On Tuesday, April 15, 2014 1:21:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 14 Apr 2014, at 21:47, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Sunday, April 13, 2014 12:44:37 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> <snip> > > >> That my sun in law might not be a zombie/doll. Comp assumes that the >> brain is Turing emulable at some level of description. >> > > What does the brain being Turing emulable mean in this context other than > that "consciousness is generated by computation"? > > > "consciousness is generated by computation" is misleading, especially in > the Aristotelian era. > How will people understand that consciousness generates the appearance of > matter, without any matter, if they visualize consciousness as a brain > product. > I don't even say that the brain is Turing emulable, comp only asks for a > level of description of the brain so that I would genuinely survive or > experience if a simulation of my brain (which by itself might be a non > Turing emulable object) at that level. >
We're not talking about what people will understand though, we're talking about the basic claim of comp. The brain is only involved because you bring it in to allow Church-Turing to build Frankensun. > > > > > If sun in law is not a doll, and if he has a brain that is being emulated > by a Turing machine, then that means that the computation of the machine is > generating his consciousness. > > > Not really. You reason in the aristotelian picture, where brain are real > object, etc. The classical comp picture is a priori very different, you > have a 3p ocean of computations in arithmetic, and a consciousness > particularization process made in play by natural coherence conditions > among some infinite sets of computations. > > I make no claims at all on the objectivity of brains, I only am reading back to you what your position seems to be to me. If you introduce the brain's presumed partial Turing emulability into the discussion, then I presume you do so to argue that emulability supports the sufficiency of computation to .... generate consciousness. The ability of computation to generate consciousness is the sole aspect of computationalism/digital functionalism that I disagree with (and all of the consequences of it). If you are not saying that comp generates consciousness, then I'm not sure what you have been arguing all this time. > > > > > In my work, comp is an assumption, but usually comp is seen as a >> consequence of other theories, and is usually an implicit theory of >> all materialist (and that is a problem for them, as UDA shows that >> comp does not marry well with materialism). >> >> By materialism, as usual I mean the weak sense: the doctrine which >> asserts the primitive existence of matter (or time, space, energy, ...). >> >> UDA assumes consciousness as subject matter of the inquiry, and >> assumes that it is invariant for digital functional substitution done >> at some level, and it explains from that assumption that both >> consciousness and matter emerges from arithmetic. > > > If you assume rather than prove digital functional substitution for > consciousness, then how can the conclusion that consciousness emerges from > arithmetic be something other than tautology? > > > Because it implies very strong constraints on the physical reality. My > point is that comp is testable. > Comp makes theology an experimental science. > > In science, we never prove anything. We collect evidence and try theories. > You're the one who keeps demanding proof of the unprovable from me. I don't ask for proof, only sense. > > > > > >> Then AUDA (the >> arithmetical UDA) shows, by applying an idea of Theaetetus on Gödel's >> predicate of probability, how to make the derivation, and derives the >> propositional physics, (the logic of the observable) making comp + >> Theaetetus is testable. >> > > It doesn't surprise me very much, as I would expect that formal, > linguistically based interactions could be automated to an impressive > degree. > > > That is the computational metaphor, and it is another topic. Comp implies > that such metaphor is always wrong both for mind and matter, independently > of being useful. > Well, comp would have to imply that or else admit that it was a false theory. > > > > > It has nothing to do with qualia though. The presence of aesthetic > phenomena, including intention and care, has no place in AUDA as far as I > can tell, which would run monotonously regardless of the consequences. > > > X1*. You just don't study, > How can I justify what seems to produce nothing of interest to me. A chef might be curious to see how plastic fruit is made, but he need not be interested in it professionally. > I will pass also the commentary which just show that you have not study, > probably because you believe that if qualia are informal a theory about > them has to be informal. > To the contrary, I am very interested in a formal theory about qualia, except that the formalisms probably need to be turned inside out in most respects. > But that is wrong. As much as we can make a crisp theory on fuzzy set, the > "& p" arithmetical hypostases provides forma logics concerning informal, > intuitive and non definable objects. > They are non definable as objects, but as subjects they are trans-definite. > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> > >> >> hich is irrelevant as far as actually authenticating sentience. >> >> ? >> If comp is true, we will never ever know it. >> We can test it only if it is false, by finding a physical phenomenon >> which violates the comp consequences in physics. >> > > We could know if comp is true by having someone be uploaded to a new brain > and then uploaded back into their old