On 13 Apr 2014, at 00:28, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Saturday, April 12, 2014 2:24:03 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Apr 2014, at 20:30, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Friday, April 11, 2014 12:16:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Apr 2014, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> On Thursday, April 10, 2014 6:42:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Craig,
>
> I have already commented that type of non-argument. Once we get
> closer to a refutation of your attempt to show that your argument
> against comp is not valid, you vindicate being illogical,
>
> I don't vindicate being illogical, I vindicate being more logical
> about factoring in the limitations of logic in modeling the deeper
> aspects of nature and consciousness. Logically we must not presume
> to rely on logic alone to argue the nature of awareness, from which
> logic seems to arise.
>
> so I am not sure that repeating my argument can help.
>
>
> I will just sum up:
>
> 1) You keep talking like if the situation was symmetrical. You
> defending ~comp, and me defending comp. But that is not the case. I
> am nowhere defending the idea that comp is true. I am agnostic on
> this.
>
> I think that you are pseudo-agnostic on it, and have admitted as
> much on occasion, but that's ok with me either way.
>
> I am not convince by your argument against comp, that's all. That is
> the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp.
>
> Part of my argument though is that being convinced is not a
> realistic expectation of any argument about consciousness. My
> argument is that it can only ever be about how much sense it makes
> relatively speaking, and that the comp argument unfairly rules out
> immeasurable aesthetic qualities from the start.
It does not. *you* rule it out. You make less sense.
If it doesn't rule it out, then comp is circular.
Proof?
Reasoning. Comp has to begin without consciousness to explain
anything. If comp begins with consciousness then you are saying that
consciousness creates itself...which is fine, but it doesn't need
computation then.
You will not convince me that my sun in law *has to be* a zombie or a
doll with argument like that, which mocks completely what I have done.
For the statement that comp makes "consciousness is generated by
computation"
Comp does not say "consciousness is generated by computation". I
have insisted on this many times.
"In philosophy, a computational theory of mind names a view that the
human mind or the human brain (or both) is an information processing
system and that thinking is a form of computing. " - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_theory_of_mind
The Wikipedia definition agrees with me. If you are not saying that
consciousness is a form of computation or product of computation,
then it seems to me you have made comp too weak of an assertion.
What do you say that comp asserts?
That my sun in law might not be a zombie/doll. Comp assumes that the
brain is Turing emulable at some level of description.
In my work, comp is an assumption, but usually comp is seen as a
consequence of other theories, and is usually an implicit theory of
all materialist (and that is a problem for them, as UDA shows that
comp does not marry well with materialism).
By materialism, as usual I mean the weak sense: the doctrine which
asserts the primitive existence of matter (or time, space, energy, ...).
UDA assumes consciousness as subject matter of the inquiry, and
assumes that it is invariant for digital functional substitution done
at some level, and it explains from that assumption that both
consciousness and matter emerges from arithmetic. Then AUDA (the
arithmetical UDA) shows, by applying an idea of Theaetetus on Gödel's
predicate of probability, how to make the derivation, and derives the
propositional physics, (the logic of the observable) making comp +
Theaetetus is testable.
we have to assume first that comp is not already consciousness itself,
Comp is a theory. There are no reason to say comp is consciousness,
no more than to say that F=GmM/r^2 has some mass. category error.
Comp is a theory, but it is a theory that computation is what
produces consciousness.
Not at all. I always says that a machine can instantiate
consciousness, or make a first person able to manifest its
consciousness, but avoid an expression like computation of brain
produces consciousness. Those expression confuses implicitlky the
machine []p and the non-machine (except in God's eye) []p & p.
Like in the hunting of the snark, you want the sentence first, and
the trial after. Well, that is still better than the NDAA, which
evacuates the trial completely ...
The trial can only be started if we have sufficient technology to
trade brains and trade back. As far as I can tell, all other testing
would rely only on measuring whether the imposter can fool a judge -
which is irrelevant as far as actually authenticating sentience.
?
If comp is true, we will never ever know it.
We can test it only if it is false, by finding a physical phenomenon
which violates the comp consequences in physics.
and a long list of reasons and examples why I should presume that he
is a doll. (a completely new and amazing kind of doll, certainly,
but a non-person nonetheless).
If we made a speech synthesizer program that sounded very realistic,
would comp tell us whether that program felt like it had lips or not
when it said words with a B or P sound?
To give sense to your question, show me how you represent the
program in a language that the program can understand.
