On 21 Sep 2016, at 21:25, John Mikes wrote:

Bruno wrote:
"... related to the Aristotelian idea that what we experience/see/ measure is what is real. ..." I wanted to raise the 'scientific doubt' about "REAL". (An 'idea' cannot be REAL). We may accept it as a condition to work on, make 'science' out of it, but I doubt if anybody has an acceptable (workable) version of REALITY?
Your text supports my fundamental tenet(s) in more than one way.

We also do not know what to call "FACTS"? (3p??)
(Pardon my agnosticism!)


John, we *know* nothing in science. Knowledge is private.

We can share theories, that is, momentary beliefs, and momentary criteria of verification, which we will momentarily used to convene on what can be a fact.



I wanted to raise the 'idea' that human formulations about non-human ways of communbication/thinking may be anthropo-centric/morphic at best.

That attitude might be anthropocentric.

In the frame of the Mechanist hypothesis, it is more general to talk about Löbian and non Löbian entities although there are many other distinctions, like the finite creatures and the infinite one.





An animal thinks differently from a human,

Are not human animal?
And how do you know that?
and what could it mean?
A british thinks differently from a french.



a plant develops response-like reply movements (incl. growth) a microbe does - I wish I knew what. Even a rock undergoes 'giving-in' to forces what we could list as a 'reply'.

... leading to the idea that observation is handled by interaction at some level. No problem with this.




We 'know' pretty little about the Entirety and build out of that fraction our entire world as an 'experienced fact-based reality;.

Yes, that what all universal numbers eventually do, and on the terrestrial plane, they can only scratch the (arithmetical) reality, even just concerning the 3p, ... and the about the 1p it is worst, as it is not describable in any 3p terms.





I think we agreed on such ideas many times.

We do. I think.

That is why I am not sure why you seem to dislike the idea that all (Löbian) universal universal might agree on this too :) (Individually, their souls might all disagree, even constructively as they can refute all normative theories built from choice of level).

(once they have enough believability potential, like Peano Arithmetic or Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory to be exact).

It is true that *some* (pseudo) scientists talk like if we knew something, if not everything, or like if we would have solved all problems. My take, is that science has not yet even begun. Or perhaps, in Occident, it has begun (-500), stopped (+500) and not yet quite restarted.

Best,

Bruno




On Wed, Sep 21, 2016 at 9:56 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
Hello John,


On 20 Sep 2016, at 21:02, John Mikes wrote:

Dear Bruno,
we are still in the anthropocentric/anthropomorphic failure to equate EVERYTHING with our humanbased experience.


I am not sure, although what you say might be related to the Aristotelian idea that what we experience/see/measure is what is real. But the history of science shows that very often big progress comes when people guess that there is something behind what we see and behind the human based experience we live, and which is indeed plausibly only a symptom of what we do not know.

Mathematics, as a science, is (slowly) born from the doubt with respect to Aristotle theology. Then, when it worlks, we tend to forget the origin, or to dismiss it for some reason (usually related to power).

Recently I have discovered that even the modern mathematical logic is born from theological problems, notably how to get rigorous in that field. Again, once the science is born, there has been professionalization pressures to dismiss the original problems and motivations.



Organisms without brain-tissue do not exercise brain-functions as we THINK they do occur in our 'head' (guts?)

In which theory? With mechanism, all entities think in basically the same way. And all entities which introspect eneough know that even the head and the neurons are "in our head" (note the pun). I mean that neuron are good local approximations of something, but is not the "real" thing.



and do not develop similar thoughts to us - the ways we try to understand our own thinking through neurons(?).


That is why we submit theories and abandon them when they do not work. And if they work, no serious/honest scientists will ever claim that they are true.

We can't decide to not build theories under the pretext they are biased by our neurons and experiences. It is only by making our theories precise enough to be REFUTED that we can learn and discover that we are missing something.

We never known the 3p truth as such, but can only learn by building theories and confronting them with facts and other theories.

Bruno








On Sun, Sep 18, 2016 at 11:19 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 16 Sep 2016, at 23:11, Jason Resch wrote:

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3792036/Do-trees-brains.html


It is my feeling too, and there are many evidences for some form of thought, and I read (where?) that even at the molecular level, there are some biochemical similarity with animal's neuron at the extremity of some roots.

Now it is hard to conclude anything at this stage, but the idea is cute, and, as I said sometimes, it is less ethically grave to attribute consciousness wrongly than to dismiss consciousness wrongly.

A tree, to another tree: ---- do you think animals can think?
--- What? No! they are  too much agitated for that!


Bruno


Jason

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