On 14 May 2015, at 07:25, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/13/2015 5:32 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, May 14, 2015 at 11:26:17AM +1200, LizR wrote:
On 13 May 2015 at 18:20, Russell Standish <[email protected]>
wrote:
For a robust ontology, counterfactuals are physically
instantiated,
therefore the MGA is invalid.
Can you elaborate on this? ISTM that counterfactuals aren't, and
indeed
can't, be physically instantiated. (Isn't that what being
counterfactual
means?!)
No - counterfactual just means not in this universe. If its not in
any
universe, then its not just counterfactual, but actually
illogical, or
impossible, or something.
If "not in any universe" is meant in the Kripke sense, then
something not in any universe is something that is logically
impossible. But if "not in any universe" is meant in the MWI
sense, then counterfactuals are only those outcomes consistent with
QM but which don't happen. I think it is only the latter kind of
counterfactual that need be considered in computations.
No. The counterfactuals that Bruno refers to in comp seem to come
from the "If A the B else C" construction of computer programming.
This puts no restriction on the worlds containg B and C. So it
actually has nothing whatsoever to do with MWI. As you say, the
possible alternative worlds in MWI come from the eigenfunctions of
an eigenselected basis, and those are by no means arbitrary.
Right, but UDA explains that it is just not an affair of counting or
weighting computations, it is also an affair of "living" them, or
"observing" them, or "betting on them", according to the first or
third or other points of view, which eventually are self--referential.
Then the logic of self-reference, non trivial (by Gödel, Löb, Solovay
and others) put a mathematical structure on the set of computation.
Then it is interesting that the definition of "knower' by Theatetus,
in arithmetic, and in this comp setting, gives an intuitionistic-
solipsistic anti-mechanist, and unnameable first person, obeying to
the antic soul theory in its development from Pythagorus-Parmenides-
Plato-Plotinus-Porphyry-Proclus.
Then on p sigma_1, restricting ourselves to the DU, or to the sigma_1
arithmetical reality, we got a quantum logic on those first person
(some plurals) points of view.
Yes, the FPI has nothing to do a priori with the comp global (on the
UD, or the sigma_1, FPI).
But if both are true, comp explains how and why to derive QM (and
perhaps QM+space-time-gravitation) from arithmetic. The why is that in
that (re)discovery you have the tool to separate, as far as it is
possible, the communicable/justifiable truth from the non communicable/
non justifiable one.
Bruno
Bruce
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
