On 26 May 2015, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:

On 5/26/2015 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 25 May 2015, at 22:49, meekerdb wrote:

On 5/25/2015 5:16 AM, Pierz wrote:


On Monday, May 25, 2015 at 4:58:53 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
On 5/24/2015 4:09 AM, Pierz wrote:


On Sunday, May 24, 2015 at 4:47:12 PM UTC+10, Jason wrote:


On Sun, May 24, 2015 at 12:40 AM, Pierz <[email protected]> wrote:


On Sunday, May 24, 2015 at 1:07:15 AM UTC+10, Jason wrote:


On Tue, May 19, 2015 at 12:44 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:

On 19 May 2015, at 15:53, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, May 19, 2015 at 12:06 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote:
On 19 May 2015 at 14:45, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>
> On Mon, May 18, 2015 at 9:21 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]>
> wrote:

>>
>> On 19 May 2015 at 11:02, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>> > I
<SNIP>

Bruno's theory is that consciousness and the physical world are all just relations between numbers and things like brains, computers, recordings, and lookup tables and just ways for manifesting consciousness and 2 and II are ways of manifesting the number two.

Except that consciousness is not an illusion. The physical universe is only an appearance from inside. It is phenomenological. Comp explains why our embedding in arithmetic makes us believe intuitively the contrary.

I only had to look back one post to find:

"There is no universe, if we are machine. It is only a stable and persistent illusion (assuming mechanism)."...Bruno Marchal

Stable and persistent illusion is what is generally referred to as "the world".

I prefer to call that a dream. But It is OK.



The existence of other people is only a stable and persistent illusion - yet you accept them as real.

Yes, but non fundamentally real. I don't have to assume them at the start. The physical universe(s) is real, too. But again,n I argue that comp makes it non primitive, but emerging from the dreams/computations- seen-from-inside.

Bruno



Brent

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