On 13 Apr 2014, at 00:46, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Can sense not be allowed to represent itself in your court of
argument?
That is a very good idea.
That is quite close to what happens with the definition by Theatetus
of (rational) knowledge by saying that is a (rational) belief
(finitely 3p describable) which is also true (something not definable
in general, but well known in many situations). That truth might not
be computable (like in self-multiplication), nor definable (like in
Peano Arithmetic or by Löbian machines), and that is why we use the
truth (p) to represent itself, in the definition of know(p) by []p & p.
That describes a knower (it obeys S4), and explains the existence of
the fixed point, the locus where the beliefs are incorrigible, and
correctly so, from that necessarily existing point of view. It
explains the existence of proposition which will be trivially true
from the first person perspective, yet impossible to communicate
rationally to another machine.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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