On Thursday, April 10, 2014 6:42:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Craig, > > I have already commented that type of non-argument. Once we get closer to > a refutation of your attempt to show that your argument against comp is not > valid, you vindicate being illogical, >
I don't vindicate being illogical, I vindicate being more logical about factoring in the limitations of logic in modeling the deeper aspects of nature and consciousness. Logically we must not presume to rely on logic alone to argue the nature of awareness, from which logic seems to arise. > so I am not sure that repeating my argument can help. > > > I will just sum up: > > 1) You keep talking like if the situation was symmetrical. You defending > ~comp, and me defending comp. But that is not the case. I am nowhere > defending the idea that comp is true. I am agnostic on this. > I think that you are pseudo-agnostic on it, and have admitted as much on occasion, but that's ok with me either way. > I am not convince by your argument against comp, that's all. That is the > confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp. > Part of my argument though is that being convinced is not a realistic expectation of any argument about consciousness. My argument is that it can only ever be about how much sense it makes relatively speaking, and that the comp argument unfairly rules out immeasurable aesthetic qualities from the start. My argument predicts the bias of comp in predicting the bias of non-comp, so in that aspect we are symmetric. > 2) you confuse truth and first person sense, all the time. > I'm not confused, I'm flat out denying that truth can ever be anything other than sense, and I'm denying that sense has to be first person. It's an explicit part of my conjecture. > I can be OK with this, for some theory which assumes non-comp, but not for > an argument, which should be independent of any theory, against ~comp. If > you use your theory to refute comp, you beg the question. > By constraining the terms of the argument to disallow aesthetic sense to transcend logical truth, you beg the question. We are symmetric here too. > 3) You confuse levels in theories. You seem to infer that a theory can > only talk about syntax and formal objects, because a theory is itself a > formal object, but that is a confusion between a theory, and what the > theory is about. > No, you're projecting that confusion on me because my results disagree with yours. I understand that the number 4 or the expression x are not intended to relate literally to the figures 4 or x, and I understand that your view of arithmetic assumes a correspondence to Platonic entities. My view though is that no such entities can arise from anything other than the capacity to detect, feel, compare, control, etc. To give arithmetic entities experiential potentials makes comp beg the question from the start. How is arithmetic truth not conscious from the start, in order to produce machines that find themselves to be conscious? > 4) You take "sense" for granted, and you object to elementary arithmetic. > Again, why not, in your theory, but again, that beg the question as an > argument refuting comp. Here I can only suggest you to study a bit more > computer science and logic. > We can just turn that around and say you take "arithmetic" for granted, and you object to elementary sense. You are saying that the assumptions of comp cannot be challenged unless we first agree not to challenge the assumptions of comp with new assumptions. > 5) Your assumption are unclear. It is still not clear if you assume or not > a physical reality, > I assume sensory-motive interaction. Physicality and realism are a set of qualities which potentially arise through modulations of sensitive/insensitive interaction. or how are handled the subject's references to the physical Cf David Nyman. > It is not clear how you address the mind/body problem. > I address it by putting the entire universe in the gap between mind and body. Perceptual relativity creates mind-like and body-like qualities to represent distance between categories of experience. > 6) Stathis' point: what in the brain/body would be responsible for its non > Turing emulability. > The same thing that is responsible for consciousness. In my view, it is backward to begin from a brain and say why won't a copy of this be conscious. Instead we must begin with a life experience and ask why we would assume it can be reduced to the functions of an object. It is only if we buy into our 1p sense of realism for 3p objects completely that we could make that assumption. > Saying that my sun-in-law is a zombie/doll is based on your non-comp, it > is not an argument for non-comp. Begging question again. > My non-comp leads to the conclusion that comp cannot be defeated by argument, so it is circular to demand that it must be. Feeling cannot be proved, but that does not mean it is not more real than logic or theory. Feeling doesn't have to be correct in its content, but the fact of feeling is the only undeniable fact. > 7) your critics of logic is self-defeating, and unanswerable. > If logic could be defeated with logic, then Godel would be wrong. > You can use it to pretend anything, and it looks like you are doing > exactly that. You make my point, as I explained you. In fact that closes > the discussion. Of course, by abandoning logic, you can still pretend to > have refute comp, but you can pretend anything at this stage. > I'm not pretending. I'm here in reality to defend sense, while comp is a theory that can only be defended theoretically. > You seem to want to extend the lack of rigor of the human science and > religion in science, where I want to encourage the same rigor in both human > science (and religion) and exact science. I show that it is very easy to > do, as it consists just in avoiding reference to 1p, in the argumentation > (NOT in the subject matter of course), or to add "interrogation mark" and > being clear on what is assumed and what is argued for. It consists also in > the complete abandon of pretending any truth. > Any truth except arithmetic truth...which is every truth. > > You might read my previous answers for more, as I have already replied to > your comment below, or similar, more than once. > We give symmetric advice here too. 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