Comp does not need to attribute a consciousness to all program. Only
to very special programs, a priori.
That's fine, but given a very special conscious program, what logic
would associate the B or P sound with feelings of lips, exhaling,
engaging the voicebox, etc? Wouldn't the sound be the same with or
without that feeling? How then can you say that your sun in law
feels these things just because it sounds the same to us?
You symmetrize again. I assume comp only, and is open to get a
contradiction from it. UDA is indeed very close, by showing it might
entails too much white rabbits, but AUDA refutes such use of UDA
against comp, as it shows that the observable obeys some quantum
probabilities, and it might still be the case that the white rabbit
phase random out, like in QM.
So I simply do not provide any argument why my sun in law is
conscious. That is philosophy, and it is simply not my job. he is
conscious, by the comp assumption only. That is not a question
begging, that is hypothetical reasoning.
But *you*, on the contrary, pretends to have a general argument, not
based on your theory, that comp has to be false, or that my sun-law
has to be a doll. But I have not yet seen it. In each case you refer
implicitly or explicitly to your theory.
You say comp is wrong.
I have never said that your theory is wrong.
I said only that your argument that comp is wrong is circular.
>
> 3) You confuse levels in theories. You seem to infer that a theory
> can only talk about syntax and formal objects, because a theory is
> itself a formal object, but that is a confusion between a theory,
> and what the theory is about.
>
> No, you're projecting that confusion on me because my results
> disagree with yours.
The results as such does not disagree, given that your theory is close
to the machine first person phenomenology.
I just patiently try to make you understand a mistake, that's all.
You are too patient.
I agree. It is my power and my weakness.
I understand the mistake that you think I'm making and just as you
do to me, I ascribe your mistake about my mistake to the starting
point of logic as the square alone rather than the square inside the
circle.
> I understand that the number 4 or the expression x are not intended
> to relate literally to the figures 4 or x, and I understand that
> your view of arithmetic assumes a correspondence to Platonic
entities.
It does not. You need only to agree that 0+x = x, etc.
But what is 0? What is x and + and =?
Nobody knows, but the point is that we don't need to know this to do
science. We only need to agree that 0+x = x.
We don't need to know, to do science, but we need to know to do a
science of consciousness. If we are attributing consciousness to
these figures from the start, then comp is not a theory but a
tautology of untestable axioms.
Nobody has ever suggested that we attribute consciousness to these
figure, nor even to any figure or machine. We attribute consciousness
to person only.
I think you have not read the papers, and you repeat simple mistakes
that are easy to avoid by reading the papers, or just my posts to you.
It makes all the difference...if arithmetic is known *not* to be
conscious, then comp can theoretically be true, but if we cannot
know, then we should go by our experience in which arithmetic does
not seem compatible with aesthetic participation
Too much ambiguity. My experience is that we can never know if
anything has "aesthetic participation", so it does not distinguish a
silicon machine from a carbon machine in their ability to manifest a
genuine conscious person.
and say that it is computation which is more likely derived from
awareness rather than the other way around, and therefore
computation in and of itself cannot necessarily contain/generate/
produce/lead to awareness/sense/
Do you agree with 0+1=1?
Do you agree with 0+2=2?
Yes, but so what?
So perhaps you agree that is true for any number n, and so you agree
on Ax (0 + x = x). And what comp says, is that with few axioms more,
of that type, we can extract a compelling theory which explains matter
and consciousness in a testable way.
I agree with "B" and "P" are associated with lips, or that blue +
red = purple. I believe in the extraordinary consistency of
mathematics, but I do not think that sets it apart from sense or
gives it the power to make sense experiences on its own.
You argue, like me and the machine, that comp is not provable, if
true. ~[]comp. We agree on this since the beginning, but you still
talk like if I was pretending the contrary.
It is your confusion between ~[]comp (we cannot prove comp) and your
string statement []~comp (I know that your sun in law is a zombie).
It is the second one that I challenge you to prove.
If arithmetic truth is conscious, then comp is circular.
Proof? Note that I was saying that it does not make much sense to
say that the arithmetical truth is conscious, although I cannot
exclude it. Open problem say. But comp is not circular as you
illustrate by not attributing consciousness to my sun in law.
I don't see where there is room for doubt. If you say A contains X
then saying that 'X is contained by A' is a tautology. Nothing is
explained, you have just moved dualism down to the level where
arithmetic arbitrary contains unexplained non-arithmetic qualities.
