On Saturday, April 12, 2014 2:24:03 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 11 Apr 2014, at 20:30, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Friday, April 11, 2014 12:16:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 10 Apr 2014, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > > > On Thursday, April 10, 2014 6:42:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Craig, > > > > I have already commented that type of non-argument. Once we get > > closer to a refutation of your attempt to show that your argument > > against comp is not valid, you vindicate being illogical, > > > > I don't vindicate being illogical, I vindicate being more logical > > about factoring in the limitations of logic in modeling the deeper > > aspects of nature and consciousness. Logically we must not presume > > to rely on logic alone to argue the nature of awareness, from which > > logic seems to arise. > > > > so I am not sure that repeating my argument can help. > > > > > > I will just sum up: > > > > 1) You keep talking like if the situation was symmetrical. You > > defending ~comp, and me defending comp. But that is not the case. I > > am nowhere defending the idea that comp is true. I am agnostic on > > this. > > > > I think that you are pseudo-agnostic on it, and have admitted as > > much on occasion, but that's ok with me either way. > > > > I am not convince by your argument against comp, that's all. That is > > the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp. > > > > Part of my argument though is that being convinced is not a > > realistic expectation of any argument about consciousness. My > > argument is that it can only ever be about how much sense it makes > > relatively speaking, and that the comp argument unfairly rules out > > immeasurable aesthetic qualities from the start. > > > It does not. *you* rule it out. You make less sense. > > > If it doesn't rule it out, then comp is circular. > > > Proof? >
Reasoning. Comp has to begin without consciousness to explain anything. If comp begins with consciousness then you are saying that consciousness creates itself...which is fine, but it doesn't need computation then. > > > > > For the statement that comp makes "consciousness is generated by > computation" > > > Comp does not say "consciousness is generated by computation". I have > insisted on this many times. > "In philosophy, a computational theory of mind names a view that the human mind or the human brain (or both) is an information processing system and that thinking is a form of computing. " - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_theory_of_mind The Wikipedia definition agrees with me. If you are not saying that consciousness is a form of computation or product of computation, then it seems to me you have made comp too weak of an assertion. What do you say that comp asserts? > > > > we have to assume first that comp is not already consciousness itself, > > > > Comp is a theory. There are no reason to say comp is consciousness, no > more than to say that F=GmM/r^2 has some mass. category error. > Comp is a theory, but it is a theory that computation is what produces consciousness. > > > I read below, and I do not see argument. Only rhetorical tricks, including > attribution of many things I have never said. > > Bruno > > > > otherwise we aren't saying anything. > > > > > > > > > My argument predicts the bias of comp in predicting the bias of non- > > comp, so in that aspect we are symmetric. > > > Not at all, because I don't conclude in either comp or not-comp from > that. You do an error in logic. That's all. > > > The "error" in logic is necessary to locate consciousness. Your calling it > an error *is* the conclusion that makes comp seem possible. > > > > > > > > > > 2) you confuse truth and first person sense, all the time. > > > > I'm not confused, I'm flat out denying that truth can ever be > > anything other than sense, > > Then truth = sense, as I said. > > > It isn't though. Blue isn't truth or non-truth. Truth is a quality of > cognitive experience, but cognitive experience is not generated by truth. > > > > But is is a cosmic or universal form of > sense, and you have to related it to the brain and flesh in some ways, > even making them delusion. > > > I'm not relating it to the brain or flesh at all. You have to stop > thinking of sense as implying physical matter. I compare logically that > 1+1=2 either makes sense because there is an unconscious property of truth > which we can detect consciously, or that 1+1=2 makes sense because it > re-acquaints us with a quality of coherence that we are compelled to > accept. I think if it was the former, then it would be impossible to ever > get a math problem wrong, and people would come out of the womb doing > calculus instead of sucking their thumb. The latter makes more sense to me, > because it does not take