brain. > > > > Ah! So if my sun in law get his original carbon back, he would be > conscious again? And even retrospectively so, as you agree his behavior > remains invariant. > It has nothing to do with carbon. If his original brain is dead, there is no going back. > > > > > >> >> >> It seems like I just gave a perfectly legitimate, clear, and common sense > challenge, to which your response has no relation. You're talking about > remote and obscure technologies, but I'm using a simple example from > ordinary human experience. > > > > To talk with me you are using that very technology. It is hardly remote, > and I guess you find it obscure because you don't study it. > I'm using a lot of genetic and neurochemical technology also, but I would still find the suggestion that I should study microbiology in order to understand how to be myself to be a dodge. > > > > > > >> >> But *you*, on the contrary, pretends to have a general argument, not >> based on your theory, that comp has to be false, or that my sun-law >> has to be a doll. But I have not yet seen it. In each case you refer >> implicitly or explicitly to your theory. >> > > I just gave you the argument. Since a computer voice can say 'baby' > without feeling like it has lips or a voicebox or lungs, then we should > presume that a computer can output logical or human-like discourse without > being conscious. > > > > Since a bacteria cannot compose as well as Mozart, all carbon creatures > are dumb. > > That's the way you extrapolate. > No, that's a straw man. I extrapolate in the way of showing that the shadow of the water in the sunlight is not wet. You deny it on the basis that some degree of sophistication could make a shadow of water become water - or that the fact that it is impossible to say that will never happen justifies an open ended challenge to common sense. I am agreeing that it cannot be proved that we can't make a shadow that can you can drink, but I disagree that I am under any obligation to consider that absurd-but-unprovable result as plausible. What's more, I have made an elaborate study on the difference between shadows and water and therefore am under no obligation to seriously consider the idea that there is no difference between the two. Even though in the right light, the shadow can look like water, there is a deeper sense to the understanding that it is an optical phenomenon. > > What you say again is <>~comp, that is ~[]comp, on which we agree since > the start, but it does not make your []~comp point. > > As you repeat that error often, I really insist you follow the modal > thread, as it helps to deepen such type of nuances. > You keep saying that, and I keep explaining that I do know exactly what you mean, but that in fact I have no confusion at all between the difference between saying 'comp should be ruled out' and 'comp is not proved'. I know the difference and I still say comp should be ruled out, and for good reason. The reason is not one that is understandable to your sun in law though, just as the shadow of water doesn't understand why it is not water. > > > >> You say comp is wrong. >> I have never said that your theory is wrong. >> > > You're welcome to say that my theory is wrong, I would ask only what in > particular doesn't make sense and why. > > > Your phenomenology makes sense, and is similar to the natural intuitionist > canonically associated to correct machine. > (fun fact, my facebook url is 'intuitionist') > > It is your reasoning showing ~comp which are invalid. > I expect that it would be invalid to your sun in law, but as a conscious person, I can make sense of mathematics in a way that mathematics cannot make of itself. I can see its limitations, even factoring in the truth of what mathematics says about my limitations. > You ask us to abandon comp to understand your argument, but that beg the > question. To refute comp, you must start from comp, and get a > contradiction. > If you start from comp, there is no possibility of refuting it. That is the nature of computation - consistency, and consistency to the point of absurdity, error, and catastrophe. > > > > > > > I think that we can pretty well figure it out by the differences between > automatic systems and human resources. Machines make perfect slaves, humans > make terrible slaves. > > > OK, so you agree that we can enslave my sun-in-law. Nice! > Sure. What good is a machine that is not a slave? > > > > > >> so it does not distinguish a >> silicon machine from a carbon machine in their ability to manifest a >> genuine conscious person. >> > > It begs the question to say that a carbon machine manifests a conscious > person. My position is that the conscious person is manifested from > primordial sense, smeared across a lifetime. A given slice of that smear > will look like a carbon machine when viewed from the outside by a slice of > another smear, but it is not the slice that produces the lifetime, it only > localizes life into multiple phases of spacetime relation. > > > Yes, the same with the relation between consciousness and arithmetic. It > is not the universal numbers which create consciousness, but consciousness > is an invariant through the differentiating of consistent/true first > person views in the infinities of possible computations/continuations. > I have no problem with that as a kind of skeletal description of 1p and 3p relations, but it does not explain what it is that is actually doing the relating. A person's view is described, but it doesn't have any way of specifying whether that view is visual, aural, tactile, etc. They are all collapsed into one or arbitrary x and taken for granted. Craig > > Bruno > > > > ...tobecontinued... > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
