I've just finished reading that review. I didn't find the arguments as convincing as I hoped I might, especially since I'm sure I've already read and liked a book by Butterfield (on time I think?) so I was looking forward to some thought-provoking arguments and maybe something that would make the whole MUH fall down. But it was not to be. In particular, saying that something significant can be made of the difference between pure and applied maths, or "is" and "instantiates" is just simply assuming that Max is wrong, rather than demonstrating it. I'm not sure what to make of his electric charge example, it looks like a level confusion to me but maybe there's something in it.
On 19 June 2014 02:06, Richard Ruquist <[email protected]> wrote: > Nothing about only 37 bits of information available for computation in the > human brain in Butterfield's paper. > Richard > > > On Wed, Jun 18, 2014 at 8:57 AM, ronaldheld <[email protected]> wrote: > >> *arXiv:1406.4348* <http://arxiv.org/abs/1406.4348> [*pdf* >> <http://arxiv.org/pdf/1406.4348>] >> Title: Our Mathematical Universe? >> Authors: *Jeremy Butterfield* >> <http://arxiv.org/find/physics/1/au:+Butterfield_J/0/1/0/all/0/1> >> Comments: 17 pages, no figures, *this http URL* >> <http://plus.maths.org/content/mathematical-universe-0>; 2014 >> >> I just saw thsi. >> Ronald >> >> On Sunday, February 2, 2014 2:31:17 PM UTC-5, yanniru wrote: >> >>> Having just read arXiv:1401.1219 [pdf, other] Title: Consciousness as a >>> State of Matter, >>> my take on its conclusion is that human consciousness cannot be >>> understood >>> on the basis of classical or quantum mechanics- >>> the former yields only a max of 37 bits >>> and the latter even less. >>> Richard >>> >>> >>> On Sat, Feb 1, 2014 at 7:23 AM, Ronald Held <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> Liz I should have typed which of the two diametrically opposed camps >>>> has the most members in it. >>>> >>>> For another try I have read the following: >>>> >>>> >>>> arXiv:0704.0646 [pdf, ps, other] >>>> Title: The Mathematical Universe >>>> Authors: Max Tegmark (MIT) >>>> arXiv:0707.2593 [pdf, ps, other] >>>> Title: Many lives in many worlds >>>> arXiv:0905.1283 [pdf, ps, other] >>>> Title: The Multiverse Hierarchy >>>> Authors: Max Tegmark (MIT) >>>> arXiv:0905.2182 [pdf, ps, other] >>>> Title: Many Worlds in Context >>>> >>>> including arXiv:1401.1219 [pdf, other] >>>> Title: Consciousness as a State of Matter >>>> >>>> Am I going to getting anything different or more clearly explained in >>>> his book? >>>> Ronald >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>> >>> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
