On 08 Nov 2014, at 19:43, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Nov 1, 2014 at 6:55 PM, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]
> wrote:
> MWI struggles to explain the violations of Bell's inequality.
The Many world's interpretation easily explains the violation of
Bell's inequality;
I think Bruce was saying that the MW struggles to explain the Bell's
inequality in a local way.
I disagree with Bruce, in the sense that I take QM, that is the
verifiable interference of all terms of the waves, as a strng evidence
that what is real is the configuration space (at least in the first
approximations). Then the universal wave (meaning by this the wave
describing both the physicists and the particles observed) explains
the Bell's inequality verification in the (first person plural)
diaries of the persons involved in an Aspect-like experience on
entangled qubit.
From a physical points of view, everything acts locally everywhere,
and the non-locality exists only because the "final" observers are
themselves entangled with particular terms of the waves.
It is instructing to look at teleportation in the MWI. You see that at
the end, when Alice give a *classical* phone cone to Bob, she just
tell him in which of the four branches of the final superposition she
is, in the classical starting qubit base. In other bases, you get the
same proportion of Alice, but wtih a multiple of 4 (could be 4 *
infinity, also, as the position plays some role here.
That is why also, I agree with Deutsch that "soplliting universe" is
not a good picture. It is really just the equality of the tensor
product which is at play.
You X 1/sqrt(2)(up + down) = 1/sqrt(2)(you X up + you X down), even if
you don't look at the particle. (With "you" being anything you want).
If you decide to look at the particle up V down state, you only
differentiate, and that is a local phenomenon, but it is contagious to
anything you interact with, and 8 minutes latter, the sun itself
interact, so that if you want to see the particles in the
superposition state, you will need to make the sun no more recording
the facts, which will be very hard, as the sun is very hot.
It is the same with the EPR-Bohm singlet state 1/sqrt(2) (up down -
down up), but as Bruce points out, and I think you would agree with
him, it is not that clear. Yopu have to realize that in the MW
picture, that state describes an infinity of of worlds with all the(1/
sqrt(2)() up' down' - up' down' ). In this case avoidng the relative
proportion of histories from the two worlds apparently invoked in the
singlet expression does not work, and that give the feeling that we
loose locality, even in the Many world. So, the quantum is not
coherent with locality if we take the MW picture too much naively. The
"truth" here, again, is in the configuration space, where the
universal vector rotates.
yes the explanation is weird but any successful theory would have to
be weird because Quantum Mechanics is weird.
Weird, but if we assume computationalism, then it is not so weird, in
the sense that something like QM should be expected. If we assume
computationalism, there is a level where we are emulated by the
infinitely many relations, which are true independently of us, in the
smae sense that "17 is p^rime" is true independently of you or me.
This implies that whatever we find below the substitution level, it
involves an infinite sum on all computations. The math explains then
where the linear and the symmetries comes from, and how
"consciousness", even in the weak sense of first person reports of
experiences, break the symmetries, and makes the antisymmetric
appearances of the subjective experience.
Unlike General Relativity no same person would come up with Quantum
Mechanics unless forced to do so do to experimental results.
With the exception of those trying to understand consciousness, when
taking seriously the computationalist hypothesis in the cognitive
science. It leads to a measure problem, and the math indicates already
that QM is a solution of that problem. But it remains to verify it is
the unique solution of the math problem in arithmetic. Then we will
gain the conceptual apparatus to see what are really quanta, and what
are "only" qualia.
Common sense tells us that Bell's inequality can never be violated,
but common sense is dead wrong.
Yes,. Note that common sense is all we have, to understand that common
sense can be dead wrong.
But computationalism does not need empirical facts to predict a many-
dream-states-histories-worlds structure for the realm of the observable.
Of course you need step 3-7, at least, and it is even better with step
3-8. (in the Universal Dovetailer Argument (UDA).
> It can do so only in a very strained way, and that at the price
of counterfactual definiteness. It seems to me that this price might
be too high.
But it's even worse for the conventional Copenhagen interpretation,
it says that a electron's position and momentum aren't just unknown
they don't even exist until somebody looks at it, and if you look at
it in such a way that you can determine it's position then it's
meaningless to ask what it's momentum would have been if you'd
measured that instead. Many worlds says that the electron always had
a real position and momentum but when you (and by "you" I mean the
only thing the laws of physics lets third parties see that fits the
description of Bruce Kellett) measure the electron the universe
splits,
It is just you who differentiate, and I let you as exercise to
introduce the 1p / 3p nuance to make that "you" non ambiguous. If you
can do that, you can move at step 4, which explains at least why if
our body are machine, then below the substitution level, matter get a
little (qu)bit bezerk.
in one universe "you" measure the electron's position and in the
other universe "you" measure the electron's momentum, and although
they (the 2 yous) can't communicate with each other both are equally
real. So if you're a fan of counterfactual definiteness you should
be a fan of Many Worlds too.
I think so, but I have not yet a good picture of Kochen and Specker
paradox in the MWI. Might say more later. Paper by Hardegree, also
discussion with Russell Standish around the movie graph argument (step
8), confirms my feeling that quantum logic (and the []p & <>t, [] &
<>t & p logics) defines a logic of the conditional/counterfactual. I
expect also that counterfactual definiteness lover should feel more at
ease with the MW than with Copenhagen. OK.
Bruno
John K Clark
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