On 6 May 2014 06:54, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > Craig, Liz, Brent and/or anyone interested, > > Again, it is just an attempt. Take it easy. I have to train myself, and a > bit yourself. > > You might tell me if this helps, if only a little bit. >
OK... > > *** (it is also a second attempt to send this mail, as it looks my emailer > has some problem) > > If you understand UDA step 1-7, normally you understand that physics > becomes: > > 1) a measure on computations, > 2) when seen from some first person perspective. > Given the original assumptions, and assuming there are no undiscovered errors in the steps - yes. (By the way I think Max Tegmark does a good job of explaining what this means in his book, even if he doesn't get to the reversal. He says you need to assume a "capsule theory of memory" and talks about observer moments a lot, which hammers home the point that any given OM could be instantiated in a computer, in a Boltzmann brain, in arithmetic etc. I think if one doesn't get that point then the steps seem a lot less intuitive. I just mention this FWIW. I haven't quite finished his book yet but in places it seems like (Max's version of ) comp for dummies, which is probably the right level for me) > > Now, the machine which believe/assume elementary arithmetic (and perhaps > more as long as they remain arithmetically sound), will have its rational > believability notion acquires a non trivial modal logic, known today as G > (or GL, PrL, KW4, it has some story so get many names). > > Actually the machines acquire a couple of logics: G and G*. G is the logic > of provability (believability) that the machine can believe, and G* is the > logic of believability (that the machine can believe or not, and indeed G* > extends properly G. > OK, this is what you lost me! What are G and G* again? (Sorry!) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
