Bruno, I don't understand your arguments fully. Specifically, I don't understand how the fact that the propositional logic of true but unprovable sentences can be structured by "modal logic G* minus G" (??) is useful to provide distinction between qualia and quanta.
When you say Godel incompleteness result is "constructive" rather than the non-constructive Chaitin "relative complexity" result, do you mean that it provides a way for some entity to precisely identify elements from the set of empirically evident emergent truths which it is unable to describe formally (e.g., with finite set of differential equations or a sequence of instructions in some universal description language)? In other words, are you saying Godel-type incompleteness is the mechanism by which some observer is able to recognize emergent complex phenomena (e.g., measurements of social/economic systems characterized by scale-free power-law distributions, generated with preferential attachment processes, and modeled by minimization of Fisher information) even though it is beyond ability of observer to describe deterministically using equations, programs, etc.? If this is what you mean, I don't understand how the Godelian result is "constructive" in this sense or why the Chaitin result is by comparison "non-constructive." How are the Chaitin-type results using inequalities of algorithmic complexities (of the observer and observed) "eventually emergent on the Gödel-Löbian sort of limitation?" This would be an argument of ontological primacy and so it should have no assumptions. When we say true but unprovable, it makes me think of relative algorithmic complexity. A "self-aware [mathematical] substructure," in Tegmark's terms, of given Kolmogorov complexity cannot recognize patterns which have greater Kolmogorov complexity than itself. When we say a truth (i.e., pattern in nature) is unprovable, this claim is relative to some particular observer and it is not an objective claim. Indeed, deep learning techniques like neuroevolution and clustering by compression enable an agent with different channels of perception from a human to be able to make *decisions* by discerning patterns it observes (intelligent decisions that will maximize entropy, future possibilities) without any need to store any explicit analytical, symbolic, or linguistic expression of the patterns themselves. Further, these may be patterns which the machine's channels of perception would enable it to symbolically represent, but perhaps which could not be symbolically expressible for a human. I am partial to Tegmark's terms when it comes to channels of perception: "frog" perspective (first person, subjective), "consensus" (first person, collective), and "bird" (third person, objective). Estimation theory probably has not received enough attention in the philosophies of mind, science, and language (at least until Frieden and Romanini quantified the semiotic philosophy of CS Pierce using Extreme Physical Information). Reviewing your paper "COMP (2013) - by Bruno Marchal", I see the following: "An argument against the comp hypothesis has to speculate on some unknown non-computable, and non-first person comp-recoverable (as explained later) function in Nature, and this has never been observed." If so, is this following recent discovery an argument against comp? Does first person indeterminacy come to the rescue in this case, as you showed it does for collapse of QM wave function? http://arxiv.org/abs/1502.04573 I have just come across and ordered your book "The Amoeba's Secret" and am looking forward to reading it. Have you seen the Youtube playlist created by Sante Fe Institute on Complexity? It raises questions in my mind about validity of COMP; I mention one example in my blog which references the following paper, where genetic algorithms are used to evolve locally interacting agents of cellular automata to coordinate and perform some global task: (paper: http://rundle.physics.ucdavis.edu/PHYGEO30/MitchellCAsandGAs.pdf , video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hdRTcrTYfiQ&index=99&list=PLF0b3ThojznRyDQlitfUTzXEXwLNNE-mI ). As I learn more about information transfer in complex systems (as in biosemiotics), I increasingly begin to question the validity of COMP or at least am unable to see how the hypothesis explains such information-theoretic descriptions of nature. EDIT: Actually, it seems quite obvious now that COMP is valid in such a case... the cellular automata rule which evolves from the genetic algorithm is the simple computation. From the perspective of any one agent in the cellular automata, however, the description of the overall system behavior is beyond symbolic expression (the system is Relatively, not Absolutely, complex because indeed the researchers were able to codify the emergent patterns using a "particle