not
distinguish silicon and organic bodies on the consciousness matter.
It's not the composition of the matter that is the problem, its what
the composition represents. Authenticity is more fundamental than
matter or information.
Why should my sun-in-law be no more authentic after its prosthetic
operation?
Because you killed him when you replaced the brain that has been
constructed since the beginning of time as his one and only
connection to express himself in 3p and replaced it with an
imitation that is missing billions of years of experience as living
organisms.
If you say that his brain has been build from the beginning of time,
I can say the same for the computer.
The substances that you make the computer out of have been built
from the beginning of time,
I thought you were not assuming time or physical realities.
but when we superimpose a machine onto that substance, there is no
crossover from the experience represented by the substance and the
modalities introduced into them.
Why do we have a brain, then? How do you relate sense and the physical
or the mathematical? How is that related with refuting comp? You beg
the question again.
Bruno
...
Craig
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
