On 10 Apr 2014, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, April 10, 2014 6:42:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Craig,
I have already commented that type of non-argument. Once we get
closer to a refutation of your attempt to show that your argument
against comp is not valid, you vindicate being illogical,
I don't vindicate being illogical, I vindicate being more logical
about factoring in the limitations of logic in modeling the deeper
aspects of nature and consciousness. Logically we must not presume
to rely on logic alone to argue the nature of awareness, from which
logic seems to arise.
so I am not sure that repeating my argument can help.
I will just sum up:
1) You keep talking like if the situation was symmetrical. You
defending ~comp, and me defending comp. But that is not the case. I
am nowhere defending the idea that comp is true. I am agnostic on
this.
I think that you are pseudo-agnostic on it, and have admitted as
much on occasion, but that's ok with me either way.
I am not convince by your argument against comp, that's all. That is
the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp.
Part of my argument though is that being convinced is not a
realistic expectation of any argument about consciousness. My
argument is that it can only ever be about how much sense it makes
relatively speaking, and that the comp argument unfairly rules out
immeasurable aesthetic qualities from the start.
It does not. *you* rule it out. You make less sense.
My argument predicts the bias of comp in predicting the bias of non-
comp, so in that aspect we are symmetric.
Not at all, because I don't conclude in either comp or not-comp from
that. You do an error in logic. That's all.
2) you confuse truth and first person sense, all the time.
I'm not confused, I'm flat out denying that truth can ever be
anything other than sense,
Then truth = sense, as I said. But is is a cosmic or universal form of
sense, and you have to related it to the brain and flesh in some ways,
even making them delusion.
and I'm denying that sense has to be first person. It's an explicit
part of my conjecture.
truth = first person is just an open problem in comp theology.
I can be OK with this, for some theory which assumes non-comp, but
not for an argument, which should be independent of any theory,
against ~comp. If you use your theory to refute comp, you beg the
question.
By constraining the terms of the argument to disallow aesthetic
sense to transcend logical truth,
There is no logical truth. It is always arithmetical truth.
you beg the question. We are symmetric here too.
No, I make assumption, where you are the one pretending having a proof
those assumption is inconsistent.
I am OK with both ~[]comp and ~[]~comp.
You are the one saying that comp is false.
I am not the one saying that ~comp is false.
You seem to have difficulties here. With respect to comp I am
agnostic, and you are "atheist". You pretend to know that my sun in
law is a doll.
3) You confuse levels in theories. You seem to infer that a theory
can only talk about syntax and formal objects, because a theory is
itself a formal object, but that is a confusion between a theory,
and what the theory is about.
No, you're projecting that confusion on me because my results
disagree with yours.
The results as such does not disagree, given that your theory is close
to the machine first person phenomenology.
I just patiently try to make you understand a mistake, that's all.
I understand that the number 4 or the expression x are not intended
to relate literally to the figures 4 or x, and I understand that
your view of arithmetic assumes a correspondence to Platonic entities.
It does not. You need only to agree that 0+x = x, etc.
My view though is that no such entities can arise from anything
other than the capacity to detect, feel, compare, control, etc.
To just define "capacity", "detect", "compare" ... you need to assume
things like 0+x=x.
To give arithmetic entities experiential potentials makes comp beg
the question from the start. How is arithmetic truth not conscious
from the start, in order to produce machines that find themselves to
be conscious?
Arithmetical truth can be said conscious, except that it is not a
person, and it is more the container and limiter of the consciousness
differentiating flux of of the universal numbers.
4) You take "sense" for granted, and you object to elementary
arithmetic. Again, why not, in your theory, but again, that beg the
question as an argument refuting comp. Here I can only suggest you
to study a bit more computer science and logic.
We can just turn that around and say you take "arithmetic" for
granted, and you object to elementary sense.
But all scientist take arithmetic for granted, nine take sense for
granted in the 3p sense of scientific theories (but cognitive
scientists can take it a important data ... in need to be explained.
You are saying that the assumptions of comp cannot be challenged
I have never said that. You symmetrize again.
unless we first agree not to challenge the assumptions of comp with
new assumptions.
5) Your assumption are unclear. It is still not clear if you assume
or not a physical reality,
I assume sensory-motive interaction.
Words are not theories. You ned to provides 3p intelligible laws, or
you do pseudo-religion only.
Physicality and realism are a set of qualities which potentially
arise through modulations of sensitive/insensitive interaction.
or how are handled the subject's references to the physical Cf David
Nyman. It is not clear how you address the mind/body problem.
I address it by putting the entire universe in the gap between mind
and body.
Like comp, thus? But just more fuzzy so that you feel free to insult
my sun-in-law?
Perceptual relativity creates mind-like and body-like qualities to
represent distance between categories of experience.
Well, nice, but that is already what the machine does, and it makes
this testable.
6) Stathis' point: what in the brain/body would be responsible for
its non Turing emulability.
The same thing that is responsible for consciousness. In my view, it
is backward to begin from a brain and say why won't a copy of this
be conscious. Instead we must begin with a life experience and ask
why we would assume it can be reduced to the functions of an object.
It is only if we buy into our 1p sense of realism for 3p objects
completely that we could make that assumption.
You avoid the question.
Saying that my sun-in-law is a zombie/doll is based on your non-
comp, it is not an argument for non-comp. Begging question again.
My non-comp leads to the conclusion that comp cannot be defeated by
argument,
But I proved it can. It is the main whole point. Comp can be defeated
by reason, and by experiments. You have still not study it.
so it is circular to demand that it must be. Feeling cannot be
proved, but that does not mean it is not more real than logic or
theory. Feeling doesn't have to be correct in its content, but the
fact of feeling is the only undeniable fact.
yes. That's eaxctly what the machine says. Should I conclude that you
are a machine from this?
No, but I can conclude that this is not an argument.
7) your critics of logic is self-defeating, and unanswerable.
If logic could be defeated with logic, then Godel would be wrong.
OK, but that's a reason more to not criticize the use of logic in
argument.
You can use it to pretend anything, and it looks like you are doing
exactly that. You make my point, as I explained you. In fact that
closes the discussion. Of course, by abandoning logic, you can still
pretend to have refute comp, but you can pretend anything at this
stage.
I'm not pretending. I'm here in reality to defend sense, while comp
is a theory that can only be defended theoretically.
On the contrary, UDA illustrate its practice, nd you are the one doing
something quite theoretical to draw negative conclusion about the
possible consciousness of some entities. You defend Craig's sense
only, and defend no-sense for all machines.
You seem to want to extend the lack of rigor of the human science
and religion in science, where I want to encourage the same rigor in
both human science (and religion) and exact science. I show that it
is very easy to do, as it consists just in avoiding reference to 1p,
in the argumentation (NOT in the subject matter of course), or to
add "interrogation mark" and being clear on what is assumed and what
is argued for. It consists also in the complete abandon of
pretending any truth.
Any truth except arithmetic truth...which is every truth.
No, we just assume you agree with a small amount of math. Assume is
different from pretending it is true.
The theorem convinces everyone patient enough, because everyone agrees
with 0+x=0, and similar. And it does not conclude anything on the
truth of comp or ~comp. It just provides a way to test comp + the
classical theory of knowledge.
You have just no argument that comp is false, so stop pretending, and
just assume this if you want, but your phenomenology does not need
this. Comp mighty be false, but you need far better argument, and for
this much more humility and study the worlds of many others and the
training in "scientific" argumentation.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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