Bruno, Brent and Dr. Cabessa(?)

The paper is a beautiful scientific work (I used to enjoy the style when
young)  and the tw reflections are commendable.
I did not bother to carefully read/follow Dr. Cabessa's paper, it is a
different world from my present mental occupation, browsed through it ad
read the 2 remrks (mainly Bruno's)  upon it.
I do not abide by stale points as: -  "let us agree about what we may call
intelligence"  -  (as in AI) which in my opinion includes the little we
think we know about it omitting the lion's share we don't.

Bruno:
*To get the "super-Turing" power, you still need non recursive patterns in
nature.*
of course from the part we think we know as part of the Entirety.
Then again I am weary in my agnosticism about math-logic (human) and the
image we crry of "Nature".
I cannot accept Bruno's RANDOM distinctions: agnostically (mine, that is)
all random-deemed remarks are based on our missing knowledge of the source.
(Remember: if there were 'random' happenings, there would be no math-based
physics, not even 'math' with it's NOT-RANDOM 2+2=4). (2+2 = R?)

The title pf the paper refers to 'neural networks' (nevermind the
adjectives) -
surely thinking about the little we think we know about such. We have a lot
of scientific effort done on the 'neural' concept without discovering one
basic feature of them: the *TOPICAL* distinction of the data evaluated
about of their functions. The complexity of our 'topically diversified'
mentality does not fit into our neuronal
psych/ologic/iatric/-physi/ologic/cal evaluation measurements or neurologic
explanations, all of mentality is a much used terra incognita. Even the
domains of the brain - assigned to certain mental functions - do not
include  topical functions (or: mixtures of different ones).

Accordingly I cannot say much about the mind-body problem, the MIND being
mentality, the body our physical exploitation of information received from
(poor) observation. MY phrase: "We THINK we know".
Mind-body came out of Descartes' genius to escape from the Inquisition - by
a SOUL substitute partnered with the BODY.

Agnostically yours
John Mikes


On Tue, Mar 1, 2016 at 2:45 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:

>
> On 01 Mar 2016, at 04:59, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Bruno, what do you think of this paper?
>
> Brent
>
>
> -------- Forwarded Message --------
>
> *The Super-Turing Computational Power of Plastic Recurrent Neural Networks*
>
> http://binds.cs.umass.edu/papers/2014_cabessa.pdf
>
>
>
> It is interesting. It might suggest an "easy" solution of the measure
> problem of Digital Mechanism.
>
> To get the "super-Turing" power, you still need non recursive patterns in
> nature. They suggest it might come from the quantum background, but
> obviously, you get it also through the "random oracle" given by the FPI
> (First Person Indeterminacy) on all computations (structured by the modal
> logics). Such random information has a measure 1 (for the same reason that
> we should bet the random "movie" in the iteration of self-multiplication on
> all screen images---if you remember  the iterated self-multiplication
> thought experience). The normal worlds would come from nature exploiting
> the (quantum, or computationalist (below the substitution level))
> randomness.
>
> Again, to solve the mind-body problem, such models of computation must be
> extracted from the measure imposed by self-reference, but such type of
> solution have some plausibility (more than many other more magical use of
> Super-Turing (which are Turing + Turing's oracle).
>
> Is it plausibly usable by humans in AI some day? I am not an expert on
> this, but I don't see why not.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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