concepts like "1" and "=" for granted, but sees > them as generalized stereotypes which are common in certain kinds of > perception (especially visual and tactile). > > > > > > > > and I'm denying that sense has to be first person. It's an explicit > > part of my conjecture. > > truth = first person is just an open problem in comp theology. > > > Not sure what you mean by that, or how it relates. > > > > > > > > > > I can be OK with this, for some theory which assumes non-comp, but > > not for an argument, which should be independent of any theory, > > against ~comp. If you use your theory to refute comp, you beg the > > question. > > > > By constraining the terms of the argument to disallow aesthetic > > sense to transcend logical truth, > > There is no logical truth. It is always arithmetical truth. > > > Either way my point is the same. You are only allowing arguments that > begin with a truth that is square when my argument requires that we admit > that the square is sitting in a larger circle. > > > > > > > > you beg the question. We are symmetric here too. > > No, I make assumption, where you are the one pretending having a proof > those assumption is inconsistent. > > > I'm saying proof is likely impossible and irrelevant. It's about what > makes more sense. > > > > I am OK with both ~[]comp and ~[]~comp. > > You are the one saying that comp is false. > I am not the one saying that ~comp is false. > > > If ~comp is true, then comp is false. > > > > We can agree on this. > ok > > > > > > > > You seem to have difficulties here. With respect to comp I am > agnostic, and you are "atheist". You pretend to know that my sun in > law is a doll. > > > I don't know, but I have no reason to give him the benefit of the doubt > > > Like in the hunting of the snark, you want the sentence first, and the > trial after. Well, that is still better than the NDAA, which evacuates the > trial completely ... > The trial can only be started if we have sufficient technology to trade brains and trade back. As far as I can tell, all other testing would rely only on measuring whether the imposter can fool a judge - which is irrelevant as far as actually authenticating sentience. > > > > > > and a long list of reasons and examples why I should presume that he is a > doll. (a completely new and amazing kind of doll, certainly, but a > non-person nonetheless). > > If we made a speech synthesizer program that sounded very realistic, would > comp tell us whether that program felt like it had lips or not when it said > words with a B or P sound? > > > To give sense to your question, show me how you represent the program in a > language that the program can understand. > Comp does not need to attribute a consciousness to all program. Only to > very special programs, a priori. > That's fine, but given a very special conscious program, what logic would associate the B or P sound with feelings of lips, exhaling, engaging the voicebox, etc? Wouldn't the sound be the same with or without that feeling? How then can you say that your sun in law feels these things just because it sounds the same to us? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 3) You confuse levels in theories. You seem to infer that a theory > > can only talk about syntax and formal objects, because a theory is > > itself a formal object, but that is a confusion between a theory, > > and what the theory is about. > > > > No, you're projecting that confusion on me because my results > > disagree with yours. > > The results as such does not disagree, given that your theory is close > to the machine first person phenomenology. > I just patiently try to make you understand a mistake, that's all. > > > You are too patient. > > > I agree. It is my power and my weakness. > > > > > I understand the mistake that you think I'm making and just as you do to > me, I ascribe your mistake about my mistake to the starting point of logic > as the square alone rather than the square inside the circle. > > > > > > > > I understand that the number 4 or the expression x are not intended > > to relate literally to the figures 4 or x, and I understand that > > your view of arithmetic assumes a correspondence to Platonic entities. > > It does not. You need only to agree that 0+x = x, etc. > > > But what is 0? What is x and + and =? > > > Nobody knows, but the point is that we don't need to know this to do > science. We only need to agree that 0+x = x. > We don't need to know, to do science, but we need to know to do a science of consciousness. If we are attributing consciousness to these figures from the start, then comp is not a theory but a tautology of untestable axioms. It makes all the difference...if arithmetic is known *not* to be conscious, then comp can theoretically be true, but if we cannot know, then we should go by our experience in which arithmetic does not seem compatible with aesthetic