On 24 Oct 2014, at 18:58, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:10 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:

> They are non-computable by a Turing machine - which is already assumed to have unlimited tape and time. It is likely that in the real world almost all integers are not computable too.

Any integer can be calculated with a Turing machine


That is ambiguous. You can give an intensional definition of the natural numbers by listing the

phi_0, phi_1, phi_2, phi_3, phi_4, phi_5, ..., with the phi_i enumerating effectively the programs with zero argument.

All natural numbers will have a definition among those phi_i, and thus are computable *in that sense*, but not all definition of a natural number of that kind will define such a natural number, as some programs will not stop.








that has unlimited tape and time, and even with a finite tape and finite time good approximations can be found for the rational numbers and some irrational numbers, even a few transcendental numbers,

Yes, all constructive reals can be defined in arithmetic, and even many non constructive one.


but for nearly all real numbers not even approximations can be calculated, not even with a infinite tape and infinite time. They're just not computable.

In classical analysis, that is correct. In intuitionist analysis, many models satisfy the Brouwer axiom: all functions are continuous, or all functions are computable. In some models: computable = continuous. It is interesting, and even useful for the engineers, but it brings conceptual difficulties in cognitive science (typically it leads to different sorts of solipsisms: it cannot solve the "other mind" problem, and it is a form of consciousness of the other eliminativism).




And if a mechanical process like a Turing Machine can't produce them can the Real numbers have anything to do with physics? I don't claim to have a answer I'm just asking a question.

Take the infinite WM self-duplication, it predicts that almost all 2^n, with n large, observers coming from such an experience, and who bet white noise, or non computable sequences, win the bets. So in a classical deterministic context we can justify the presence of non computable randomness in the subjective discourses (the diaries) of the observers involved. Now in front of the whole arithmetical truth, it is an harder question, but we can already ask non trivial question to the machines about this, and get some results. Normally, we should get indeterminacy below our substitution level, and quantum mechanics, when taken literally might confirm this, or refute it..

The computationalist hypothesis, taken with the classical definition of knowledge (the modal logic S4) in the cognitive science is testable.

Bruno




  John K Clark



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