On 14 November 2015 at 13:18, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 11/13/2015 5:27 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On Saturday, 14 November 2015, Brent Meeker < <[email protected]> > [email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> On 11/13/2015 2:21 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> >> On Saturday, 14 November 2015, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Here's an interesting essay by Scott that ends up with a somewhat more >>> technical explication of my idea that consciousness requires a world or >>> environment with which it interacts. >>> >>> http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1951 >>> >>> However, he doesn't notice that this also solves the problem of why we >>> don't worry about being simulated in the digits of pi and what it means to >>> be "physically instantiated". >>> >>> A lot of good comments too. >>> >> >> Clever though it seems, there is no reason to accept the theory other >> than to support the prejudice that only certain types of entities can be >> conscious. >> >> >> Only those that experience an arrow of time. That seems like more than a >> prejudice. I can't imagine what consciousness without an AoT would be. >> > > He claims that irreversibility and unpredictability are somehow important > in consciousness. But this isn't the prejudice, this is in order to justify > the prejudice. The prejudice is that the various consequences of unfettered > computationalism, such as that a consciousness can be non-destructively > copied and that we could be Boltzmann brains, are obviously false. > > > You must not have read it. He concludes that Boltzman brains cannot be > conscious. And he argues that non-destructive copying is physically > impossible; although it appears he's assuming a very accurate copy is > required. > Yes, he claims these things are impossible and that his theory precludes them. But the theory is proposed *in order that* thees things are renderrd impossible, becauise he considers them absurd. That seems to be the main motivation for the theory. Ultimately, if you allow computationalism without ad hoc restrictions, you end up with something akin to Bruno's idealism. And that seems unacceptable to many people. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
