I wish that often, but then I'm (a) pernickety* about grammar and spelling, and (b) generally in a hurry!
*Or a word spelled something like that! On 18 August 2014 23:44, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 17 Aug 2014, at 07:23, LizR wrote: > > PS You do know you can delete posts from the EL, don't you? > > > > But not from the mail boxes. Besides, I am against all post deletions, > except on facebook when people use your wall for advertising, or when they > repeat insults. > > What would be nice is an ability to edit mails, for the typo. > > Bruno > > > > On 17 August 2014 17:23, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Never mind, you stated your position nice and clearly, perhaps more >> clearly than you normally do on the EL. >> >> (...or is that why you're saying "OOPS!" ? :-) >> >> >> On 17 August 2014 16:54, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> OOPS! I didn't intend to post this to the everything-list; although it >>> may serve as an introduction for James Lindsay if he decides to join the >>> list. I wrote to him after reading his book "dot dot do" which is about >>> infinity in mathematics and philosophy. >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> >>> On 8/16/2014 9:28 PM, meekerdb wrote: >>> >>> On 8/16/2014 4:57 PM, James Lindsay wrote: >>> >>> Hi Brent, >>> >>> Thanks for the note. I like the thought about mathematics as a >>> refinement of language. I also think of it as a specialization of >>> philosophy, or even a highly distilled variant upon it with limited scope. >>> Indeed, I frequently conceive of mathematics as a branch of philosophy >>> where we (mostly) agree upon the axioms and (mostly) know we're talking >>> about abstract ideas, to be distinguished from what I feel like I get from >>> many philosophers. >>> >>> I am not familiar with Bruno Marchal, >>> >>> >>> Here's his paper that describes his TOE. It rests on two points for >>> which he gives arguments: (1) If consciousness is instantiated by certain >>> computational processes which could be realized in different media (so >>> there's nothing "magici" about them being done in brains) then they can >>> exist the way arithmetic exist (i.e. in "platonia"). And in platonia there >>> is a universal dovetailer, UD, that computes everything computable (and >>> more), so it instantiates all possible conscious thoughts including those >>> that cause us to infer the existence of an external physical world. The >>> problem with his theory, which he recognizes, is that this apparently >>> instantiates too much. But as physicist like Max Tegmark, Vilenkin, and >>> Krause talk about eternal inflation and infinitely many universes in which >>> all possible physics is realized, maybe the UD doesn't produce too much. >>> He thinks he can show that what it produces is like quantum mechanics >>> except for a measure zero. But I'm not convinced his measure is more than >>> wishful thinking. >>> >>> He's a nice fellow though and not a crank. So if you'd like to engage >>> him on any of this you can join the discussion list >>> [email protected]. >>> >>> and I am not expert in theories of anything, much less everything, >>> based upon computation or even computation theories. I remain a bit >>> skeptical of them, and overall, I would suggest that such things are likely >>> to be *theories* of everything, which is to say still on the map side >>> of the map/terrain divide. >>> >>> >>> I agree. But some people assume that there must be some ultimate >>> ontology of ur-stuff that exists necessarily - and mathematical objects are >>> their favorite candidates (if they're not religious). I don't think this >>> is a compelling argument since I regard numbers as inventions (not >>> necessarily human - likely evolution invented them). I think of ontologies >>> as the stuff that is in our theories. Since theories are invented to >>> explain things they may ultimately be circular, sort of like: mathematics-> >>> physics-> chemistry->biology-> intelligence-> mathematics. So you can >>> start with whatever you think you understand. If this circle of >>> explanation is big enough to include everything, then I claim it's >>> "virtuously" circular. >>> >>> Brent >>> "What is there? Everything! So what isn't there? Nothing!" >>> --- Norm Levitt, after Quine >>> >>> >>> Regarding your note about my Chapter 2, that's an interesting point >>> that he raises, and interestingly, I don't wholly disagree with him that it >>> is an integral feature of arithmetic that it is axiomatically incomplete >>> (though maybe I thought differently when I wrote the book). Particularly, I >>> don't think of it as a "bug," but I don't necessarily think of it as a >>> "feature" either. I'm pretty neutral to it, and I feel like I was trying to >>> express the idea in my book that it reveals mostly how theoretical, as >>> opposed to real, mathematics is. I'm not sure about this "more than a map" >>> thing yet, as by "map" I just mean abstract way to work with reality >>> instead of reality itself and hadn't read more into my own statement than >>> that. >>> >>> I would disagree with him, however, that it is related to the hard >>> problem of consciousness, I think, or perhaps it's better to say that I'm >>> very skeptical of such a claim. Brains are, however "immensely" complex, >>> finite things, and as such, I do not think that the lack of a complete >>> axiomatization of arithmetic is likely to be integrally related to the hard >>> problem of consciousness. Maybe I just don't understand what he's getting >>> at, though. Who knows? >>> >>> I also tend to agree with you--in some senses--about the ultrafinitists >>> probably being right. My distinction is that I'm fine with infinity as a >>> kind of fiction that we play with or use to make calculus/analysis more >>> accessible. I certainly agree with you that infinity probably shouldn't be >>> taken too seriously, particularly once they start getting weird and >>> (relatively) huge. >>> >>> There's something interesting to think about, though, when it comes to >>> the ideas of some infinities being larger than others. I was thinking a bit >>> about it the other day, in fact. That seems to be a necessary consequence >>> of little more than certain definitions on certain kinds of sets (with >>> "infinite" perhaps not even necessary here, using the finitists' >>> "indefinite" instead) and one-to-one correspondences. >>> >>> Anyway, thanks again for the note. >>> >>> Kindly, >>> James >>> >>> >>> On Sat, Aug 16, 2014 at 1:14 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> After seeing your posts on Vic's avoid-L list, I ordered your book. >>>> I'm generally inclined to see mathematics as a refinement of language - or >>>> in your terms a "map", not to be confused with the thing mapped. However I >>>> often argue with Bruno Marchal, a logician and neo-platonist, who has a TOE >>>> based on computation (Church-Turing) or number theory. I thought you book >>>> might help me. But I think Bruno would rightly object to your Chapter 2. >>>> He considers it an important feature of arithmetic that it is axiomatically >>>> incomplete, i.e. per Godel's theorem it is bigger than what can be proven >>>> from the axioms. He takes this as a feature, not a bug, to explain that if >>>> conscious thought is a computation this is why it cannot fully explain >>>> itself; and that is why "the hard problem" of consciousness is hard. I >>>> think there are simpler, evolutionary explanations for why consciousness >>>> does not include perception of brain functions, but I think Bruno has a >>>> point that arithmetic is bigger than what follows from Peano's axioms and >>>> so it is more than a map. >>>> >>>> I'm inclined to say Peano's axioms already "prove too much" and the >>>> ultrafinitists are right. Infinity is just a convenience to avoid saying >>>> how big, and shouldn't be taken too seriously. >>>> >>>> Brent Meeker >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
