On 19 Apr 2017, at 19:09, David Nyman wrote:

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On 19 April 2017 at 16:48, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: On 19 Apr 2017, at 12:56, David Nyman wrote:On 19 April 2017 at 08:24, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:John has never write one clear post refuting the step-3 which wouldmake it possible to answer by one post. There is no need for this,as the answer is in the publications, which makes clear the 1-3distinction, so the ambiguity that John dreams for cannot occur.I've often wondered whether Hoyle's heuristic could be a way ofshort-cutting this dispute. Hoyle gives us a way to think aboutevery subjective moment as if it occurred within the 1-view of acommon agent. Essentially the heuristic invites us to think of allsubjective experiences, aka observer moments, as a single logicalserialisation in which relative spatial and temporal orientation isinternal to each moment. In comp terms this conceptual agent mightperhaps be the virgin (unprogrammed) machine, on the basis that allsuch machines are effectively computationally equivalent.Exactly. With comp you have to fix one universal base to name allthe other number/program/machine, and their relative statesrelatively to the universal numbers which implements them. Theuniversal numbers are what define the relative computations. Acomputation is only a sequence of elementary local deformation, andonce a universal sequence of phi_i is given, they are parametrisedby four numbers some u, and its own sequence of phi_u(i,j)^s =phi_i(j)^s (the sth step of the computation by u of the program i onthe input j).But Hoyle heuristic does not seem to solve the "prediction" problem,for each 1p-views there is an infinity of universal competinguniversal numbers (and thus computations) below the substitutionlevel (and worst: it is impossible for the 1p to know itssubstitution level).Sure, but I believe the idea is that after the metaphorical"selection" (i.e. not a real process - more below) of any given 1-view, the "agent" finds itself immediately 1-relativised to aparticular psychological history. Hence ISTM that, from each 1-view,relative predictions would be the same as in the usual compsituation. Of course, there is always the issue of differentialmeasure over the entire class of 1-views. Hoyle's heuristic imposesa quasi-frequency interpretation of probability for any finitesegment of the serialisation and, in terms of histories, we doindeed find ourselves (at least psychologically) bounded within somequasi-finite segment. So I imagine Hoyle would want us to think interms of the "most probable" continuations being selected morefrequently, whether these are considered absolutely pre-selection,or relatively post. Of course the agent is bound to "encounter" 1-views of lower probability, but then this is ultimately a matter tobe resolved in the struggle between consistent remembering (hardlyever) and inconsistent forgetting (almost always). One could saythat the former are perhaps analogous to the in-phase, least-actionpart of Feynman's path integral approach and the latter with the out-of-phase part.

