Not to bad (except for the references ...). They get closer to comp, but still miss the (comp) mind-body problem. They miss that deriving the Born Rule is not enough if they use the comp FPI (as they do clearly). The wave has to be derived too, like the logic of the observable has to be derived too, not from the wave, but from the set of all computations, with its canonical redundancy.

Bruno

On 31 May 2014, at 01:09, meekerdb wrote:




Self-Locating Uncertainty and the Origin of Probability in Everettian Quantum Mechanics

Charles T. Sebens, Sean M. Carroll
(Submitted on 29 May 2014)
A longstanding issue in attempts to understand the Everett (Many- Worlds) approach to quantum mechanics is the origin of the Born rule: why is the probability given by the square of the amplitude? Following Vaidman, we note that observers are in a position of self- locating uncertainty during the period between the branches of the wave function splitting via decoherence and the observer registering the outcome of the measurement. In this period it is tempting to regard each branch as equiprobable, but we give new reasons why that would be inadvisable. Applying lessons from this analysis, we demonstrate (using arguments similar to those in Zurek's envariance- based derivation) that the Born rule is the uniquely rational way of apportioning credence in Everettian quantum mechanics. In particular, we rely on a single key principle: changes purely to the environment do not affect the probabilities one ought to assign to measurement outcomes in a local subsystem. We arrive at a method for assigning probabilities in cases that involve both classical and quantum self-locating uncertainty. This method provides unique answers to quantum Sleeping Beauty problems, as well as a well- defined procedure for calculating probabilities in quantum cosmological multiverses with multiple similar observers.

http://arxiv.org/pdf/1405.7577v1.pdf


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