2016-08-04 19:20 GMT+02:00 smitra <[email protected]>: > On 04-08-2016 03:05, Brent Meeker wrote: > >> On 8/3/2016 4:30 PM, smitra wrote: >> >>> On 04-08-2016 01:16, Brent Meeker wrote: >>> >>>> On 8/3/2016 4:09 PM, smitra wrote: >>>> >>>> On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Only if you wake up and find out winning the lottery was a >>>>>> mistake, >>>>>> which seems less likely than waking up a winner. Waking up as one >>>>>> of >>>>>> the many copies who didn't win is not one of the options - those >>>>>> copies are not continuations of the you who won the lottery. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I'm imagining waking up after a night of heavy drinking with >>>>> memories gradually returning. Now, you can, of course, condition >>>>> everything on the person who will find that he won the lottery. But >>>>> making that a hard part of my identity doesn't make sense to me, >>>>> otherwise you could not be the same person and forget about it, or >>>>> consider being the same person who participated in the lottery who >>>>> then went on to win it. >>>>> >>>>> Now,while this boils down to an arbitrary definition of personal >>>>> identity, we should be consistent about this; you can be the same >>>>> person as the won who had not yet won it, and you could imagine >>>>> being a person who did not win it, then you'll likely end up waking >>>>> up as a copy in another branch who did not win it. >>>>> >>>> >>>> That seems to invoke a dualism, such that there's only one real "you" >>>> who may be in different branches at different times. I'd say that if >>>> "you" wake up as a copy in another branch where "you" didn't win, it's >>>> because "you" didn't win. It's the same as saying the man who sees >>>> Moscow didn't "wake up" as the man who sees Washington. >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>> >>> We can turn this into a reverse Bruno-like problem. If your memory is >>> temporarily cleared then copies of different branches merge. >>> >> >> You mean there are branches of the world in which your memory of >> yesterday, when the lottery was drawn, is erased (and we're supposing >> there is no physics, so there is no physical evidence of yesterday?). >> Then the threads of consciousness constituting Saibal before yesterday >> AND suffering amnesia about yesterday will merge with each other, but >> NOT with the threads of Saibal that do remember yesterday. >> >> The branches will of course be different, but you without a memory of >>> having won in the branch where you did win is the same you as the you in >>> another branch were you did not win where you also have forgotten about not >>> winning. >>> >>> The question is then if it is advisable to go through this procedure if >>> you have won. >>> >> >> You're supposing there's a "procedure" for erasing memory of >> yesterday? How could there be, there's no physics? So there are some >> Saibals that forgot yesterday, and whether or not "they" won, but the >> forgetting wasn't a "procedure" because that would imply a physical >> world context in which whether on not Saibal won would be evident in >> the physical world and beyond mere "forgetting". The forgetting would >> just have to be a result of the computation. >> > > > I've written in the past about an elaborate procedure involving an AI that > resets its memory, but I now think that this is not necessary. It seems to > me that every moment we experience is a new measurement of our state that > is equivalent to forgetting everything and then just reloading all the > information. Predictions of outcomes of experiments should not depend on > making this assumption. Put differently, at any one time you could imagine > yourself as being sampled randomly from the set of all observer moments. > > This is basically ASSA... and it has all the problems ASSA has....
> Saibal > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
