On 27 Feb 2015, at 08:07, Jason Resch wrote:
On Fri, Feb 27, 2015 at 12:41 AM, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
> wrote:
Jason Resch wrote:
On Fri, Feb 27, 2015 at 12:09 AM, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
<mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:
Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 10:17 PM, Bruce Kellett
<bhkell...@optusnet.com.au <mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>
<mailto:bhkellett@optusnet.__com.au
<mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>>> wrote:
Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 9:51 PM, meekerdb
<meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>
On 2/26/2015 7:10 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
So then the mystery of the Born rule is
solved.
I don't see
why/how adding collapse solves anything.
I[t] adds that one of the probable states happens.
MWI fails
to add that.
Isn't it enough when one considers the FPI (which
tells
us you
will only experience one of the probable states)?
FPI has been around a long time. In the earlier literature
on the
Anthropic Principle it was known as self-selection. The
problem is
that any such principle applied to QM assumes what has
yet to be
proved -- namely that anything that can be considered a
"self" or
"1p" to be indeterminate about.
All it requires is denying there is magic involved in the
first-person view.
That assumes that the first person view exists -- which has yet to
be proved from within the theory.
You deny that you are conscious, or have a first person view? Are
you okay with someone torturing or killing you?
If your theory purports to explain my conscious experience, you
can't begin by assuming that conscious experience as a given.
I'm not offering a theory of everything nor even a theory of
consciousness. But the existence of consciousness is a given to
which all conscious entities are privy.
Implicit in Everett's relative state formulation was an implicit
assumption of a mechanist theory of mind. In CI there seems to be
the assumption of a non-material, non-physical mind, which can cause/
initiate physical changes which no other (non-conscious) physical
things can do. I think the default position of any rationalist would
be to assume that we (assumed to be physical objects) operate
according to the same physical laws as everything else. What it
ultimately comes down to: is the mind affecting the wave function
(making all but a small part of it disappear), or is the wave
function affecting the mind (multiplying it such that each sees its
own part of the wave function)? Just because we don't see those
parts (from here) doesn't mean they don't exist (over there).
If someone created a duplicate of you in Andromeda, there
would
be no way for you here on Earth to know about that view
because
there's no interaction between your brain on Earth and your
Brain in Andromeda. Similarly, there's no interaction between
your brain that's seen and formed memories of measuring the
up-spin electron and the one that's seen and formed memories
of
measuring the down-spin electron. So unless you're operating
according to a philosophy of mind that allows it to violate
physics and learn/know about the other one, then there is no
way
to avoid the selection or indeterminacy about which one you
will
later subjectively identify with.
This is where the Born rule comes into play. You need some basis
for
assuming that small off-diagonal terms in the density matrix
correspond to low probabilities.
Why does Gleason's theorem work for CI but not MW?
Who is claiming that?
Brent did a few posts ago.
Gleason's theorem is a useful contribution, but the general
consensus is that it is not enough by itself.
What is it missing? Does Gleanson+FPI+a Theory of Mind suffice?
"Almost", I would say.
FPI + comp theory of mind leads to a measure problem, and SWE +
Gleason looks like the solution, except that it works properly (with
the distinction qualia/quanta) only if we justify the SWE from the
measure on the sigma_1 sentences (and their proofs which are also
sigma_1 sentence). The SWE must be proven in arithmetic. Mere
consistency is not enough.
Bruno
The formalism merely says that an initial state evolves
into a
superposition -- nothing is selected as a "person" in that
superposition that could self-select, or be an
indeterminate
individual.
You seem to be ignoring/eliminating/denying the existence of
the
first-person perspectives create by the brains that enter
states
of superposition.
You assume that this happens. prove it!
It follows from the SWE.
You can't just assert that and expect to be believed.
What part are you disagreeing with? That brains can enter states of
superposition? Schrodinger himself believed this, and Everett showed
how the illusion of collapse is recovered without assuming it (the
strongest piece of evidence for the MW in my opinion).
You should learn what the SWE does and does not do.
It describes the evolution of the wave function over time. There's
nothing in the theory to suggest collapse, because the appearance of
it can be derived without assuming it. It is like Netwon's theories
which predicted both that the Earth was continually moving and that
no one would be able to feel it moving (the illusion of why it feels
still). Therefore we could dispense with the extraneous "stillness
postulate" which informs us that there is a field on Earth which
affects all conscious observers on Earth and though Earth is moving
very fast it acts to prevent them from feeling that motion or
getting motion sickness. After we understood inertia, we could
understand both why the Earth is continually moving AND the illusion
that it feels like it is still.
MWI does not lead to a useful notion of probability that
can be
used, via the Born rule, to infer that interference terms
are not
important.
I don't understand the above sentence. Could you clarify the
meaning in terms a non-physicist might understand?
As stated above, you need a notion of probability,
Let's go with frequentest.
And how do you apply this in your theory? That might be a model of
probabilities, but it does not answer how your theory is probabilist.
Frequentism is an account of probabalism. Like my example to Brent
relating to Tegmark's cosmological interpretation. Within an
infinite universe, all things happen, and they all happen an
infinite number of times. Yet everyday probability still applies.
Flipping a coin still has 50/50 odds of heads/tails.
and the Born rule relating small terms to low probabilities, in
order to get anywhere.
Okay.
Attempts to derive the Born rule within the Everettian program
have
proved to be either circular or incoherent. So the work remains to
be done.
Work remaining to be done is not an argument against the theory.
It is for those who claim that their theory answers every possible
question.
When did I say that?
In any case, my point still stands.
Jason
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