On 10 Jun 2015, at 20:41, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/10/2015 1:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK. For what set of quantum operators have you demonstrated non-
commutation?
For the "yes-no" operator in general. They are given and construct
from the quantization ([]<>A) in the logic Z1*. It is rather long
to describe, and you have shown no interest for the small amount of
technic needed to make sense of the material hypostases. We can
come back on this later, if you are more interested.
I'm interested.
I know that more best in the journal I publish in, more difficult it
is to get it without being in an institution, but this is explained in
most paper.
You need to understand many "representation theorem".
That computability can be represented in arithmetic by sigma_1
provability,
that sigma_1 provability represent an idea "scientist" having self-
referential abilities,
that the logic of self-reference is axiomatized (that the modal
propositional level) by *two* logic: G and G* (also know as GL and
GLS, Prl and prl-omega, K4W (for G) in the literature).
That a logic of knowledge is canonically associated, and can be
represented in G and G* (but there they coincide).
That an intuitionist logic is associated, and can be represented, by
that logic of knowledge.
That a logic of observability (in a simple direct sense provided by
the UDA, which I illustrate recently (thank to John Clark!) with the
step 3 protocol + the 2 coffees. That logic of observability is a B-
type of modal logic.
That quantum type of logic admits representation in term of B-type of
modal logic.
All the representation theorem are constructive, and all logics, and
the multimodal logic (like the 3-1 notions) are, by composition of
representations; inherit the decidability of G.
G* itself is representable, mechanical emulable, by G. making all of
the material logic decidable, but they are also untractable, when you
get many modal nesting.
G is what the machine can say about itself, about what it can say and
not say.
G* is what is true about what the machine can say and not say.
Typically, self-consistency, belongs to G* minus G, the proper
"classical theology" of the machine looking inward.
I don't believe that PA is a zombie, even if that discourse, in the
third person way, appears to be atemporal: it is itself infinity
recurrent in arithmetic.
You need only a passive, but genuine, understanding of Gödel's paper,
fundamentally. He is the one starting the interview. He missed the
reversal, because he was sceptical on mechanism. he missed the Church-
thesis too, and the *universal* beast.
Of course position and momentum are not yet derived, and it is
not clear if they will be derived.
If they are not, comp fails a crucial test....
That is not entirely obvious. It might be possible that time and
space are more geographical than physical notion, in which case,
time and space would not be derivable. Hamiltonian with gravity and
space-time structure might be contingent. Open problem. To be sure,
I have some conjecture which would entail that space and time
existence belong to the physical. I have explained this, but this
needs Temperley Lieb algebra, the braid group, and some relation
with the comp Quantum Logic.
Where have you explained it? On this list?
Yes. You might search on "temperley and/or lieb" on the archive. The
winner might be a universal subgroup of the braid group. the physicist
in me suspect some Moonshine Magic and role for finite simple group,
and the number 24 (which might intervene in dimension comp theory).
But, anyway, UDA shows first the *necessity* of all this. I am
still waiting your non-comp explanation of consciousness. Comp
explains already why there is consciousness, and why there might be
matter (in a testable way) capable of stabilizing the consciousness
flux.
If the stability of consciousness is not explained then
consciousness is not explained.
Agreed.
It's no good saying, "There must be an explanation if my theory is
right."
It depends. When you do reasoning on reasoning, this can be done in
valid, or not, way. But when you bet on some theory, if you throw out
the theory at a first problem, you might never solve that first
problem. If physicists would have abandoned Newton each time it was
contradicted, they would never have found relativity and the quantum.
Löbianity allow a sort of arithmetical valid way to beg the question,
but, here, I allude to something slightly different (yet related).
"There must be an explanation if my theory is right." can be put: let
us assume P and we see that we have that problem. But that is the
whole point: comp leads to a very interesting problem, formulable in
the arithmetical language, and look, machines like PA and ZF can
already provide unexpected incredible light on that subject.
I am the guy who say that there is a problem, and who show that with
comp, the problem is a math problem, and I show how to solve it, by
basically asking simple löbian machine. They are way less influenced
by the local authoritative prejudices.
Even if comp is wrong, it will remain that comp associates to all
Löbian number a sort of canonical neoplatonist theology, including a
clear physics.
If it is a different physics than ours, then we lived in a weirder
reality than I thought, but that's OK.
And that must be nuanced, as technically we get three physics (S4Grz1,
Z1*, X1*), and the X and Z logics are graded, for all m and n, m > n,
there are weaker X(m, n) and Z(m, n) logics (with and without the
star).
It is not my theory, also. It is an idea already exploited in the
theory of evolution. Most people who take it for a reductionism
confuse it with its pre-Gödelian conception. Church thesis is a
vaccine against reductionism of the phenomenological (including
physics). Comp is a reductionism only on the ontological (you need
only S and K, and their combinations, and application laws).
Bruno
Brent
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