On 05 Jul 2014, at 07:27, meekerdb wrote:
Yes, that's an interesting aspect of Bruno's theory. He identifies "provable" with "believes". But the the same kind of thing can be done in a physical theory: "believes" = "acts as if it were true". There's even a whole theory of Bayesian inference based on bets. It may not be right, but it's a theory of epistemology.
[]p models rational beliefs by any correct machine, talking about itself (in the 3p) at the correct substitution level.
It works on your instantaneous state, when you discuss with the doctor who plans the teleportation. In fact it provides the logic of any machines talking in a self-referentially correct way about its own abilities, provided she is a machine and that she believes in a first order logic specification of its representation at some level.
[]p & <>t is closer for bets. It already concern already a not completely bayesian theory of ("quantum sort of") bet (the certainty case, still different from the "knowing for sure", which basically does not exist except for consciousness).
I don't have to identify "provable" and believe. It is that the notion of provability, thanks Gödel, share enough of the axiomatic of belief to allow an ideal case study of the correct person. It is enough to derive physics along its FPI statistics (re)definition.
Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
