On 16 Apr 2015, at 21:54, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/16/2015 1:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So consciousness is not 1-duplicable, but can be considered as
having been duplicated in some 3-1-view, even before it diverges.
How can it be considered duplicated before it diverges?
By associating it with different token of the machinery
implementing it.
Are you assuming consciousness is physical and so having different
spacetime location can distinguish two otherwise indiscernible set
of thoughts?
No, it can't, in the 1-view, but it can in the 3-1 view. OK?
I'm not sure what 3-1 view means,
It is the content of the diary of the observer outside the box (like
in sane04), but on the consciousness of the copies involved. This is
for the people who say that they will be conscious in W and M. That is
true, but the "pure" 1-view is that they will be conscious in only one
city (even if that happens in both cities).
In the math part, this is captured by [1][0]A, with [0]A = the usual
bewesibar of Gödel, and [1]A = [0]A & A (Theaetetus).
but if you mean in the sense of running on two different machines
then I agree.
OK.
That means duplication of consciousness/computation depends on
distinguishability of the physical substrate with no distinction in
the consciousness/computation.
OK. Like when the guy has already been multiplied in W and M, but has
not yet open the door. We assume of course that the two boxes are
identical from inside, no windows, and the air molecules at the same
place (for example). That can be made absolutely identical in the step
6, where the reconstitutions are made in a virtual environment.
But is that the duplication envisioned in the M-W thought
experiment?
Yes, at different steps.
I find I'm confused about that. In our quantum-mechanical world it
is impossible to duplicate something in an unknown state. One could
duplicate a human being in the rough classical sense of structure at
the molecular composition level, but not the molecular states. Such
duplicates would be similar as I'm similar to myself of yesterday -
but they would instantly diverge in thoughts, even without seeing
Moscow or Washington.
In practice, yes. Assuming the duplication is done in a real world,
and assuming QM. But in step six, you can manage the environments to
be themselves perfectly emulated and 100% identical. That is all what
is needed for the reasoning.
Yet it seems Bruno's argument is based on deterministic computation
At my substitution level. But this will entail that the real world,
whatever it can be, is non deterministic. We "WM" duplicate on all the
different computations in the UD* (in arithmetic) which go through my
local current state.
and requires the duplication and subsequent thoughts to be
duplicates at a deterministic classcial level so that the M-man and
W-man on diverge in thought when they see different things in their
respective cities.
Yes. That is why the H-man cannot predict which divergence he will
live. But sometimes we mention the state of the person before he or
she open the doors, for example to address a question like "would a
tiny oxygen atom in the box makes a difference in the measure or
not", Here there is almost a matter of convention to say that there
are two or one consciousness. We can ascribe consciousness to the
different people in the different box, but that is a 3-1 view. The 1-
views feels to be in once city, and not in the other.
Bruno
Brent
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