On Thursday, May 8, 2014 9:56:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 07 May 2014, at 21:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, May 6, 2014 8:53:54 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 05 May 2014, at 21:38, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Monday, May 5, 2014 10:26:27 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Then you can study how to define sequence in that theory. > > > Only because you have an a priori expectation of sequence which can be > inferred. Otherwise nothing is defined and you have only unrelated > statements. You need sense to draw them together and match your intuition. > > > No. Logic is the art of making derivation without sense. > > > There is no art without sense. > > > Then substitute "art" by "mean". > > > If that were true and logic is a means of deriving (deriving what if not > sense?) > > > > Deriving sentence, syntactically. > > Doesn't sentence have to make sense?
> > > without sense, then computation would not need/want to develop sense. > > > > ? > Because it is getting along fine without it. > > > > > > I would say that logic seeks to derive sensible information using minimal > sense, but it all still goes back ultimately to sensed interactions. > > > ? > All logic is a kind of sense, but sense is not a kind of logic. > > > > > > > > > If logic could be accomplished without sense then it would be impossible > to make an error in logic. > > > That does not follow. Logic don't use sense, but the machine or the theory > can use it at another level. > > > Where are other levels coming from? > > > Interaction with other machine, introspection, etc. > Why would interactions entail a separate, fallible kind of logic? > > > > > Why would they by able to make errors? > > > For many reason. Some are deep like the incompleteness phenomenon, which > makes consistent that the consistent machine asserts consistent but false > proposition like "I am inconsistent", and others are superficial, like a > programs badly implemented in arithmetic (the UD emulates all programs, > including programs with bugs, and asserting false propositions). > In fact, it has been shown that some machines can get genuine new > computational power by believing false irrefutable sentences. > It's not clear that there can be any difference between true and false without sense, especially if we are saying that the UD plows ahead regardless of incoherence. Saying "I am inconsistent" would not be an error, it would simply be yet another inevitable thing that will be said eventually. If the UD cannot tell the difference between programs that make sense and programs that don't, then why would any program generated by the UD be any more sensitive? > > > > > > > > The physical lwas does not make error, nut an altimeter in a plane can be > wrong when referring to the plane altitude. > > > You're smuggling in reality to prop up the theory. Of course real > technology can make 'mistakes', because in reality logic is not primordial > - sense is. If an ideal machine produced an ideal simulation of an > altimeter, I see no reason to allow that there could be any such thing as > error. > > > Ideal machine can prove the existence of non ideal machines in arithmetic. > How do you know that the ideal machine that proves the existence of non-ideal machines is really ideal? What makes ideal machines fall into non-ideal states? > > > > > > > > > > There would be no need to formalize logic because it would be inescapable > in every state of consciousness. > > > It is still needed when you communicate to others. > > > Again, that's in reality. Sure, we need to formalize logic...because it > doesn't entirely permeate reality. Logic must be discerned and developed > through sense experience. > > > I don't know what is sense. > It is participatory aesthetic phenomena. Sensory-motive participation. Nested presence and representation. > It looks like a gap of the god. It seems to explain everything. > Sure, that's the whole idea: to explain everything. Computationalism tries to do the same thing only with computation instead of sense. > You have not yet explain how to derive arithmetic from your sense theory, > still less anything which could help us to make sense of your notion of > "primordial sense". > Arithmetic is derived from insensitivity or reduction of sense. Representation is a function of inter-qualitative distance. It is profound because all qualia share the same distance, which can be expressed most precisely as arithmetic, but the qualia itself is not contained within or projected through arithmetic. Primordial sense is the boundaryless container of containment - but specifically it is sensory-motive presence. Arithmetic, as well as all forms and functions, including space, time, subjectivity, etc are all containers which divide the primordial sense into novel palettes of local sense experience. It could seem contradictory to say that it is boundaryless but that it is also sensory-motive, but that is because the intellect wants to begin from zero