On Saturday, April 12, 2014 2:24:03 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 11 Apr 2014, at 20:30, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > His mind is reverse engineered from mind-like circuits that again > represent nothing else. The mind *is* the circuit. For a natural person, > the mind is a vehicle for personal attention - a glove of cognitive > transformations. I don't insult your sun-in-law lightly or out of > prejudice, I only explain why he is likely only a shadow of human > intelligence cast in mechanical clothing. > > >> >> >> >> > Perceptual relativity creates mind-like and body-like qualities to >> > represent distance between categories of experience. >> >> Well, nice, but that is already what the machine does, and it makes >> this testable. >> > > I don't think that the machine creates any qualities or appreciates them, > it only quantifies some common aspects of theoretical/generic experience. > > > I know you don't think, but that is not an argument. >
The assertion that the machine does create such qualities and appreciation is not an argument either. The question is which seems more plausible given everything that we can understand. > > > > > >> >> >> >> > >> > 6) Stathis' point: what in the brain/body would be responsible for >> > its non Turing emulability. >> > >> > The same thing that is responsible for consciousness. In my view, it >> > is backward to begin from a brain and say why won't a copy of this >> > be conscious. Instead we must begin with a life experience and ask >> > why we would assume it can be reduced to the functions of an object. >> > It is only if we buy into our 1p sense of realism for 3p objects >> > completely that we could make that assumption. >> >> You avoid the question. >> > > I don't see how. You are assuming that the brain produces consciousness > > > > Not at all. Please study comp and its consequence. > This isn't about the consequence of comp, its about the attempt to force a validation of comp by bringing the Church-Turing and the brain into it. > > > whereas my view is that the brain is a representation of human qualities > of consciousness from the 3p body view. > > > As any physical object. That is a comp consequence. > Yes, but then how can you use that view of the brain to justify comp? We agree that the brain, even assuming it is Turing emulable, is only a footprint of the total consciousness, so why would emulating a footprint lead to the foot? It's the same thing over and over again. I say the map is not the territory and you say that makes me a racist against maps. > > > > The 3p view may or may not be Turing emulable, as it is influenced by > phenomena which is ~p immeasurable. > > > The phsyical 3p viex is not Turing emulable indeed. Again, that is a > consequence of comp. > That's why I say that your " 6) Stathis' point: what in the brain/body would be responsible for > its non Turing emulability." is invalid because it presumes that the possibility of the brain being Turing emulable would validate comp. If the footprint is a machine, then the foot must be also...I assert that it does not follow logically. > > > >> >> >> > >> > Saying that my sun-in-law is a zombie/doll is based on your non- >> > comp, it is not an argument for non-comp. Begging question again. >> > >> > My non-comp leads to the conclusion that comp cannot be defeated by >> > argument, >> >> But I proved it can. It is the main whole point. Comp can be defeated >> by reason, and by experiments. You have still not study it. >> > > No, I'm saying that is false falsifiability in this case. We cannot trust > the square theory to judge its own completeness, as it will find that > indeed it seems to be square. This is what Godel is all about. > > > You make to big jumps. > I still make it to the other side. > > > > > > All I am doing is adapting it to consciousness so that the whole of > arithmetic truth and logic constitutes a kind of formal system which cannot > contain awareness itself. > > >> >> >> > so it is circular to demand that it must be. Feeling cannot be >> > proved, but that does not mean it is not more real than logic or >> > theory. Feeling doesn't have to be correct in its content, but the >> > fact of feeling is the only undeniable fact. >> >> yes. That's eaxctly what the machine says. Should I conclude that you >> are a machine from this? >> No, but I can conclude that this is not an argument. >> >> > You would be concluding that based on preference for the modes of thought > that you prefer though. > > >> >> > >> > 7) your critics of logic is self-defeating, and unanswerable. >> > >> > If logic could be defeated with logic, then Godel would be wrong. >> >> OK, but that's a reason more to not criticize the use of logic in >> argument. >> > > Logic is fine in arguments, until