continued On Sunday, April 13, 2014 12:44:37 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 13 Apr 2014, at 00:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > > and say that it is computation which is more likely derived from > > awareness rather than the other way around, and therefore > > computation in and of itself cannot necessarily contain/generate/ > > produce/lead to awareness/sense/ > > > > > > Do you agree with 0+1=1? > > Do you agree with 0+2=2? > > > > Yes, but so what? > > So perhaps you agree that is true for any number n, and so you agree > on Ax (0 + x = x). And what comp says, is that with few axioms more, > of that type, we can extract a compelling theory which explains matter > and consciousness in a testable way. >
What is the testable way of explaining consciousness? > > > > > > I agree with "B" and "P" are associated with lips, or that blue + > > red = purple. I believe in the extraordinary consistency of > > mathematics, but I do not think that sets it apart from sense or > > gives it the power to make sense experiences on its own. > > You argue, like me and the machine, that comp is not provable, if > true. ~[]comp. We agree on this since the beginning, but you still > talk like if I was pretending the contrary. > It is your confusion between ~[]comp (we cannot prove comp) and your > string statement []~comp (I know that your sun in law is a zombie). > It is the second one that I challenge you to prove. > Proof may not be the proper expectation. By Occam's razor we can see that the computer need not feel that it has lips in order to make a 'B' sound come out of a speaker. The speaker functions as mouth, lips, lungs, and voicebox but it has no connection to those things or their experiences. The sun in law is designed from the outside in to mimic external behaviors. Why would internal experiences match our expectations? Why should there be any internal experiences on that level at all? > > > > > > If arithmetic truth is conscious, then comp is circular. > > > > Proof? Note that I was saying that it does not make much sense to > > say that the arithmetical truth is conscious, although I cannot > > exclude it. Open problem say. But comp is not circular as you > > illustrate by not attributing consciousness to my sun in law. > > > > I don't see where there is room for doubt. If you say A contains X > > then saying that 'X is contained by A' is a tautology. Nothing is > > explained, you have just moved dualism down to the level where > > arithmetic arbitrary contains unexplained non-arithmetic qualities. > > I understand that in the math you are talking about, you see > > indications that such non-arithmetic qualities must be present, and > > I don't doubt that numbers present a kind of negative rendition of > > those qualities by their absence, but I don't think that ultimately > > amounts to a support for comp. > > > But for the millionth time; I am NOT arguing that comp is true or > supported. You defend again ~[]comp, which is a theorem in comp. Since > the start I repeat and repeat again that you are CORRECT on this point. > > All what I say, is that you cannot deduce validly []~comp from > ~[]comp. From your non seeing something you cannot pretend the non > existence of something. > and I repeat that I agree you are correct in saying that it cannot be proved logically, but I am saying that nothing about consciousness is logical to begin with, so the expectation of that kind of deduction working for consciousness is not valid. There is no argument for why I can move my fingers just by moving them, but it is nonetheless as true as any truth can possibly be. > > > > > > You are saying that the assumptions of comp cannot be challenged > > > > I have never said that. You symmetrize again. > > > > By aligning the defense of comp > > > > > > I do not defend comp. You are defending non-comp. But I have not yet > > seen an argument. > > > > The argument is that the map is not the territory. > > The map is not always the territory, but the map can be plunged in the > territory, I think only metaphorically > and there will be a fixed point, that is a point of the map > whose position will be equal to the position of the location it refers > too. > Something similar happens with universal number transfiormation, there > are fixed point, some syntactical-like (reproduction), some semantical > (self-reference). > I think self-reference can appear figuratively, as when a doll talks about itself. I don't reduce sophisticated AI to a doll talking to itself, since interactivity adds an order of magnitude more depth, but the principle is the same. We can be fooled by the doll, but the doll can't fool itself into thinking it is alive. > > > > > > B and P sound can be reproduced electronically without reproducing > > any feeling of lips and speaking behind it. If you build a machine > > based on the reproduction, then we cannot presume that anything not > > explicitly observed is being reproduced. It's a good argument, > > If you say so. > > "we cannot presume that anything not explicitly observed is being > reproduced". That is just non-comp. > I think its just rational understanding. Any number of physical structures could make a 'B' sound, but the math behind the B sound itself doesn't refer to any of those structures, let alone prefer any one of them. > Why couldn't we presume that if the reproduction is done at some fine > grain level, even what is not explicitly observe (like any semantic of > programs btw, provably not observable) will be preserved. > Because the reproduction is coming from a perspective of generic function in an information space rather than the totality of proprietary experience. The doll reproduces what we see of other people's bodies to some level of description, but it does not reproduce any of the