On 03 Sep 2016, at 21:02, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
On Friday, September 2, 2016 at 11:52:55 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 11:27 AM, <agrayson2...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Friday, September 2, 2016 at 11:07:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 31 Aug 2016, at 20:30, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wednesday, August 31, 2016 at 11:17:22 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 30 Aug 2016, at 18:23, Alan Grayson wrote:
On Friday, June 10, 2016 at 6:10:41 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
On 11/06/2016 3:56 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 10 Jun 2016, at 03:02, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>> On 10/06/2016 1:41 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 09 Jun 2016, at 01:28, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>> In other words, FPI is just the statement that Alice and Bob
have
>>>> to look to find out which of the (+,+'), (+,-'), (-,+'), or
(-,-')
>>>> worlds they are in. I don't think that actually adds anything
>>>> significant to the discussion.
>>>
>>> That eliminates the physical spooky action at a distance which
are
>>> necessarily there in QM+collapse.
>>
>> You have yet to prove that -- assertion is not proof.
>
> By defining world by "closed for interaction", locality follows
from
> linearity.
Bruno, you specialize in these oracular pronouncements that mean
absolutely nothing.
This is just insulting, and add nothing but confusion.
Avoid ad hominem patronizing tone and focus on what you do not
understand or disagree with.
"locality follows from linearity" -- what a load of
total nonsense.
OK, I was quick there, but I provided more details in *many* other
posts. Please read most of a thread, not just a a sentence here and
there and then adding to the prejudices.
To be slightly less short, and explain, I was talking in the frame
of the non collapse formulation of QM, and I was just saying that
without any collapse, the linearity of the tensor product with the
linearity of the SWE ensure that at any time everything is local,
even computable, in the global third person picture.
Basically, "physical non locality" needs to put some amount of 3p
sense in the collapse of the wave, where in the MWI (and in
arithmetic) the indeterminacies and the non local appearances are
purely epistemic (first person or first person plural).
> There are 1p statistical interference, but Bell's inequality
violation
> is accounted without FTL, which is not the case with collapse, or
> Bohmian particules.
> I gave the proof with others, and eventually you admitted that
there
> was no real action at a distance. But with one world, those are
real
> action at a distance. So I think the point has been made.
There is no FTL mechanism in action in one world or many: Bell
non-locality obeys the no-signalling theorem. You have to get over
thinking that non-locality means FTL action.
Here's an article of interest. FWIW, I don't believe the no-
signalling theorem puts this issue
to rest. AG
In all the thread we (me and Bruce) were agreeing with this,
I haven't read every post in this thread, but from Bruce's remark
above, he apparently believes that you believe in FTL transmission
of information, and that since the no-signal theorem denies that,
your claim (or any claim of FTL transmission) is falsified.
Guess what, you were completely wrong.
I was the one who denies the FTL.
My text may have confused you. I thought you went to the MWI to deny
FTL in this one-world. That's what I meant. But Bruce seems to deny
FTL in this world, by saying the phenomenon is just a property of
the wf, and in his appeal to the no-signalling theorem; as if to
say, if you can't send information, there can't be FTL. But here
"send information" in the context of no-signalling theorem just
means you can't send a message of choice. AG
What does FPI stand for? TIA, AG
The article I posted denies that the apparent contradiction between
relativity and non locality can be resolved simply by appealing to
the non-signalling theorem, which Bruce seems to assert.
I was the one asserting that with the MWI, even the Bell's violation
does not force FTL, even without signalling possible.
My point, shared by others in the thread, was that with the MWI
restores both 3p determinacy, and 3p locality. The point of Clark
and Bruce is that even with the MWI, Bell's inequality violation
proves that nature is 3p non local, and that action at a distance
exists.
I can only go by his words. So I don't see that the article I
posted is irrelevant to the discussion. AG
It was Bruce who claims that Bell's inequality violation shows that
FTL exists, even without possible signalling.
Then why does he tell you to "get over it", it being FTL? AG
Maybe he means that FTL exists in this world, so why resort to the
MWI to deny it. But then why does he bring up the no-signalling
theorem? AG
Hope I didn't offend any true believers in the MWI,
MWI is a theory. I have often explain, as a logician, that MWI is not
an interpretation but a different theory than Copenhagen. MWI = wave-
function postulate. Copenhagen-QM = wave function postulate + collapse
postulate. Of course both have some problem of interpretation (like
all theories). I tend to not accept the notion of "physical world",
and working in arithmetic I use only the notion of computation.
