On 16 May 2014 08:22, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: > On Thursday, May 15, 2014 2:19:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> On 15 May 2014, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 6:34:55 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> On 14 May 2014, at 03:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> >>> I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that >>> the failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be >>> empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of >>> logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows >>> logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't >>> know about what logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth. >>> >>> >>> Gödel has shown the completeness of first order logic, and this means >>> that what we prove in a theory written in such logic, will be true in all >>> interpretation of the theory, and what is true in all interpretations, will >>> be provable in the theory. >>> >>> Then Gödel proved the incompleteness of *all* theories about numbers and >>> machines, with respect to a standard notion of truth. >>> >>> This means that the truth about number and machines are above what >>> machines can prove, and thus what human can prove, locally, if we assume >>> computationalism. >>> >> > But computationalism is a theory about numbers and machines, so we cannot > truthfully assume it. > > I believe it's an assumption, and all we can do is bet on (or against) it. If we make that assumption, the UDA shows the consequences.
The assumption is a fairly standard one for scientists working in the materialist paradigm, I believe. Unless they use continua or infinities at some point, it seems quite plausible that at some level reality could be TE. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