participation and say that it is computation which is more likely derived from awareness rather than the other way around, and therefore computation in and of itself cannot necessarily contain/generate/produce/lead to awareness/sense/ > > Do you agree with 0+1=1? > Do you agree with 0+2=2? > Yes, but so what? I agree with "B" and "P" are associated with lips, or that blue + red = purple. I believe in the extraordinary consistency of mathematics, but I do not think that sets it apart from sense or gives it the power to make sense experiences on its own. > > Have you a reason to suspect that for some natural numbers we shoud avoid > that 0+x=x axiom? > No, but the axiom and the numbers arise from the same modality of logic. Why wouldn't they reinforce each other in a modality which is all about the multiplicity of reinforcement? > > In science we never define completely what we talk about, we just reason > from principles on which a large enough audience agree. My point is that > here I use some simple notions, where you start from a notion "sense" on > which humans fight since the beginning. > I don't think that we have a choice. Unfortunately sense actually is what makes the most sense. > > > > > > > > > My view though is that no such entities can arise from anything > > other than the capacity to detect, feel, compare, control, etc. > > To just define "capacity", "detect", "compare" ... you need to assume > things like 0+x=x. > > > Comparison and detection exists on every level, but nothing needs to > assume 'x' to be a part of the universe. Detection does not need to be > defined, it is self evident. > > > Comparison is another kind of meta-detection. > > > > > > > > > To give arithmetic entities experiential potentials makes comp beg > > the question from the start. How is arithmetic truth not conscious > > from the start, in order to produce machines that find themselves to > > be conscious? > > Arithmetical truth can be said conscious, except that it is not a > person, and it is more the container and limiter of the consciousness > differentiating flux of of the universal numbers. > > > If arithmetic truth is conscious, then comp is circular. > > > Proof? Note that I was saying that it does not make much sense to say that > the arithmetical truth is conscious, although I cannot exclude it. Open > problem say. But comp is not circular as you illustrate by not attributing > consciousness to my sun in law. > I don't see where there is room for doubt. If you say A contains X then saying that 'X is contained by A' is a tautology. Nothing is explained, you have just moved dualism down to the level where arithmetic arbitrary contains unexplained non-arithmetic qualities. I understand that in the math you are talking about, you see indications that such non-arithmetic qualities must be present, and I don't doubt that numbers present a kind of negative rendition of those qualities by their absence, but I don't think that ultimately amounts to a support for comp. Rather, it is support for the ubiquity of the signatures of sense - even within the most mechanical renditions of it. The sun in law is only pieces of a sun in law swept up in a mindless current that plays an unfamiliar song in a familiar way. > > > > It has no meaning to say 'consciousness comes from arithmetic' if > arithmetic is already conscious. Calling something a universal number > precludes it from being a non-number like a color, flavor, or feeling. If > you give numbers feelings from the start, then it isn't very impressive > that machines made of numbers have feelings. > > > I only assume that I can survive with a copy of my brain done at some > description level. > There is no evidence that living organisms can be copied. To the contrary, what we do see is that identical twins and clones do not share personhood. There is no reason to believe that a brain that is not ours would host our consciousness just because it is a very similar brain. Nothing works that way. My car is not someone else's car even if it is the identical model and age. > > > > > > > > > > > 4) You take "sense" for granted, and you object to elementary > > arithmetic. Again, why not, in your theory, but again, that beg the > > question as an argument refuting comp. Here I can only suggest you > > to study a bit more computer science and logic. > > > > We can just turn that around and say you take "arithmetic" for > > granted, and you object to elementary sense. > > But all scientist take arithmetic for granted, nine take sense for > granted in the 3p sense of scientific theories (but cognitive > scientists can take it a important data ... in need to be explained. > > > Not sure what you're saying but it sounds like a naturalistic fallacy with > a dash of argument from authority. > > > In your dream. > I don't think that's what I dream of. > > > > > > > > > > > > You are saying that the