Indeed, my result is that both the collapse of the wave and the wave
itself are universal number's First Person phenomenologies, when we
assume a form of Mechanist Hypothesis in cognitive science. Mechanism
makes physicalism wrong.
but in extensive discussions about this on another MB, none of the
true believers could give a coherent account of these other worlds;
for example, where the energy comes from,
Energy is a "one-world" notion, but anyway, I don't believe in worlds,
at least not until someone explains what they mean. For me, it is a
convenient fiction. With Mechanism, a world is an extrapolation made
by numbers sharing sheaves of computation verifying some measure
weight, and such measure weighting must be explained through the logic
of self-reference. You might take a look at my papers, like this one:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
Or this one, if you can access it:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2013.03.014
and whether an observer in this world is reproduced in other worlds,
and if so, with what memories. The MWI seems like a desperate
attempt to avoid non-locality and/or non-linearity of QM. AG
Well, it avois the non linearity of the collapse, and its dualism.
OK. But the "other worlds" are only a consequence of the contagion of
the superposition of the particle (say) to the observer. If you look
at a cat in the dead+alive state, you end yourself looking at a dead
cat + looking at a alive cat. The given brain states are orthogonal
and do not interact, but can still interfere statistically. This list
is for people believing that "everything" is a simpler conceptual
notion than any particular thing, and so welcome both the MWI in
quantum physics, and the "many-computations" in arithmetic, that we
get from Mechanism. I predicted the *appearance* of "many-worlds"
before knowing about quantum physics measurement problem.
About Bruce's points, maybe you should ask Bruce, as the cited post is
a bit out of the context of the thread.
You asked in another post what is the FPI.
It is an acronym for First Person Indeterminacy, and it is the
subjective indeterminacy that you get in the (classical) self-
duplication. Again, look at the paper sane04 cited above, where this
is made precise and explained. The FPI is the building brick of the
argument showing that Mechanism and Physicalism are incompatible, and
that physics is conceptually reduced to arithmetic when we assume
mechanism. I show that this leads to testable consequences, and some
are tested retrospectively with QM.
I agree that FTL (fast than light influence which not necessarily
exploitable for transmission of information) still exist, and I
agree that it is logically possible, but people believing in that
have the obligation to give evidence, and my point is that in the
MWI, Bell's violation is no more an evidence, as Bell supposes
definite outcomes in definite realties, which makes no sense in the
MWI, nor in computationalism more generally.
I tend to agree that Bell's results assume one world. AG
Good. I think some people disagree with this on this list, but I will
let them to defend their point again, or not.
Bruno
Bruno
The question was specifically about some possible remnant of
physical action at a distance in the MWI. We both know that the non
signaling does not put light on this. Genuine physical action at a
distance obviously exist in the QM-with-collapse, by Bell's
inequality violation, but Bell's argument does not show action at a
distance( in any unique branch if that exist), in the MWI.
What we have is the contagion of superposition, and they never go
quicker than interaction, that is at sub-speed of light.
And that is why we can define, or represent the "world" by set of
space-time events closed for interaction.
http://people.uleth.ca/~kent.peacock/FQXi_v2.pdf
Interesting (but out of topic indeed).
Bruno
>>> That adds nothing, indeed. That shows only that the paradoxes
came
>>> only from the axioms some have added to fit their philosophical
>>> prejudices.
>>
>> So you add axioms to suit your philosophical prejudices just as
>> others do -- how does that make your position any better than
that of
>> others?
>
> No. I subtract axioms.
>
> Bohr's axioms: SWE + COLLAPSE + number (add,mult) (+
> unintelligible theory of mind)
>
> Everett's axioms SWE + Number (add,mult). (+ mechanist
theory of
> mind)
>
> Your servitor's axioms: Number(add,mult). (+ mechanist
theory
> of mind)
>
> And I don't pretend that is true, only that digital mechanism
makes
> this necessary and testable (modulo the usual "malin génies").
All the above sets of axioms lead to non-local theories. You may
claim
just to subtract axioms, but that is as much choosing your axioms
as any
other procedure. And you have yet to show that you get the physics
of
this world out of your theory --and demonstrate the necessary
stability
of the physics. Just wishing evil genies away does not actually
banish them.
Bruce
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in
the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/SJdbZNPRALg/unsubscribe
.
To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