physics" framework). On Thursday, March 24, 2016 at 12:56:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 24 Mar 2016, at 05:15, Dan wrote: > > Paper discussing exact mapping between renormalization group and deep > learning: http://arxiv.org/abs/1410.3831 > > > > It seems interesting, thanks. > > > > Another paper relating Kolmogorov complexity to geometry, with focus on > spacetime / causality: http://arxiv.org/abs/1206.2893 > > > I will dig on this more when I have more time, but I am less convinced at > first sight. > > Have you read my arguments? You would better see if some ideas there could > help or not to extract physics from arithmetic through machine's > self-reference. Some caution have to be taken to get the distinction quanta > and qualia properly. > > In this list most people defend ensemble of universe or dreams type of > theories, which generalize Everett conceptually, and which maintain 3p > determinacy and 3p locality. We can exploit the fact that machine have the > means to grasp that the truth about them extends properly what they can > justify rationally, yet such truth is still very well structured, and > incompleteness forces it to obey different logics for each mode. You might > appreciate, given that you seem to appreciate Chaitin's work, which also > relies mainly on the recursion theorem in computer science. The learning > theory of Gold, Blum, Case and Smith, Osherson, Stob, Weinstein (to name a > few) is also very interesting (and non constructive like Chaitin). > The usual "Godel" result is constructive and this is what I exploit to put > some light on the "body" problem that the mechanist philosopher is > confronted too. > > Bruno > > > > > > > On Monday, March 21, 2016 at 9:12:33 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> On 17 Mar 2016, at 16:26, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: >> >> >> Wolfram would agree with this paper in some ways. >> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Re9eB_j6m-0 >> >> The main content gets very interesting, for me, at 1hr 8 minutes in, and >> 1 hr 12 minutes in to Wolfram's SETI lecture. >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Dan <[email protected]> >> To: Everything List <[email protected]> >> Sent: Wed, Mar 16, 2016 11:13 pm >> Subject: Can Space-Time Be Based on Logic and Computation? >> >> Paper: >> http://arxiv.org/abs/1602.06987 >> >> Comments: >> Lossless compression of an image or audio file approximates its >> Kolmogorov complexity and reveals its "compressibility," or >> "interestingness." If it's not at all compressible it is too random to be >> aesthetic or enjoyable, whereas too much compressibility is associated with >> oversimplicity. Many classical works have been analyzed in this way and >> show to be in the middle. Schmidhuber mentions a theory of creativity, fun, >> motivation based on compression progress. Compression progress seems to be >> essential to theory of general AI- I refer to neuroevolution techniques, >> Cilibrasi and Vitanyi's paper Clustering by Compression for inference, as >> well as Wissner-Gross's simulations showing tool-usage behavior upon >> entropy maximization. Was a paper recently giving exact mapping between >> renomalization group and deep learning. >> >> >> Do you have the reference of that paper? >> >> >> >> Paper I link to above takes idea of data compression / Kolmogorov >> complexity even beyond a relationship to statistical mechanics or deep >> learning to explain the causal appearance of spacetime itself. I want to >> understand how Extreme Physical Information fits in to all of this.. it >> provides observer dependence and derivation of so many physical and >> nonphysical laws. It also encapsulates limits of knowledge using any >> particular channel of perception. >> >> >> Of course the Gödel type of limitation (as opposed to Kolmogorov or >> Chaitin type of limitation) is independent of even the existence of a >> channel of perception (which are eventually emergent on the Gödel-Löbian >> sort of limitation). A big difference between both is that the algorithmic >> information limitation is non constructive: you get an infinity of >> undecidable sentences, but no means to individually recognize them. On the >> contrary, the Gödel-Löbian limitations is constructive, and gives the means >> to the machine to build the undecidable sentences, and perhaps to extends >> itself from them. Indeed the whole (propositional) logic of the true but >> non provable sentences is structured by the modal logic G* minus G and its >> intensional variants. This is useful to get the qualia and the general >> qualitative feature associate to consciousness. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <javascript:>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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