experience of a person. The doll has no history, no parents, no nothing, its just a cleverly shaped object. A mental doll is the same, only it is a cleverly shaped information producing object. > > > and I have not seen you address it beyond accusations of racism and > > adherence to a fun but dubious version of the pathetic fallacy. > > We and others have addressed it many times: it begs the question. You > must prove that the negation of "we cannot presume that anything not > explicitly observed is being reproduced" leads to a contradiction. > It leads to a violation of Occam's Razor, which becomes a contradiction given that the ethos of functionalism relies on the parsimony of function. If we presume that phenomena which are irrelevant to the function exist, then we are making comp into hypocritical religion. Comp would be made to say 'everything can be reduced to computation, because computation can include whatever phenomena can't be explained. > > i skip some paragraphs, some close to the extreme ridiculous. > > > > > No, I don't think that I do. That's the whole point. I'm saying that > > 3p anything is subject to perceptual framing, it is not primitive. I > > need only show that sensory-motive interaction has no plausible > > parts to it, and that there are no counter-factuals of phenomena > > which can exist outside of sense. If I apply the same standard > > against comp or physics, they fail, as both are certainly known to > > us through sensation and sense-making and both can be described in > > terms of sensory-motive parts. > > > > This does not follow logically. It is not because knowledge need > > sense, that there is no 3p reality. or you must provide a proof. > > > > What kind of proof do you want? If I'm right, and there is no > > absolute 3p reality > > There might be no 3p physical reality, but there are simple 3p > arithmetical reality. You illustrated this by (thanks to God or Sense, > or better the <one who has no name>) this by agreeing on simple things > like 0+2=2, or ~comp is true entails comp is false, etc. > I agree with lots of things, but that doesn't mean that they are true in the absence of all awareness. > > > > > > and knowledge does require sense, > > No problem with this. I told you that replacing sense by truth, and > you tall exactly like the first person manifested by the correct > machine. > We can't replace sense with truth. Being dead can be true, but it doesn't mean that you can sense that you're dead. Sense is like a vast ocean, and truth is an iceberg floating in the middle. > > > > > how should that be evident other than through the numerous examples > > of knowledge based on sense and the complete absence of knowledge > > independent from sense? > > > Why any of this would make my poor sun-in-law into a doll? > > You evade the question. You decide that the 1p is the absolute > reality, but you have no more access to my experience than to the > possible experience of my sun in law. > You don't know how much access we have to others. You are buying into the story that your mind tells you about what it can know, when we already see from blindsight and intuition that we can know much more (and less) than we think. > > > > > > > I'm explaining what the theory explains - that there is a difference > > between map and territory which is asymmetric. Maps cannot literally > > map anything but other maps, but territories can be mapped in every > > way without ever reproducing themselves completely. It's an > > observation that I think holds up in all cases. > > Not bad, but that assumes some primitive territories exists, which > indeed can't, in any sense with the usual Occam razor. > I think that consciousness is the primitive territory. > > That is not a problem for your theory, if you assume a primitive > territory, but is indeed a problem for your theory to be compatible > with comp. > I want my theory only to be compatible with comp-turned-inside-out, which I think it is. > > Of course, that, is not a refutation of comp, given the absence of any > 3p evidence for a *primitive* territory. > Potatoes made of potato salad again... > > Yeah ... the first person loves her territory, her home, and to be > unique in front of the mirror, and she is right from her point of > view, and that is why it is really important to distinguish the points > of view of the number with respect to its universal possible neighbors. > You overlook the possibility that this view of separateness of our perspectives is not part of your home and your territory. The separateness can be overcome to some extent even using drugs and meditation. > > You miss the real, but interesting problem of comp, which is a > reduction of physics into the existence of stable coherent "dreams" in > arithmetic, which can avoid consciousness to differentiate too much. I > think to refute comp, you might as well try to prove that it leads to > too much white rabbits predictions. > I have no problem with a reduction of physics into comp, I just see both of them as aspects of the irreducible sense. Turning physics into math is good stuff. > > Here, "your solution" will be: those are zombies, and only the > universal number implemented on our primitive territory deserve > consciousness. Possible, but not necessary, and that's all my point. I > helped to the task, as I give a theorem prover for the propositional > observable, and compare them to the empiric quantum logic(s). > It's not that they don't deserve consciousness, its that only a rudimentary, pseudo-semantic quality of consciousness is required. I don't dispute the rope that makes up a fishing net feels something like tension on some level when the net is full of fish, I just don't think that it means that it knows its caught anything. Craig > Bruno > > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