you get to elements and axioms. Then we > have only sense to go on...which is another clue that sense supersedes > logic. > > >> >> >> >> > >> > You can use it to pretend anything, and it looks like you are doing >> > exactly that. You make my point, as I explained you. In fact that >> > closes the discussion. Of course, by abandoning logic, you can still >> > pretend to have refute comp, but you can pretend anything at this >> > stage. >> > >> > I'm not pretending. I'm here in reality to defend sense, while comp >> > is a theory that can only be defended theoretically. >> >> On the contrary, UDA illustrate its practice, nd you are the one doing >> something quite theoretical to draw negative conclusion about the >> possible consciousness of some entities. You defend Craig's sense >> only, and defend no-sense for all machines. >> > > I draw a negative conclusion not only on consciousness but on machine > entities in general. I don't think that machines are 'things in > themselves'. I don't see anything proprietary about the view that I defend. > > > You can defend that view, but you can't infer that comp is contradictory > from such a view. that is circular. > Is it circular to say that the footprint is not the foot? Is it circular to say that footprints are caused by shoes which are caused by humans designing clothes for their feet? To me, defending comp is defending the position that footprints are inevitable arithmetic beings, and that people who walk in shoes are a remarkable but theoretically inevitable consequence of the laws of footprints. > You confess here that you do philosophy. Comp is something precise enough > so that if it is contradictory, you can coinvince aaveryone. But you > convince no one, because you refuse to reason. You invoke your non)comp > intuition at the start. > Non comp must be invoked from the start, just as comp must be invoked from the start. The difference is that I invoke what I cannot deny (awareness) where comp invokes arithmetic relations which I see as clearly abstracted from awareness and exist within awareness. > > > > > >> >> >> > >> > >> > You seem to want to extend the lack of rigor of the human science >> > and religion in science, where I want to encourage the same rigor in >> > both human science (and religion) and exact science. I show that it >> > is very easy to do, as it consists just in avoiding reference to 1p, >> > in the argumentation (NOT in the subject matter of course), or to >> > add "interrogation mark" and being clear on what is assumed and what >> > is argued for. It consists also in the complete abandon of >> > pretending any truth. >> > >> > Any truth except arithmetic truth...which is every truth. >> >> No, we just assume you agree with a small amount of math. > > > Why would we assume that? > > > > To progress. > We can progress assuming the opposite also. No reason to have to pick one. > > > > > >> Assume is >> different from pretending it is true. >> The theorem convinces everyone patient enough, because everyone agrees >> with 0+x=0, and similar. And it does not conclude anything on the >> truth of comp or ~comp. It just provides a way to test comp + the >> classical theory of knowledge. >> >> You have just no argument that comp is false, so stop pretending, > > > I'm not pretending anything. I do have an argument, but it is that any > argument to prove or disprove comp is biased from the start. The > expectation of proof in an argument is a 3p expectation that screens out > direct awareness from the start. > > > Not really. > Proof? > > > > We know that we cannot make our legs stand by arguing with them or proving > that standing can occur, we must exercise direct sensory-motive > participation and move our legs by ourselves. > > >> and >> just assume this if you want, but your phenomenology does not need >> this. Comp mighty be false, but you need far better argument, > > > You demand that the subtlest, most delicate truth in the universe kneel > down to the vending machine of comp and bash it open with a brick. That's > not the way that it works. The machine gets nothing from me. Not a single > coin. I know that it has nothing without our patronage, and gives nothing > back but its own mindless rules, empty images, plastic music, and rude > interventions. > > >> and for >> this much more humility and study the worlds of many others and the >> training in "scientific" argumentation. >> > > There is little humility in comp. I see it as an ideology which feigns > politeness but actually buries consciousness alive. > > > Rhetoric. > > You can answer this, but in my reply, I will just say if I see or not an > argument. > Can sense not be allowed to represent itself in your court of argument? Craig > > > Bruno > > > > Craig > > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
