Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
<mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 4/15/2015 11:16 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 15:37, Bruce Kellett
<bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
<mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:
Bruno has said to me that one cannot refute a
scientific finding by
philosophy. One cannot, of course, refute a
scientific observation
by philosophy, but one can certainly enter a
philosophical
discussion of the meaning and interpretation of an
observation. In
an argument like Bruno's, one can certainly question the
metaphysical and other presumptions that go into his
discourse.
Yes, of course. I don't think anyone is denying that -
quite the reverse, people who argue /against /Bruno
often do so on the basis of unexamined metaphysical
assumptions (like primary materialism)
And the contrary, that primary materialism is false, is just
as much an unevidenced metaphysical assumption.
But it's not an assumption in Bruno's argument. As I understand
it, his theory in outline is:
1. All our thoughts are certain kinds of computations.
2. The physical world is an inference from our thoughts.
3. Computations are abstract relations among mathematical objects.
4. The physical world is instantiated by those computations that
correspond to intersubjective agreement in our thoughts.
5. Our perceptions/thoughts/beliefs about the world are modeled
by computed relations between the computed physics and our
computed thoughts.
6. The UD realizes (in Platonia) all possible computations and
so realizes the model 1-5 in all possible ways and this produces
the multiple-worlds of QM, plus perhaps infinitely many other
worlds which he hopes to show have "low measure".
I leave it to Bruno to comment on whether this is a fair summary of
his theory. I have difficulties with several of the points you list.
But that aside, one has to ask exactly what has bee achieved, even
if all of this goes through? I do not think it explains
consciousness. It seems to stem from the idea that consciousness is
a certain type of computation (that can be emulated in a universal
Turing machine, or general purpose computer.) This is then developed
as a form of idealism (2 above) to argue that the physical world and
our perceptions, thoughts, and beliefs about that world, are also
certain types of computations.
But this is no nearer to an explanation of consciousness than the
alternative model of assuming a primitive physical universe and
arguing that consciousness supervenes on the physical structure of
brains, and that mathematics is an inference from our physical
experiences. Consciousness supervenes on computations? What sort of
computation? Why on this sort and not any other sort? Similar
questions arise in the physicalist account of course, but proposing
a new theory that does not answer any of the questions posed by the
original theory does not seem like an advance to me. At least
physicalism has evolutionary arguments open to it as an explanation
of consciousness
The physicalist model has the advantage that it gives the physical
world directly -- physics does not have to be constructed from some
abstract computations in Platonia (even if such a concept can be
given any meaning.) If you take the degree of agreement with
observation as the measure of success of a theory, then physicalism
wins hands down. Bruno's theory does not currently produce any real
physics at all.
The discussion of the detailed steps in the argument Bruno gives is
merely a search for clarification. As I have said, many things seem
open to philosophical discussion, and some of Bruno's definitions
seem self-serving. When I seek clarification, the ground seems to
move beneath me. The detailed argument is hard to pin down for these
reasons.
Physicalism reduces to computationalism if the physics in the brain is
Turing emulable, and then if you follow Bruno's reasoning in the
UDA computationalism leads to elimination of a primary physical world.
But physics itself is not Turing emulable. The no-cloning theorem of
quantum physics precludes it.
Bruce
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