assumptions of comp cannot be challenged > > I have never said that. You symmetrize again. > > > By aligning the defense of comp > > > > I do not defend comp. You are defending non-comp. But I have not yet seen > an argument. > The argument is that the map is not the territory. B and P sound can be reproduced electronically without reproducing any feeling of lips and speaking behind it. If you build a machine based on the reproduction, then we cannot presume that anything not explicitly observed is being reproduced. It's a good argument, and I have not seen you address it beyond accusations of racism and adherence to a fun but dubious version of the pathetic fallacy. > > > with conventions of logic, science, and arithmetic, I think that you are > saying that comp cannot be challenged. > > > > On the contrary UDA challenge it a lot, and AUDA too, for comp + classical > theory of knowledge, in a precise testable way. > I think its a pseudo-challenge, as it still must take the axioms of arithmetic for granted. The recipe for consciousness is buried beneath + and *. Numbers are already too complex and abstract. > > > > The idea of primordial sense is put on the defensive from the start, but > the idea of primordial arithmetic cannot be questioned. > > > "primordial sense" is like "god". Nice idea, but worst type of > *explanation*. > Explanation does not have to be of a good 'type'. Either it explains better or it doesn't. To me, primordial sense does seem to explain better, and everything that we have talked about only seems to affirm that more for me. > Arithmetic is simpler, and most people have no problem with it. > There's that naturalistic fallacy + argument from authority combo again. Child abuse is simple and popular too, but that doesn't make it the right solution, or even a good one. > If your theory needs that the natural numbers obeys different laws, then I > have finished the reductio ad absurdum of your refutation. > No, they don't need to obey different laws at all. I'm not trying to change what is observed within math or science, I am trying to change their relation to the rest of the universe. I'm looking at the physics beneath arithmetic, and what I find is sense. > > > > > > > > > > > > unless we first agree not to challenge the assumptions of comp with > > new assumptions. > > > > 5) Your assumption are unclear. It is still not clear if you assume > > or not a physical reality, > > > > I assume sensory-motive interaction. > > Words are not theories. You ned to provides 3p intelligible laws, or > you do pseudo-religion only. > > > No, I don't think that I do. That's the whole point. I'm saying that 3p > anything is subject to perceptual framing, it is not primitive. I need only > show that sensory-motive interaction has no plausible parts to it, and that > there are no counter-factuals of phenomena which can exist outside of > sense. If I apply the same standard against comp or physics, they fail, as > both are certainly known to us through sensation and sense-making and both > can be described in terms of sensory-motive parts. > > > This does not follow logically. It is not because knowledge need sense, > that there is no 3p reality. or you must provide a proof. > What kind of proof do you want? If I'm right, and there is no absolute 3p reality and knowledge does require sense, how should that be evident other than through the numerous examples of knowledge based on sense and the complete absence of knowledge independent from sense? > > > > > > > > > > > Physicality and realism are a set of qualities which potentially > > arise through modulations of sensitive/insensitive interaction. > > > > or how are handled the subject's references to the physical Cf David > > Nyman. It is not clear how you address the mind/body problem. > > > > I address it by putting the entire universe in the gap between mind > > and body. > > Like comp, thus? But just more fuzzy so that you feel free to insult > my sun-in-law? > > > I don't see that its fuzzy. The body is a representation across space of a > nested sense experience. > > > In comp too. Provably or arguably so. Cf UDA. > Sure, I have no problem with comp deflating physics, but I see comp itself as riding on a sub-physics of sense. > > > > > > The mind is a representation through time of a nested sense experience. > Your sun-in-law is produced backwards, from the outside in, so that his > presence *is* a body which represents nothing else. > > > Because you work in your theory, but this begs the question. > I'm explaining what the theory explains - that there is a difference between map and territory which is asymmetric. Maps cannot literally map anything but other maps, but territories can be mapped in every way without ever reproducing themselves completely. It's an observation that I think holds up in all cases. > > Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
