Thanks Scerir. Very interesting.
On 08 May 2016, at 09:58, 'scerir' via Everything List wrote:
https://arxiv.org/abs/1501.03521
'Bell on Bell's theorem: The changing face of nonlocality'
Authors: Harvey R. Brown, Christopher G. Timpson
there are several interesting points here
ch. 9 - Locality in the Everett picture
ch. 9.1 EPR and Bell correlations in the Everettian setting
Nice.
I think that what we are trying to explain to Bruce is well summed
up in their section 9.1.2 (the Everett description of the singlet
state, case of non-align polarizer).
I think Saunders and Wallace also got that point, and that is
equivalent with Tipler (plus some reasonable assumptions)
The only real problem for Everett is that he uses a form of "comp"
which now asks for a phenomenological account of the waves itself, and
the symmetries and the apparent breaking of the symmetries.
The nice surprise is that not only that approach seems to work,
(thanks to the discovery of the universal machine (computer science)
and of the Gödel-Löbian machine), but that approach makes possible to
split the logics and theories obtained (for those phenomenologies,
implied by incompleteness) and to distinguish truth and the
justifiable, truth and the observable, truth and the knowable, truth
and the sensible, etc. It is handy to get the relation right between
the quanta and the qualia.
We cannot derive the existence of a universal machine/system/language
without assuming such a universal system. But once we believe in one
of them, like when we believe in elementary arithmetic or in the
Fortran programming language, we get all the others and the many
internal phenomenologies, which are not dependent of the initial
choice we make to tlak about them.
Once you assume computationalism (under the weak form of Church thesis
+ consciousness invariance for a relatively- digital substitution)
Peano Arithmetic (+ computationalism thus) can prove the existence of
a web of dreams and of a limiting multiverse (locally stable and
sharable first person plural points of view.
Bruno
etc. etc.
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