On 07 May 2014, at 21:55, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, May 6, 2014 8:53:54 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 May 2014, at 21:38, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, May 5, 2014 10:26:27 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Then you can study how to define sequence in that theory.
Only because you have an a priori expectation of sequence which can
be inferred. Otherwise nothing is defined and you have only
unrelated statements. You need sense to draw them together and match
your intuition.
No. Logic is the art of making derivation without sense.
There is no art without sense.
Then substitute "art" by "mean".
If that were true and logic is a means of deriving (deriving what if
not sense?)
Deriving sentence, syntactically.
without sense, then computation would not need/want to develop sense.
?
I would say that logic seeks to derive sensible information using
minimal sense, but it all still goes back ultimately to sensed
interactions.
?
If logic could be accomplished without sense then it would be
impossible to make an error in logic.
That does not follow. Logic don't use sense, but the machine or the
theory can use it at another level.
Where are other levels coming from?
Interaction with other machine, introspection, etc.
Why would they by able to make errors?
For many reason. Some are deep like the incompleteness phenomenon,
which makes consistent that the consistent machine asserts consistent
but false proposition like "I am inconsistent", and others are
superficial, like a programs badly implemented in arithmetic (the UD
emulates all programs, including programs with bugs, and asserting
false propositions).
In fact, it has been shown that some machines can get genuine new
computational power by believing false irrefutable sentences.
The physical lwas does not make error, nut an altimeter in a plane
can be wrong when referring to the plane altitude.
You're smuggling in reality to prop up the theory. Of course real
technology can make 'mistakes', because in reality logic is not
primordial - sense is. If an ideal machine produced an ideal
simulation of an altimeter, I see no reason to allow that there
could be any such thing as error.
Ideal machine can prove the existence of non ideal machines in
arithmetic.
There would be no need to formalize logic because it would be
inescapable in every state of consciousness.
It is still needed when you communicate to others.
Again, that's in reality. Sure, we need to formalize logic...because
it doesn't entirely permeate reality. Logic must be discerned and
developed through sense experience.
I don't know what is sense. It looks like a gap of the god. It seems
to explain everything. You have not yet explain how to derive
arithmetic from your sense theory, still less anything which could
help us to make sense of your notion of "primordial sense".
That isn't what we see though. In fact, logic is very tenuous and
requires a particularly sober intellect which is focused on modeling
concepts in an impersonal sense.
That is even why so many people think that a machine which can
reason is just doing syntactical manipulation without understanding,
and at the low level, that's correct.
A derivation, in a formal theory, is valid or non valid,
independently of any of its possible interpretation (all those terms
are well defined).
Syntactical manipulation is still sense, it just has relatively
limited aesthetic qualities.
You are not trying to understand.
I'm trying to explain so that you (or others) might understand. What
you are saying is that low level mechanism is derived automatically
but that does not prevent high level mechanism from developing
interpretations.
OK. (Roughly speaking).
What I am saying is that these considerations are irrelevant to what
awareness is about -
Why. people agreed that awareness should obey a formula like []A -> []
[]A (for introspective belief: if I believe A then I believe that I
believe A).
which is nothing to do with complexity or interpretation or self-
reference but with presence itself.
This is prose. You cannot pretend that my sun-in-law is a zombie with
prose. You make a strong statement, but you don't argue for it: you
just repeat in different way axioms equivalent to that effect. This is
not arguing, and then you attack the very idea of argumentation and
logic, making it impossible for me and you to progress on this.
I am explaining why aesthetic experience cannot originate from any
sort of mechanism,
OK. But I showed to you that once that statement is made precise, we
can show that machines already argue like that. That gives a counter-
example. You don't admit this, because you reject precision and logic,
but then you can argue for anything, and we don't progress.
It is the whole of science which makes problem to you. Not
computationalism. Actually you said so in your earlier post.
and why all mechanisms rely on more primitive sensory and
motivational contexts.
But mechanism is what we do understand. You explain what is easy by
what is difficult. You replace easy mechanism by God-of-the-gap. It is
a bit like the creationists.
It is not the existence of arithmetic, it is the existence of 0,
s(0), etc. + the basic relation that you can derive from the axioms.
"Derive" requires sequence and sense.
Not at all.
Does that mean that dead people would be good at deriving relations
from axioms?
Apparently ... in your theory. You are the one saying that my sun in
law is a zombie, death as far as his consciousness is concerned.
Yes, the sun in law is a doll, but there is still low level sense
going on to keep the simulation going.
So when sense is brought by carbon, it gives rise to consciousness,
but when sense is brought by silicon, it does not, without us having
the slightest idea why.
It is the same capacity to reason which tells me that 5-3=2 which
tells me that sequence can exist without arithmetic but arithmetic
cannot exist without sequence.
It is a bit imprecise. I can define sequence in *any* turing
complete language, and they are all equivalent for computationalism.
You can define a notion of sequence as primitive, instead of
numbers, yes. That is the case for LISP, somehow, which is close to
combinators and lambda calculus.
Yo have never provide any theory, so I can't figure what you talk
about.
The theory is that logic and arithmetic are particular
continuations of sense, not the other way around.
Sense is a vague term. Not two human being understand it in the
same way. It is a bit like God. Important notion, but hardly usable
in theories.
If theories can't use sense, and sense is important, then surely it
is the theories that should change.
No. It is like "god". We can talk about it without referring to it
to assert a proposition, when we want make a rational communication,
which was what we were talking about. Of course in daily life, we
don't do rational communication all of the time. You change the
subject, and confuse level of discourse. []p does not refer to
sense, but []p & p does, for example.
[]p refers to sense also. p is basically sense^2. In the way that I
am using it, as primordial capacity for detection/appreciation/
motivation, sense would be more like ][.
You are playing with words.
first person = ][([] > ][p) Sense of local experience is more
privileged than abstract (sense experiences compared conceptually)
expectations.
third person = ][([] < ][p) Sense of local experience is less
privileged than abstract expectations.
The expectation of p as true is abstract. In reality, there can
never be any simple case of p - all p is a kaleidoscope of relations
and expectations within sense. Consciousness creates p, and it
creates many alternate ~p, semi-p, near-p, temporary p, ambiguous-p,
etc.
Machines can distinguish many modalities too.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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