On 14 Apr 2014, at 21:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sunday, April 13, 2014 12:44:37 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
<snip>
That my sun in law might not be a zombie/doll. Comp assumes that the
brain is Turing emulable at some level of description.
What does the brain being Turing emulable mean in this context other
than that "consciousness is generated by computation"?
"consciousness is generated by computation" is misleading, especially
in the Aristotelian era.
How will people understand that consciousness generates the appearance
of matter, without any matter, if they visualize consciousness as a
brain product.
I don't even say that the brain is Turing emulable, comp only asks for
a level of description of the brain so that I would genuinely survive
or experience if a simulation of my brain (which by itself might be a
non Turing emulable object) at that level.
If sun in law is not a doll, and if he has a brain that is being
emulated by a Turing machine, then that means that the computation
of the machine is generating his consciousness.
Not really. You reason in the aristotelian picture, where brain are
real object, etc. The classical comp picture is a priori very
different, you have a 3p ocean of computations in arithmetic, and a
consciousness particularization process made in play by natural
coherence conditions among some infinite sets of computations.
In my work, comp is an assumption, but usually comp is seen as a
consequence of other theories, and is usually an implicit theory of
all materialist (and that is a problem for them, as UDA shows that
comp does not marry well with materialism).
By materialism, as usual I mean the weak sense: the doctrine which
asserts the primitive existence of matter (or time, space,
energy, ...).
UDA assumes consciousness as subject matter of the inquiry, and
assumes that it is invariant for digital functional substitution done
at some level, and it explains from that assumption that both
consciousness and matter emerges from arithmetic.
If you assume rather than prove digital functional substitution for
consciousness, then how can the conclusion that consciousness
emerges from arithmetic be something other than tautology?
Because it implies very strong constraints on the physical reality. My
point is that comp is testable.
Comp makes theology an experimental science.
In science, we never prove anything. We collect evidence and try
theories.
Then AUDA (the
arithmetical UDA) shows, by applying an idea of Theaetetus on Gödel's
predicate of probability, how to make the derivation, and derives the
propositional physics, (the logic of the observable) making comp +
Theaetetus is testable.
It doesn't surprise me very much, as I would expect that formal,
linguistically based interactions could be automated to an
impressive degree.
That is the computational metaphor, and it is another topic. Comp
implies that such metaphor is always wrong both for mind and matter,
independently of being useful.
It has nothing to do with qualia though. The presence of aesthetic
phenomena, including intention and care, has no place in AUDA as far
as I can tell, which would run monotonously regardless of the
consequences.
X1*. You just don't study, I will pass also the commentary which just
show that you have not study, probably because you believe that if
qualia are informal a theory about them has to be informal. But that
is wrong. As much as we can make a crisp theory on fuzzy set, the "&
p" arithmetical hypostases provides forma logics concerning informal,
intuitive and non definable objects.
hich is irrelevant as far as actually authenticating sentience.
?
If comp is true, we will never ever know it.
We can test it only if it is false, by finding a physical phenomenon
which violates the comp consequences in physics.
We could know if comp is true by having someone be uploaded to a new
brain and then uploaded back into their old brain.
Ah! So if my sun in law get his original carbon back, he would be
conscious again? And even retrospectively so, as you agree his
behavior remains invariant.
It seems like I just gave a perfectly legitimate, clear, and common
sense challenge, to which your response has no relation. You're
talking about remote and obscure technologies, but I'm using a
simple example from ordinary human experience.
To talk with me you are using that very technology. It is hardly
remote, and I guess you find it obscure because you don't study it.
But *you*, on the contrary, pretends to have a general argument, not
based on your theory, that comp has to be false, or that my sun-law
has to be a doll. But I have not yet seen it. In each case you refer
implicitly or explicitly to your theory.
I just gave you the argument. Since a computer voice can say 'baby'
without feeling like it has lips or a voicebox or lungs, then we
should presume that a computer can output logical or human-like
discourse without being conscious.
Since a bacteria cannot compose as well as Mozart, all carbon
creatures are dumb.
That's the way you extrapolate.
What you say again is <>~comp, that is ~[]comp, on which we agree
since the start, but it does not make your []~comp point.
As you repeat that error often, I really insist you follow the modal
thread, as it helps to deepen such type of nuances.
You say comp is wrong.
I have never said that your theory is wrong.
You're welcome to say that my theory is wrong, I would ask only what
in particular doesn't make sense and why.
Your phenomenology makes sense, and is similar to the natural
intuitionist canonically associated to correct machine.
It is your reasoning showing ~comp which are invalid. You ask us to
abandon comp to understand your argument, but that beg the question.
To refute comp, you must start from comp, and get a contradiction.
I think that we can pretty well figure it out by the differences
between automatic systems and human resources. Machines make perfect
slaves, humans make terrible slaves.
OK, so you agree that we can enslave my sun-in-law. Nice!
so it does not distinguish a
silicon machine from a carbon machine in their ability to manifest a
genuine conscious person.
It begs the question to say that a carbon machine manifests a
conscious person. My position is that the conscious person is
manifested from primordial sense, smeared across a lifetime. A given
slice of that smear will look like a carbon machine when viewed from
the outside by a slice of another smear, but it is not the slice
that produces the lifetime, it only localizes life into multiple
phases of spacetime relation.
Yes, the same with the relation between consciousness and arithmetic.
It is not the universal numbers which create consciousness, but
consciousness is an invariant through the differentiating of
consistent/true first person views in the infinities of possible
computations/continuations.
Bruno
...tobecontinued...
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