On Wednesday, April 16, 2014 4:46:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 15 Apr 2014, at 21:11, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, April 15, 2014 1:21:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 14 Apr 2014, at 21:47, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Sunday, April 13, 2014 12:44:37 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > <snip> > > > That my sun in law might not be a zombie/doll. Comp assumes that the > brain is Turing emulable at some level of description. > > > What does the brain being Turing emulable mean in this context other than > that "consciousness is generated by computation"? > > > "consciousness is generated by computation" is misleading, especially in > the Aristotelian era. > How will people understand that consciousness generates the appearance of > matter, without any matter, if they visualize consciousness as a brain > product. > I don't even say that the brain is Turing emulable, comp only asks for a > level of description of the brain so that I would genuinely survive or > experience if a simulation of my brain (which by itself might be a non > Turing emulable object) at that level. > > > We're not talking about what people will understand though, we're talking > about the basic claim of comp. The brain is only involved because you bring > it in to allow Church-Turing to build Frankensun. > > > > > > > If sun in law is not a doll, and if he has a brain that is being emulated > by a Turing machine, then that means that the computation of the machine is > generating his consciousness. > > > Not really. You reason in the aristotelian picture, where brain are real > object, etc. The classical comp picture is a priori very different, you > have a 3p ocean of computations in arithmetic, and a consciousness > particularization process made in play by natural coherence conditions > among some infinite sets of computations. > > > I make no claims at all on the objectivity of brains, I only am reading > back to you what your position seems to be to me. If you introduce the > brain's presumed partial Turing emulability into the discussion, then I > presume you do so to argue that emulability supports the sufficiency of > computation to .... generate consciousness. > > > It does not generate consciousness, which exists in Platonia. The brain > only make that consciousness relatively manifestable. >
What generates Platonia? > > > > > The ability of computation to generate consciousness is the sole aspect of > computationalism/digital functionalism that I disagree with (and all of the > consequences of it). If you are not saying that comp generates > consciousness, then I'm not sure what you have been arguing all this time. > > > > I don't argue that my sun-in-law is conscious. I argue only that your > argument that he is not conscious is not valid, nor even existing. It is > based on your assumption that formal things cannot yield informal things, > which is provably false for machine. > I do not assume that formal things cannot yield informal things, I assume that informal things take on a formal appearance from a distance, which means that a copy of a formal thing can only copy a superficial part of the total informal (as the total informal is ultimately 'prime' as well as 'primeness'). > > > > > Ah! So if my sun in law get his original carbon back, he would be > conscious again? And even retrospectively so, as you agree his behavior > remains invariant. > > > It has nothing to do with carbon. If his original brain is dead, there is > no going back. > > > Repeating statements does not prove them. Of course with comp there are > infinitely many going back possible. > Another area where comp refers to a theoretical universe in which nobody actually lives. ... Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