I understand that in the math you are talking about, you see
indications that such non-arithmetic qualities must be present, and
I don't doubt that numbers present a kind of negative rendition of
those qualities by their absence, but I don't think that ultimately
amounts to a support for comp.
But for the millionth time; I am NOT arguing that comp is true or
supported. You defend again ~[]comp, which is a theorem in comp. Since
the start I repeat and repeat again that you are CORRECT on this point.
All what I say, is that you cannot deduce validly []~comp from
~[]comp. From your non seeing something you cannot pretend the non
existence of something.
> You are saying that the assumptions of comp cannot be challenged
I have never said that. You symmetrize again.
By aligning the defense of comp
I do not defend comp. You are defending non-comp. But I have not yet
seen an argument.
The argument is that the map is not the territory.
The map is not always the territory, but the map can be plunged in the
territory, and there will be a fixed point, that is a point of the map
whose position will be equal to the position of the location it refers
too.
Something similar happens with universal number transfiormation, there
are fixed point, some syntactical-like (reproduction), some semantical
(self-reference).
B and P sound can be reproduced electronically without reproducing
any feeling of lips and speaking behind it. If you build a machine
based on the reproduction, then we cannot presume that anything not
explicitly observed is being reproduced. It's a good argument,
If you say so.
"we cannot presume that anything not explicitly observed is being
reproduced". That is just non-comp.
Why couldn't we presume that if the reproduction is done at some fine
grain level, even what is not explicitly observe (like any semantic of
programs btw, provably not observable) will be preserved.
and I have not seen you address it beyond accusations of racism and
adherence to a fun but dubious version of the pathetic fallacy.
We and others have addressed it many times: it begs the question. You
must prove that the negation of "we cannot presume that anything not
explicitly observed is being reproduced" leads to a contradiction.
i skip some paragraphs, some close to the extreme ridiculous.
No, I don't think that I do. That's the whole point. I'm saying that
3p anything is subject to perceptual framing, it is not primitive. I
need only show that sensory-motive interaction has no plausible
parts to it, and that there are no counter-factuals of phenomena
which can exist outside of sense. If I apply the same standard
against comp or physics, they fail, as both are certainly known to
us through sensation and sense-making and both can be described in
terms of sensory-motive parts.
This does not follow logically. It is not because knowledge need
sense, that there is no 3p reality. or you must provide a proof.
What kind of proof do you want? If I'm right, and there is no
absolute 3p reality
There might be no 3p physical reality, but there are simple 3p
arithmetical reality. You illustrated this by (thanks to God or Sense,
or better the <one who has no name>) this by agreeing on simple things
like 0+2=2, or ~comp is true entails comp is false, etc.
and knowledge does require sense,
No problem with this. I told you that replacing sense by truth, and
you tall exactly like the first person manifested by the correct
machine.
how should that be evident other than through the numerous examples
of knowledge based on sense and the complete absence of knowledge
independent from sense?
Why any of this would make my poor sun-in-law into a doll?
You evade the question. You decide that the 1p is the absolute
reality, but you have no more access to my experience than to the
possible experience of my sun in law.
I'm explaining what the theory explains - that there is a difference
between map and territory which is asymmetric. Maps cannot literally
map anything but other maps, but territories can be mapped in every
way without ever reproducing themselves completely. It's an
observation that I think holds up in all cases.
Not bad, but that assumes some primitive territories exists, which
indeed can't, in any sense with the usual Occam razor.
That is not a problem for your theory, if you assume a primitive
territory, but is indeed a problem for your theory to be compatible
with comp.
Of course, that, is not a refutation of comp, given the absence of any
3p evidence for a *primitive* territory.
Yeah ... the first person loves her territory, her home, and to be
unique in front of the mirror, and she is right from her point of
view, and that is why it is really important to distinguish the points
of view of the number with respect to its universal possible neighbors.
You miss the real, but interesting problem of comp, which is a
reduction of physics into the existence of stable coherent "dreams" in
arithmetic, which can avoid consciousness to differentiate too much. I
think to refute comp, you might as well try to prove that it leads to
too much white rabbits predictions.
Here, "your solution" will be: those are zombies, and only the
universal number implemented on our primitive territory deserve
consciousness. Possible, but not necessary, and that's all my point. I
helped to the task, as I give a theorem prover for the propositional
observable, and compare them to the empiric quantum logic(s).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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