On Monday, May 12, 2014 1:50:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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> On 12 May 2014, at 03:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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> We don't know that. It could be the case that all detections used by the 
> abstraction of the universal machine are done by the sensory substrate in 
> which the machine-program is instantiated. The machine is only an automated 
> map as far as I can tell. To make it more than that, the computations must 
> take place within sensory-motive-time<>space-energy-mass.
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> I will wait for you to prove this statement.
>

I think my example of the violin being unable to play the song about how 
piano music sounds might work. I would not be surprised if it could be 
formalized into a proof, except that you would need to invent new formal 
symbols for qualia (or use mine). If authenticity is allowed as an axiom, 
then it can be proved. If it is denied, then it is begging the question to 
try to prove authenticity within a formal system in which authenticity is 
specifically disallowed.
 

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> Nor with 0, s(0), s(s(0)), yes logic is not enough.
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>> I guess you mean that logic + elementary arithmetic is not enough. But 
>> that's is tautological in your non-comp theory.
>>
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> It's not a theory that I'm imposing though, its an observation. As sure as 
> I can be that 5-2=3, I can also be sure that no quantitative function can 
> generate qualia by itself.
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> Yes, but as observation the machine already say so. And you are right, we 
> agree on this, but when you disqualify the machine, you confuse her []p 
> with her []p & p. You confuse her body clothe with its possible relation 
> with truth.
>

I don't think the machine has a []p or a []p & p. They are all just steps 
in an Escher staircase, leading to anywhere or nowhere, but never somewhere.

Craig
 

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> Bruno
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> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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