rather than everything. The intellect wants to add red and blue to make purple, but the primordial palette gets red by subtracting all-but-red from white. What I'm trying to get at is that the default state of all possible universes is awareness, not nothingness or existence or an abstract 'possibility', but concretely aesthetic engagement - feeling/being/doing/sensing. > > > > > > > > > > That isn't what we see though. In fact, logic is very tenuous and requires > a particularly sober intellect which is focused on modeling concepts in an > impersonal sense. > > > That is even why so many people think that a machine which can reason is > just doing syntactical manipulation without understanding, and at the low > level, that's correct. > A derivation, in a formal theory, is valid or non valid, independently of > any of its possible interpretation (all those terms are well defined). > > > Syntactical manipulation is still sense, it just has relatively limited > aesthetic qualities. > > > You are not trying to understand. > > > I'm trying to explain so that you (or others) might understand. What you > are saying is that low level mechanism is derived automatically but that > does not prevent high level mechanism from developing interpretations. > > > OK. (Roughly speaking). > > > > > What I am saying is that these considerations are irrelevant to what > awareness is about - > > > Why. people agreed that awareness should obey a formula like []A -> [][]A > (for introspective belief: if I believe A then I believe that I believe > A). > Why would awareness obey a formula? I don't see that the flavor of a carrot for instance requires any kind of belief or belief about belief. I don't see that any degree of mathematical complexity should cause carrot flavor to appear in the mind of a machine, and it seems to me that the suggestion that it could arise from complexity nullified the entire premise of computationalism. Computationalism suggests that arithmetic is sufficient for all functions, so that the idea that some supra-arithmetic qualities would be conjured into being betrays the insufficiency of arithmetic. If numbers are so perfect, why does the carrot need a flavor rather than a simple compression algorithm to transfer the data from the carrot to the person? > > > > which is nothing to do with complexity or interpretation or self-reference > but with presence itself. > > > This is prose. You cannot pretend that my sun-in-law is a zombie with > prose. You make a strong statement, but you don't argue for it: you just > repeat in different way axioms equivalent to that effect. > You're overlooking my rebuttal to that criticism every time though. The rebuttal is that argument is not necessarily sufficient to approach presence. We cannot expect to move our own fingers by arguing with them, or to turn sand into thirst quenching water by argument, so too we must rearrange our model so that argument is a type of experience of the mind rather than mind being a logical prospect that can be argued into being. We already know that consciousness defies our attempts to locate it in physics or logic, we should not assume that we can get away with not factoring that in to our reasoning about it. If the map is not the territory, and logic/argument is a map, then why would we expect the difference between the two to be visible in the map? > This is not arguing, and then you attack the very idea of argumentation > and logic, making it impossible for me and you to progress on this. > I'm not against argumentation and logic, only that we must import incompleteness into them if we are to address consciousness as it is experienced rather than a toy model of its skeleton. This is Descartes, only made impersonal and universal. It's not about being or thinking as a human self, but it is about experience in general - about concrete presence rather than abstractions...a spectrum of sense. > > > I am explaining why aesthetic experience cannot originate from any sort of > mechanism, > > > OK. But I showed to you that once that statement is made precise, we can > show that machines already argue like that. That gives a counter-example. > You don't admit this, because you reject precision and logic, but then you > can argue for anything, and we don't progress. > It is the whole of science which makes problem to you. Not > computationalism. Actually you said so in your earlier post. > It could be said that the whole of science was the problem for Godel or Heisenberg also. What I am saying is that we can precisely and logically show that precision and logic are subordinate to sense. They can only be of use within a 3p box (or 3p facing view from a 1p box) > > > > and why all mechanisms rely on more primitive sensory and motivational > contexts. > > > > But mechanism is what we do understand. You explain what is easy by what > is difficult. You replace easy mechanism by God-of-the-gap. It is a bit > like the creationists. > It only seems easy because our description of mechanism begins by amputating the hard problem. We say Given: p, but