`That looks nice. So now, I ask to you, and to everybody a question,`

`which is important, and still open although I do have some opinion/hint.`

`You are in Helsinki, and you are scanned and annihilate as usual, and`

`(3p)-duplicate in three exemplars: one is reconstituted in W and two`

`in Moscow. You are told before, in Helsinki, that in Moscow, the two`

`exemplaries are in the exact same state and environment, and that this`

`will last forever (they will never 1p differentiate). The question is`

`asked when you are still in Helsinki. What is P(W) and P(M) ?`

`Then, I ask the same question, but in Helsinki we are told that some`

`differentiation will occur between the two copies in Moscow, at some`

`later time.`

Bruno

Anyway, in this way of thinking, after my 3-duplication there areof course two 3-copies; so in the 3-view it can make perfect senseto say that each copy is me (i.e. one of my continuations). Hencemy expectation in that same 3-sense is that I will be present inboth locations. However, again in terms of the heuristic, it isequally the case that each 1-view is occupied serially andexclusively by the single agent: i.e. *at one time and in oneplace*. Hence in that sense only a single 1-view can possiblyrepresent me *at that one time and that one place*. Hoyle shows ushow all the copies can indeed come to occupy each of their relativespatio-temporal locations in the logical serialisation, but alsothat *these cannot occur simultaneously*.I think it is the indexical view, that Saunders attributes to Everett.Well, it's clear from the narrative of the novel that Hoyle meantthe 1-view.It is also implicit in Galileo and Einstein relativity theory. Withthe discovery of the universal number in arithmetic, and theirexecutions and interaction are described by elementary reasoning,although tedious like I have try to give you a gist lately :)The crucial point to bear in mind is that according to Hoyle, bothof these understandings are equally true and *do not contradicteach other*.Mechanism would be inconsistent. But even arithmetic and computerscience would be inconsistent. It would be like the discovery of aprogram capable to predict in advance the specific answer to whereits backup will be upload in a cut and double paste operation.In "real life" that is made precise and simple, I think, by thetemporary definition of the first person by the owner of thepersonal diary, which enter the teleportation box.In the math, that will be be featured by the difference between"[]p", and "[]p & p", with other nuances. They do not contradicteach other, as G* proves them equivalent on arithmetic, but theyobey quite different logic. A logic of communicable beliefs aboutoneself, and a logic of informal non communicable personal intuition/knowledge, here limited to the rational. "[]p & p" cannot becaptured by one box definable in arithmetic, we can only meta-defineit on simpler machine than us that we trust. here you have tointrospect yourself if you agree or not with the usual axioms I havegiven (which is really the question, did you take your kids backfrom school when a teacher dares to tell them that 2+2=4.Furthermore, comp or no comp, they are surely consistent withanything we would reasonably expect to experience: namely, thatwhenever sufficiently accurate copies of our bodies could be made,using whatever method, our expectation would nevertheless be tofind ourselves occupying a single 1-view, representing asubjectively exclusive spatio-temporal location. Indeed it is thatvery 1-view which effectively defines the relative boundaries ofany given time and place. Subjective experiences are temporally andspatially bounded by definition; it is therefore inescapable thatthey are mutually exclusive in the 1-view.Assuredly.So what Hoyle's method achieves here is a clear and importantdistinction between the notion of 3-synchronisation (i.e. temporalco-location with respect to a publicly available clock) and that of1-simultaneity (i.e. the co-occurrence of two spatio-temporallydistinct perspectives within a single, momentary 1-view). Whereasthe former is commonplace and hence to be expected, the latter isentirely inconsistent with normal experience and hence should not be.But did Hoyle accepted the pure indexical view?Yes, that he meant the 1-view is quite clear from the narrative ofOctober the First. Did he not attempt to make a selection with some flash of light?But remember it's only meant to be a metaphor. So the flash oflight (or the guy wandering among the pigeon holes) in effect playsthe role of stepping through the computational continuations, whenconsidered relative to any point of origin within a history.Otherwise the metaphor would have been static.It is tempting to select a computation among the infinities, likewhen adding hidden variables and special initial condition in QM, orlike when invoking irrationality like Roland Omnès still in QM(sic), or, no less irrational, like invoking God in QM again (likeBelinfante), or like invoking Primary Matter in Arithmetic (like,I'm afraid many of us do unconsciously, by a sort of innateextrapolation, which has its role in helping us to not confuse theprey and the predator.With computationalism, what is important is to understand that thisleads to a difficult mathematical problem, basically: finding ameasure on the (true) sigma_1 sentences. This is made possible onlyif we get the right logic on the intensional variants of provabilityimposed by incompleteness.I should explain better this: there are three incompleteness theorems:1) PA (and its consistent extensions) is (are) undecidable (there isa true arithmetical proposition not provable by PA, which is assumedconsistent).2) If PA is consistent, then PA cannot prove its consistency.3) (which is the major thing) PA proves 2 above. That if: PA proves(~beweisbar('f') -> ~beweisbar('~beweisbar('f')').Many people ignores that Gödel discovered (without proving it) thatPA already knew (in the theaetetus sense) Gödel's theorem. That willbe proven in all details by Hilbert and Bernays, and embellished bythe crazy Löb contribution. More on this more later. My schedulingtight up exponentially up to June I'm afraid.By the way, I shall be on holiday in Sicily from April 20th untilMay 12th (one of me only, I trust) so I probably won't be appearingmuch in the list during that period.Meanwhile I think about the intermediate level, but it is difficult,if not perilous, to give an informal account of the formal andinformal differences between the formal and informal, and thiswithout going through a minimum of formality, ... well don't mindtoo much.May be you can meditate on the Plotinus - arithmetic lexicon,keeping in mind we talk about a simple machine we trust to bearithmetically correct, the machine will be able to "live" thedifference betweentruth (the One, p) rationally justifiable (the man (G), the Noùs (G*) []pknowable (the universal soul, the first person, S4Grz) []p & p(Theaetetus)==== Observable (Intelligible matter, Z1*) []p & <>tFeelable (Sensible matter, X1*) []p & <>t & p. (Plotinus might bea good intermediate level, somehow, Smullyan too perhaps)Just one truth, but viewed according to many different type of views(the hypostases above), and different "observer moment" defined bythe many universal numbers in arithmetic (the box are parametrizedby the four numbers above, in a first simple description).I will dream on this. Take it easy. Happy holiday! I'll do my best! David BrunoDavid --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

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