On 4/15/2015 5:29 PM, LizR wrote:
On 15 April 2015 at 04:40, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, "Stathis Papaioannou" <stath...@gmail.com <mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> a écrit : > Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow copying, but > that cannot be a logical requirement. To claim that something is > logically impossible is to claim that it is self-contradictory. I don't see why a theory saying like I said in the upper paragraph that consciousness could not be copied would be selfcontradictory... You have to see that when you say consciousness is duplicatable, you assume a lot of things about the reality and how it is working, and that you're making a metaphysical commitment, a leap of faith concerning what you assume the real to be and the reality itself. That's all I'm saying, but clearly if computationalism is true consciousness is obviously duplicatable. QuentinIn order to say what duplication of consciousness is and whether it is non-contradictory you need some propositional definition of it. Not just, an instrospective "well everybody knows what it is".Comp assumes it's an outcome of computational processes, at some level. Is that enough to be a propositional definition?
I don't think it's specific enough because it isn't clear whether computational process means a physical process or an abstract one. If you take "computational process" to be the abstract process "in Platonia" then it would not be duplicable; every copy would just be a token of the same process. I think that's what Bruno means. But I think Stathis is thinking of a copy of an AI, not just a particular computation by that AI.
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