there is no 'Given' and no 'p' without the expectation of our imagination. > > > > >> >> >> >> It is not the existence of arithmetic, it is the existence of 0, s(0), >> etc. + the basic relation that you can derive from the axioms. >> >> >> "Derive" requires sequence and sense. >> >> >> Not at all. >> >> Does that mean that dead people would be good at deriving relations from >> axioms? >> >> Apparently ... in your theory. You are the one saying that my sun in law >> is a zombie, death as far as his consciousness is concerned. >> >> > Yes, the sun in law is a doll, but there is still low level sense going on > to keep the simulation going. > > > > So when sense is brought by carbon, > Sense isn't brought by carbon, any more than Shakespeare is brought by the Latin alphabet. it gives rise to consciousness, but when sense is brought by silicon, it > does not, without us having the slightest idea why. > We have gone over this so many times. I have never said that matter has anything to do with the quality of consciousness - no more than IP Address blocks determine which websites can exist. You have to erase the idea of carbon completely and understand all phenomena as experiences which create space and time. The experiences which have led to human qualities of life are recorded in the public facing structure of our bodies, so that no other structure would be able to evoke the same continuity of experience. Carbon is not enough - you need sugars and proteins, lipids, etc. You need animal blood and muscle, glands, etc. You need bodies whose ancestors wandered the plains for centuries, and whose habits have been forged in large societies. Silicon can't even get passed the first stage. In some other universe it might, but in this universe, silicon does not present the correct summation of experience which can lead to us - neither does simulated carbon...again this is about concrete presence rather than form or function. I am saying that experience is the actual fabric of all phenomena, and that experience cannot have a substitute. > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> It is the same capacity to reason which tells me that 5-3=2 which tells >>> me that sequence can exist without arithmetic but arithmetic cannot exist >>> without sequence. >>> >>> >>> It is a bit imprecise. I can define sequence in *any* turing complete >>> language, and they are all equivalent for computationalism. >>> You can define a notion of sequence as primitive, instead of numbers, >>> yes. That is the case for LISP, somehow, which is close to combinators and >>> lambda calculus. >>> >>> Yo have never provide any theory, so I can't figure what you talk about. >>> >>> >>> The theory is that logic and arithmetic are particular continuations of >>> sense, not the other way around. >>> >>> >>> Sense is a vague term. Not two human being understand it in the same >>> way. It is a bit like God. Important notion, but hardly usable in theories. >>> >> >> If theories can't use sense, and sense is important, then surely it is >> the theories that should change. >> >> >> No. It is like "god". We can talk about it without referring to it to >> assert a proposition, when we want make a rational communication, which was >> what we were talking about. Of course in daily life, we don't do rational >> communication all of the time. You change the subject, and confuse level of >> discourse. []p does not refer to sense, but []p & p does, for example. >> >> []p refers to sense also. p is basically sense^2. In the way that I am > using it, as primordial capacity for detection/appreciation/motivation, > sense would be more like ][. > > > You are playing with words. > I'm disappointed that you think so. I don't see why it is so threatening. Instead of as closed [], denoting a closed context of private/local belief, I'm turning it inside out ][ makes sense an open/absolute pretext for all phenomena. To say that p is sense^2 I think is pretty straightforward. In order to have 'p', there must be a sense of discernment which extends exponentially through affirmation. One sense is a capacity to encounter, while another affirms the encounter as definite to the first. Sense is like chopsticks - put them together and you can pick up 'p', but there is no 'p' to pick up without some kind of chopsticks. > > > > first person = ][([] > ][p) Sense of local experience is more privileged > than abstract (sense experiences compared conceptually) expectations. > third person = ][([] < ][p) Sense of local experience is less privileged > than abstract expectations. > > The expectation of p as true is abstract. In reality, there can never be > any simple case of p - all p is a kaleidoscope of relations and > expectations within sense. Consciousness creates p, and it creates many > alternate ~p, semi-p, near-p, temporary p, ambiguous-p, etc. > > > Machines can distinguish many modalities too. > Sure, but I don't think they are aesthetic modalities. Craig > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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