On Wednesday, April 16, 2014 4:46:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 15 Apr 2014, at 21:11, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> It seems like I just gave a perfectly legitimate, clear, and common >> sense challenge, to which your response has no relation. You're talking >> about remote and obscure technologies, but I'm using a simple example from >> ordinary human experience. >> >> >> >> To talk with me you are using that very technology. It is hardly remote, >> and I guess you find it obscure because you don't study it. >> > > I'm using a lot of genetic and neurochemical technology also, but I would > still find the suggestion that I should study microbiology in order to > understand how to be myself to be a dodge. > > > > By definition of comp, you are not a dodge when you get an artificial > brain, or an artificial kidney, heart, whatever, unless you are copied at > some inadequate level. >
Yes, but that's because comp cannot conceive of a brain as being different from a kidney, heart, etc, but in reality, of course, the difference between a person's brain and anything else in the universe is of the highest possible significance, while the difference between kidneys, hearts etc is irrelevant except with respect to function. If we put on the blinders of comp, we fail to see that consciousness entails personal presence above all other functions, and that presence is not a function or configuration of numbers at all. > > > > > You keep saying that, and I keep explaining that I do know exactly what > you mean, but that in fact I have no confusion at all between the > difference between saying 'comp should be ruled out' and 'comp is not > proved'. I know the difference and I still say comp should be ruled out, > and for good reason. The reason is not one that is understandable to your > sun in law though, just as the shadow of water doesn't understand why it is > not water. > > > > I will skip the irrelevant metaphors too. > Too, bad, they are probably the only way that we can understand the reality of nature. > > > > > > > If you start from comp, there is no possibility of refuting it. That is > the nature of computation - consistency, and consistency to the point of > absurdity, error, and catastrophe. > > > > To refute X, you have to start from X and get a contrdiction, > I am starting from X. As soon as we come to aesthetic experience, we get a contradiction. > without adding anything to X. > If not, you are just advertizing another theory. > I think my argument is pretty straightforward. If computation can exist without consciousness, then there is no room in computationalism for consciousness. All computations can be performed unconsciously, if any can be. > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I think that we can pretty well figure it out by the differences between >> automatic systems and human resources. Machines make perfect slaves, humans >> make terrible slaves. >> >> >> OK, so you agree that we can enslave my sun-in-law. Nice! >> > > Sure. What good is a machine that is not a slave? > > > Well, thanks for the warning. > Numbers are not creative, they are recursive. Universal number are complete with respect of recursiveness, and this is arguably creative, Creative how? and that is why Emil Post used the term "creative" to describe them. They > can refute all normative theories that we can do about them. So > recursiveness or recursive enumerability suggests creativity. We don't know that recursiveness suggests creativity, or if it does, that may be only in response to the creativity of our inquiry. > What you say is not more than: "machine are not clever, they are machine". >> It is only your same begging of the question. >> > Machines are clever, but they have no understanding, no presence...not because they are machines, but because machines are maps with no territory. > >> I conclude from this, and after this long exchange that you have just no >> argument. >> > I have the same conclusion about your argument. Craig > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
